[sacw] sacw dispatch (17 Jan 00) Pakistan Stories

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Web Dispatch [Pakistan Stories]
17 January 2000
___________________
#1. PAKISTAN: Junta may remove velvet glove
#2. Dissecting Support For Military Rule In Pakistan
#3. A Tragic Leap Backwards
#4. What's new, Charlie Brown?
___________________

#1.

South China Morning Post
Monday, January 17, 2000
SOUTH ASIA TODAY

PAKISTAN: JUNTA MAY REMOVE VELVET GLOVE

by Zahid Hussain in Karachi

Three months after seizing power, the military is finding it hard to
maintain a benign image and analysts fear the generals will crack down as
opposition grows.

As the euphoria that greeted the coup subsides, new ruler General Pervez
Musharraf faces continuing calls at home and abroad for the restoration of
democracy.

Senior US State Department official Karl Inderfurth will visit Pakistan on
Thursday - the third high-level US visit in a week.

The assistant secretary of state for South Asia will meet General
Musharraf and push for a timetable for the restoration of democracy, a US
embassy official in Islamabad said yesterday

His visit follows one by a group led by Senate Democratic leader Tom
Daschle, which ended on Saturday, and another ending today by Senator Sam
Brownback, chairman of the Senate sub-committee on the Near East and South
Asia.

Despite pledges after the overthrow of prime minister Nawaz Sharif,
Pakistanis are still waiting for change.

Some analysts believe the military rulers have over-extended themselves
and run the risk of getting bogged down in a political and economic morass.

General Musharraf has pledged to keep the military out of the
administration and confine it to a watchdog role. But it will be difficult
for it to remain on the sidelines.

There is a clear indication corps commanders are calling the shots in the
provinces and more than 190 senior army officers have been inducted into
the joint civil and military monitoring teams.

What has made the situation more confusing is there is no law giving the
new Government legitimacy.

The constitution has been suspended but there is no martial law. The
present arrangement is based on a provisional order by the army chief and
its legality is open to challenge.

Analysts agree the present mix of a civil and military rule is unworkable.
They say it cannot continue for long and observers believe the Government
will soon have to discard disguised military rule.

However, any attempt to impose martial law and suppress fundamental rights
could be disastrous.

The move would not go down well with the international community, which
has so far reacted mildly to the coup.

There is also increasing pressure for a time frame on the restoration of
democracy.

The trial of Sharif on a string of criminal charges, ranging from
hijacking to conspiring to kill the new military leader to treason, present
a challenge to the Government.

The charges carry the death penalty, and Sharif's trial has already evoked
strong international reaction.

Military leaders have promised a fair trial, but the ousted government's
supporters are sceptical.

The Government received a serious setback last week when a judge in the
anti-terrorism court refused to sit at the trial, protesting against the
heavy presence of intelligence officials.

If justice is not seen to be done, this could create a storm, particularly
in Sharif's home province of Punjab. Opposition to the regime may not be
strong at this stage, but it could grow.

General Musharraf's liberal and moderate personality comes as a marked
contrast to the fervent Islamic stance of the previous military dictator,
General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq.

He is much more in the mould of Field Marshall Ayub Khan, a secular leader
who ruled Pakistan from 1958 to 1969.

But the ideological nature of the military is not the same as it was in
the 1960s and 1970s where General Zia's 11 years in power saw a significant
rise of Islamic radicalism among officers.

Pakistan's military is still hierarchical and any attempt by a lower-rank
officer for promotion stands little chance of success.

But the prevailing environment, marked by an increasing polarisation in
society, could spill over to the military. Besides, Pakistan's involvement
in Afghanistan and Kashmir has led to a significant rise in Islamic
militancy.

All these factors have contributed to the rise of radical Islamic
nationalism in the Pakistan army, particularly in the lower ranks.

The present military leadership appears liberal and pragmatic. But this is
not necessarily the case among most officers.

The leadership faces a dilemma. A liberal stance is necessary to win
support from an international community wary of the growing Islamic
militancy in the region, but this would probably anger extremist and
conservative elements.

The military appears united but the leadership could encounter serious
problems from any changes.
____________

#2.
The News on Sunday
16 January 2000
Political Economy

INDIVIDUALS, INSTITUTIONS AND OPPORTUNISM: DISSECTING SUPPORT FOR MILITARY
RULE IN PAKISTAN:
Of the people, for the people, by the people=8A. (Representative rule, not
martial diktat, remains the only viable option for the Republic)

(Political resolution, on the other hand, requires institutions which
negotiate increasingly diverse interests and passions-along class, regional
and other sectoral lines--in a country's social structure. The umbrella
institution under which further institutionalisation can take place is
elected, representative government. The weight of history also demonstrates
that there is no alternative to representative rule if diverse and complex
societies--such as Pakistan--are to be at peace with themselves and
prosper=8A. Political Economy continues to search for answers)

by Dr Asad Sayeed

=46or Pakistanis, the millennium coup of October 12 is not altogether
surprising. Pakistan has been ruled by the military for most of its
tortuous history. What is more surprising is the across the board support
for martial rule in this day and age. Support from common folk-largely the
poor and the powerless-is either indifference or a minimal expectation of
stability and some relief from the ever-deteriorating conditions of the day
to day grind.

While a great deal of further understanding is needed to understand the
popular indifference with representative rule, support for military rule
among the liberals--for want of a better word--and the intelligentsia is
the real shocker. Many, who in the past, went to jail opposing martial rule
are now bending over backwards to collaborate with the khakis this time.
=46or the miniscule minority of those (including this writer) who are in
opposition to this non-elected regime, it is important to begin
understanding this phenomenon rather than merely lament this fact.

There are three broad categories in which supporters for this regime fall.
A mixture of cynicism, opportunism and a misreading of the country's
history and sociology appear to be the implicit rationales for this support
described below.

The first category of supporters are those who do not necessarily have any
regard for, or much expectation from, the General and his coterie. Their
support is based on their intense-rather pathological-contempt for the
person of Mian Nawaz Sharif and his colleagues. This contempt might broaden
to the entire culture and style of the ousted Muslim League government. For
this lot, it is not important as to who replaces Nawaz Sharif and the
Muslim League. They derive perverse pleasure in seeing the backs of Sharif
& co and to see them publicly humiliated. In short their support for
marital rule is de facto. Such bughze-muawiya is beyond rational debate and
discussion, for pathological problems can only be medically treated, if at
all.

The second category of supporters are those whose support for the
'millennium coup' is based on the apparent sincerity and decency in the
person of General Parvez Musharraf.

Within this category, there are two different support bases. One is the
more simplistic reading of the situation where a sincere and decent
individual at the helm is all that is required to confront the myriad
problems that afflict state and society in Pakistan. The other category is
of the liberals. They consider this coup to be the harbinger of a new
secular and liberal socio-political environment in Pakistan. This hope is
based on one paragraph in General Musharraf's speech on 17 October where he
called for religious tolerance, his now famous posing with the Pekinese
dogs and the virtual absence of religious crusaders amongst his
appointments.

Such views are typical of the kings and queens reading of history. In this
particular epistemology-which is ingrained in our culture-historical epochs
are abstracted from the more complex interplay of material conditions,
ideas and individuals. Only heroes and villains are seen as the makers of
history. Musharraf is considered sincere and committed and, therefore, able
to deliver--where as the failure of the Sharifs, the Bhuttos and the Zias
is consigned to their insincerity, callousness and fanaticism.

Leaders--be they civilian or military--are constrained to operate within
certain structural parameters that they inherit. Regardless of the personal
views and habits of the coup maker, he has attained the commanding heights
of power only because he represents an institution-the armed forces. It has
been stated by the General himself that the initial impulse for the coup
was to preserve the institutional integrity of the armed forces. Then why
should it let go of its institutional hegemony over the political economy
of the country? A number of commentators have argued earlier that the
institution of the armed forces is part of the problem of much that is
wrong with Pakistan. It is this very institution which has encouraged and
in many cases fostered and nurtured forces of violence, reaction and
discrimination in society. To expect the head honcho of such an institution
to disturb this delicate balance within his own constituency is--to say the
least--a flight of fancy.

Writings and speeches emanating from this category of supporters are
already underlined by murmurings of disappointment. The lack lustre
economic package and the increase in oil prices is one indication that the
nice guy playing to the same old tunes and is not in the business of
delivering substantive change. The liberals are also disappointed that
there has not been any categorical move on the part of the state to alter
its allegiance with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and all the
discriminatory legislations and attitudes of the state continue unabated.

The third category is of the opportunists. It is this class which can see
its own interests only prosper in an environment of non-representative
rule, be it care-taker or military governments. They prefer selection to
election because that is the only way that they can enter the corridors of
power. Only a visual image of the NSC, the federal and provincial cabinets
as well as the various think tanks provides a vivid illustration of this
phenomenon. Men in dark suits--most of them scions of the old
elite--dominate this government. This configuration is in stark contrast to
the maajha saajhas seen in the times of representative governments, or for
that matter, even during the Zia ul Haq dictatorship.

There are again two groupings within this category. One is simply the elite
of the 1950s and 1960s. They aspire for a return to that golden age when
they were economically and culturally dominant in society. With a small and
pliant middle class, they could keep everyone in their place. Not only has
their economic hegemony eroded over the years but the swelling of the
middle class has unleashed a more popular-at times reactionary
culture-which they despise. In their consideration, they can help the
General to return that golden age to Pakistan.

The other category of opportunists is more interesting. These are the
so-called representatives of 'civil society' in Pakistan. While there is a
certain over-lap between them and the old elite as some of the latter are
also scions of the old elite-they are different from them to the extent
that their motivations and interests are couched in the largely post-modern
NGO view of the world. Some of them have joined the government and others
are providing all sorts of unsolicited advice in the expectation of a call
>from Rawalpindi.

This preference for non-elected rule by representatives of civil society
comes on the back of long-nurtured political ambitions on their part. Some
of them fought elections in the past-only to lose their deposits-while
others never tried their hand at electoral politics, ostensibly because of
lack of resources, but more realistically because they could not develop a
popular support base for themselves. To carry their political
ambitions-rather fantasies-forward they appropriated the cloak of NGOs.
These NGOs allowed them to hover around the corridors of power albeit at
the margins-through their 'partnership' with donor agencies. This
relationship-apart from making them very rich-required them to couch their
political ambitions in the seductive new jargoon of good governance,
decentralisation, participation, gender sensitivity etc. The only problem
was that this baggage also included exhortations to democratic and
representative government. For the past many years, these NGO leaders thus
appeared to be the champions of democratic rule.

Their demeanor also portrayed a politics of bottom-up change which invited
ordinary people. However, the moment an opportunity for top-down, backdoor
intrusion into the power corridors was offered to them, they jumped on the
band-wagon. Perhaps the only silver lining of this process has been that a
part of the so called civil-society leadership stands to be discredited--at
least so far as its democratic credentials are concerned.

To whatever degree there is genuine belief amongst the individualists and
opportunists that they can bring about about meaningful change in Pakistan
is belied by a close look at the dynamics of Pakistan's political economy.
As in all complex societies, in Pakistan also contentious issues require
political resolution rather than simply better management by martial diktat.

Political resolution, on the other hand, requires institutions which
negotiate increasingly diverse interests and passions-along class, regional
and other sectoral lines--in a country's social structure. The umbrella
institution under which further institutionalisation can take place is
elected, representative government. The weight of history also demonstrates
that there is no alternative to representative rule if diverse and complex
societies--such as Pakistan--are to be at peace with themselves and prosper.

Granted that this umbrella institution in Pakistan was weak, ineffective
and propone to capture in our last tryst with democracy. But, rather than
building up on this base, the October coup has derailed this process. No
matter what the military government accomplishes--though not much is
expected of it--it has stalled the process of sustainable and enduring
institutionalisation of conflict resolution in Pakistan.

___________

#3.
The News on Sunday
16 January 2000
Political Economy

A TRAGIC LEAP BACKWARDS: RETHINKING THE IMPERATIVE OF DEMOCRACY
=46ederalism under the military junta-Is it not a blatant contradiction in t=
erms?

(A military set up is by definition a centralized one. For a military junta
to profess to promote federalism is, thus, a contradiction in terms. This
is all the more so in Pakistan's case, where the armed forces are not
representatively composed. If evidence to this effect is at all necessary,
it emerges from the fact that General Musharraf could not find any Sindhi
of requisite rank from the army to appoint as governor of Sindh and could
not find any Balochi of requisite rank from any branch of the armed forces
to appoint as governor of Balochistan. This fact alone should underscore
the absolute imperative and urgency for the immediate restoration of
constitutional rule for the sake of national unity and integrity, if not
for democracy itself. The world has just crossed over to the new
millennium. Pakistan has stepped backwards. What a tragedy! )

by Kaiser Bengali

General Pervez Musharraf's military junta is now approaching its fourth
month in power. The initial euphoria of a change for the better has all but
evaporated. Perhaps it is time to put the question, particularly to the
apparently well-meaning but abjectly naive English-medium schooled
self-styled civil society stalwarts, whether the hopes and expectations
were justified in the first place.

No doubt, General Musharraf comes across as a man who is sincere in his
pronouncements and determined to clean up the mess and launch the country
on the path of economic progress and democratic development.

To date, there is no reason to doubt or question his commitment.
Unfortunately, however, the affairs of nations are run by systems and not
by individuals. And the system General Musharraf is presiding over today is
no different from what it has been from August 14: 1947 to October 11:
1999. In fact, one constant during Pakistan's half century long history is
the rise of the role of the military in politics during the first decade
and its supremacy thereafter; particularly, since the last quarter century.

The military has had a monopoly of decision making in matters relating to
foreign policy and defence, which has preempted resource allocation
decisions for even civilian governments. Thus, if responsibility is to be
assigned for the colossal mess that has been created, it will have to be
apportioned among generals, bureaucrats, and politicians in that order.

General Musharraf's sermon, during his first major address to the nation,
about the sorry state of the nation rings familiar bells. Similar words
were spelt out equally indignantly by Generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and
Zia ul Haq in their first addresses after their respective take overs.
Public memory may be short, but the scars left behind by the military
regimes are permanent reminders of their follies and failures and the heavy
price the country and the people have paid for them.

Each of the above dictators began by bemoaning the low point the country
had been reduced to, but brought it down even lower by the time they left.
Can it be forgotten that it was the military government of General Ayub
Khan which alienated erstwhile East Pakistan and that it was the military
junta of General Yahya Khan which finally lost it, caused the Pakistan army
to surrender, and rendered nearly one lakh Pakistani soldiers prisoners of
war. And can it be forgotten that it was the military junta of General Zia
ul Haq which systematically destroyed every civil and democratic
institution, including the judiciary, and left the country with a gigantic
fiscal crisis, proliferation of arms and drugs, and ethnic and sectarian
hatred and violence.

Ironically, every time the military has been in power, Pakistan's borders
have shrunk. General Ayub Khan ceded territory in the Rann of Kutch,
General Yahya Khan surrendered East Pakistan, and General Zia ul Haq lost
Siachin. As such, no General-howsoever well meaning-has the right to
lecture the people or the politicians on the sins of governance.

Admittedly, the decade of democracy since 1988 has not been satisfactory.
It has been marked by economic mismanagement, corruption, and political
adventurism. All the blame cannot, however, be laid at the doorstep of the
politicians. To begin with, the ISI intervened to abort a PPP victory by
cobbling together the IJI and financing its election campaign.

When the effort failed and the PPP assumed power, the ISI continued to
destabilize the PPP government by financing Nawaz Sharif's attempts to
purchase PPP legislators. That Benazir Bhutto opted to stoop to Nawaz
Sharif 's market place of political bargains is unfortunate. Nevertheless,
it is clear that without the ISI's dirty tricks campaigns, the political
process would never have been sullied to the extent that it did. Finally,
Nawaz Sharif's two thirds majority in the 1997 elections was also not
without a considerable degree of machinations by the military dominated
"establishment" and its agencies. Thus, if their blue eyed boy began to
swing out of orbit, the military has to accept the bulk of the
responsibility.

Nawaz Sharif is indeed responsible for triggering the events of October 12.
However, the suspension of the Constitution and the Parliament constitutes
disproportionate and excessive response. After all, the entire country
cannot be punished for the alleged sins of a few. The suspension of the
constitutional order and the establishment of a "government" of sorts
raises fundamental questions of law and political morality; particularly
for the civil society stalwarts who have so wholeheartedly endorsed the
military junta and even joined its ranks.

In a sense, the previous military takeovers were better than the present
one. In each case, civil law was abrogated or suspended and replaced by
military law. There was at least a legal cover, howsoever unacceptable, to
govern the country. In the present case, civil law has been suspended and
replaced with no other law. A government is always established by law.
Strictly speaking, therefore, there is no government and the country is
being governed on the basis of the Chief Executive's orders, whatever they
may be!

The military junta has been supported on various counts. There are those
who do not believe in democracy and elected governments. But there are also
those who profess to believe in democracy and representative governments,
but are not averse to collaborating with military dictatorships. In the
present circumstances, they can be seen to be extending 'support by
default'. They cite Nawaz Sharif's multi-faceted failures-and that of
Benazir Bhutto's earlier-and draw the facetious conclusion that there is no
choice but to support the current arrangement.

However, a distinction needs to be made between basic principles and
transient circumstances. Back in 1958, Justice Munir faced a similar
choice. He could have pronounced his judgement in favour of basic
principles and invalidated General Ayub Khan's Martial Law or allowed the
circumstances-political instability and corruption-to cloud his judgement.
Had he opted for the former, Pakistan's history would have been different.

He opted for the latter and stands condemned by history. Worse still, the
instability and corruption which he cited as grounds for condoning
constitutional deviation increased manifold and is haunting us even today.

Accepting governing arrangements outside the bounds of the law has serious
ramifications. Assume a drug smuggler descending on Islamabad with his
armed band, taking control of the Presidency, Parliament Houses, the
Secretariat and the television station. Imagine him broadcasting to the
nation that he has taken control because the sitting government had failed
to address the problem of balance of payments, indebted the country
externally, and forfeited its economic sovereignty.

He further claims that he possesses the resources to pay off the 30 billion
dollar plus foreign debt and free the country from western strangulation!
The validity of such a government would not be any law, but a band of
gun-toting smugglers-a la General Musharraf's gun-toting soldiers. Would
such a "government" be acceptable to us? Would there be members of society
who will see "special" circumstances and extend support? Are there any
higher moral principles which we would consider inviolable under any
circumstances?

General Musharraf has also laid out a 7-point agenda. True to form,
sycophants are out in profusion croaking their support. In reality, the
agenda is bereft of any substance and can be dismissed as the proverbially
old wine in new bottle. Let us take accountability. The first
accountability scene was enacted by the first military dictator, General
Ayub Khan.

He issued an order called the Electoral Bodies Disqualification Order
(EBDO) and disqualified a host of "corrupt" politicians from holding public
office for a number of years. They were then known to have been "ebdo-ed".
Ironically, the scale of corruption increased to notorious levels in the
post-EBDO era and General Ayub Khan was booted out by the people.

General Yahya Khan dismissed 303 senior civil servants on charges of
corruption and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto dismissed 1300 civil servants on similar
grounds. General Zia ul Haq embarked on a convenient crusade of
'accountability before elections'. Ironically again, General Zia ul Haq
institutionalized corruption more than anyone else and used it shamelessly
as a policy tool.

He initiated the use of the banking system to distribute loans liberally to
neutralize opposition and buy support; the implicit understanding, of
course, being that they were not to be repaid. He also introduced the
infamous MNA/MPA/Senator funds for so-called development schemes as a ploy
to corrupt parliamentarians. Nawaz Sharif too toyed with accountability
through his Ehtesab Bureau and had Benazir Bhutto convicted, but is now
himself facing serious charges of corruption. Are there grounds for
optimism that the game will not go on?

The commitment to devolution of power has also been demonstrated by all
military rulers. General Ayub Khan established the Basic Democracies
system, which exited along with him. General Zia ul Haq also ensured that
elected local governments were in place during most of his stint in power.

It appears that dictatorships need to allow local level political activity
to cause public pressures to be let off. Also, it is a message that the
people should confine themselves to the business of maintaining their
sewerage systems and the like, while the business of governance should be
left to generals, bureaucrats, technocrats, and now NGO-crats. This is
evident from the fact that no government, including that of Generals Ayub
Khan and Zia ul Haq, has effectively devolved power by granting local
governments political, administrative and fiscal autonomy; freeing them
>from the control of the deputy commissioner and enabling them to control
land and other resources. What the present junta does remains to be seen.

One new element in the 7-point agenda relates to "strengthening the
=46ederation". There is no doubt that Nawaz Sharif had strained federal
relations by Lahorizing almost every organ of government. General
Musharraf's recognition of discontent in the smaller provinces and his
commitment to ensure equity in appointments is, thus, welcome. However, the
federal question is not one of appointments but of provincial rights.
Ironically, these rights can only be exercised in a democratic
dispensation.

A military set up is by definition a centralized one. For a military junta
to profess to promote federalism is, thus, a contradiction in terms. This
is all the more so in Pakistan's case, where the armed forces are not
representatively composed. If evidence to this effect is at all necessary,
it emerges from the fact that General Musharraf could not find any Sindhi
of requisite rank from the army to appoint as governor of Sindh and could
not find any Balochi of requisite rank from any branch of the armed forces
to appoint as governor of Balochistan.

This fact alone should underscore the absolute imperative and urgency for
the immediate restoration of constitutional rule for the sake of national
unity and integrity, if not for democracy itself. The world has just
crossed over to the new millennium. Pakistan has stepped backwards. What a
tragedy!
__________

#4.
DAWN
15 January 2000 Saturday
Mazdak

WHAT'S NEW, CHARLIE BROWN?

By Irfan Husain

ACCORDING to one old proverb, "Children and fools speak the truth";
according to another, "Children and fools have merry lives."

The children in the 'Peanuts' comic strip do both, but they are also
subject to melancholy, disappointment and despair. In short, they reflect
the human condition with its wide emotional spectrum. Day after day, these
cartoon characters entertained and instructed millions of readers as the
syndicated strip was published in 2,600 newspapers around the world. The
recent retirement of Charles Schultz, the creator of 'Peanuts' fifty years
after he launched his lovable characters, will leave a big gap.

Charlie Brown, the hapless Everyman, is constantly at the receiving end of
stinging barbs and snubs from the acid-tongued Lucy. In one memorable
series, she balances an (American) football on the ground and invites
Charlie Brown to kick it, only to pull it away at the last moment. Time
after time, Charlie Brown charges up to the ball, only to be deceived and
land hard on his backside. Linus, Charlie Brown's friend, asks him why he
falls for the same trick every time. "Well", replies the victim. "I keep
hoping that one day Lucy will keep her word."

Like Charlie Brown, the Pakistani nation keeps hoping that the army will
keep its word and like the cartoon character, we keep falling on our
collective backside. The messiah of the day repeats the same mantra his
illustrious predecessors intoned earlier, and we duly applaud yet another
unconstitutional intervention. It is only when the nation's rear end comes
into contact with reality that we realize we have been tricked yet again.
To be fair, the generals do not mean to fool us: they are as convinced as
the rest of us that they can deliver. But as time goes on and things remain
the same or get worse, the 'junta du jour' hangs in there, fooling itself
that it is doing a better job than 'those damned civvies'.

Take the latest round of Pakistan's recurring bouts of military
intervention: three months after he stepped in, all General Pervez
Musharraf has to show for his efforts is a few businessmen and politicians
in jail, eight billion rupees in returned loans and some new faces in
power. All this is an improvement over the last government, but the price
we have paid for cosmetic changes is far too high. There have been no
radical changes, no departure from the trodden path. But expecting drastic
reform from a basically conservative institution shows our Charlie
Brown-like naivete.

The whole business of having a general in charge while maintaining a
democratic facade is beyond me: the only possible justification for
military rule is that freed from constitutional restraints, the
administration can take drastic steps and cut through red tape. As it is,
we have the worst of both worlds: on the one hand, we have lost the basic
right to choose our government, while on the other, we do not have the
benefits of quick decision-making the army is supposed to display.

A few examples will prove my point. Well over a month ago, the Chief
Executive had proclaimed that the vexing question of independent power
projects pricing would be resolved in 30 days. That deadline has come and
gone without any solution in sight. Meanwhile, the verdict declaring
interest to be un-Islamic has made any future foreign investments in
Pakistan almost unthinkable.

One of the most appealing elements in General Musharraf's first address to
the nation three months ago was his clear rejection of religious extremism
of any kind. The Charlie Browns among us had hoped for some kind of firm
action against the gangs of armed zealots that have increasingly infested
Pakistan since General Zia's days. But far from calling them to heel, this
government seems to have given them greater licence than ever before. In
the aftermath of the Indian Airline hijacking last month, we have one of
the released prisoners, Maulana Masood Azhar, going around threatening
India and the United States with fire and brimstone without the government
lifting a finger.

As it is, Pakistan has long stood accused of harbouring terrorists in our
midst. After the hijacking, we had been thrown on the defensive by the
barrage of accusations from New Delhi, but instead of acting circumspectly,
we have added fuel to the fire by allowing Pakistani citizens to act in a
flagrantly provocative manner. So much for the Chief Executive's liberal
credentials.

And although this government's spokesmen have stressed its commitment to
fundamental rights, people like Mushahid Husain and members of Nawaz
Sharif's family continue to be detained without charges. Surely three
months should be enough to determine whether there are grounds to prosecute
or not. Just because Nawaz Sharif and his bunch of thugs treated opponents
in this manner does not mean that those now in custody should be denied
their legal rights. Two wrongs never made a right.

What is lacking is a clear sense of direction and purpose. Despite the
calibre of some of the new team, we have received no signal of what the
junta proposes to do with its unlimited powers. Basically, this government
is doing what all its predecessors have done: muddling along. By refusing
to take the tough steps, it is forgoing the possibilities that had briefly
opened up three months ago when there was universal euphoria at Nawaz
Sharif's overthrow.

We need to be clear that Pakistan's very survival now depends on
reasserting the writ of the state; this in turn demands that the politics
of violence should cease. To achieve this goal, the preachers of the gospel
of hate and violence have to be strongly discouraged, and ethnic and
sectarian armies disarmed. Given the organization and the sophisticated
arms they now possess, only the army is capable of carrying out this task.
So instead of recovering defaulted loans and outstanding electricity bills,
if our armed forces were to concentrate on the more difficult but essential
task of restoring law and order, they would be making a genuine
contribution towards bringing peace and prosperity to Pakistan.

But if they choose to fritter away the goodwill they still enjoy by
carrying on with business as usual, it will not be long before people start
asking them why they entered the fray in the first place. After all, even
Charlie Brown will get wise one day to the fact that Lucy will never keep
her word.