[sacw] sacw dispatch (12 Jan 00 )

Harsh Kapoor act@egroups.com
Wed, 12 Jan 2000 17:54:05 +0100


South Asia Citizens Web Dispatch
12 January 2000
________________________
#1. Why the CTBT is Controversial in Pakistan
#2. Discussion with Anti Nuclear authors in Bangalore, India
#3. Special Hearing of Gas Tragedy Case Begins in India
#4. Pakistan - if ban not lifted on labour unions: ILO to get aid suspended
________________________

#1.
WHY THE CTBT IS CONTROVERSIAL
by Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy

[12 January 2000]

Contrary to appearances, the heated CTBT controversy in Pakistan does not
pit nuclear doves against nuclear hawks. Nor is it a dispute about peace or
war with India. Instead, it is an increasingly rancorous argument between
those who fear Pakistan's deepening international isolation and those who
celebrate it.

By a curious twist of fate the CTBT is being advocated by Foreign Minister
Abdul Sattar, a man renowned for his impeccable anti-Indian credentials, a
build-more-bombs nuclear philosophy, and implacable opposition to nuclear
treaties. India's probable decision to sign the CTBT, and reap rich
benefits, has evidently galvanized him into action. But Mr Sattar
miscalculated by thinking that his formidable reputation had made his
position unassailable. His speech on 4 January at a seminar hosted by a
religious party, in which he argued that signing the CTBT would not
diminish Pakistan's nuclear capability, drew a swift communiqu=E9 of
denunciation from 16 religious leaders, criticism during Friday prayers in
mosques throughout the country, and calls for his resignation by the Muslim
World Order.

Had Pakistan's nuclear capability been the actual issue, Mr. Sattar could
easily have won acceptance for the CTBT. Because Pakistan has already
tested its nuclear weapons and proven that they work, further testing is
only of marginal significance. Indeed, signing the CTBT does not prevent
Pakistan from keeping the nuclear weapons it presently possesses,
increasing their numbers, making them more reliable, simulating them on
computers, developing new types, or even testing most components of a
nuclear weapon. The CTBT also places no restrictions on improving aircraft
and missile delivery systems. Nor does it provide for intrusive inspections
of Pakistan's nuclear weapons facilities. The treaty demands only that a
country refrain from further nuclear testing. For these reasons the
Pakistani nuclear establishment has, by and large, not publicly opposed the
CTBT, and is even generally supportive.

Mr Sattar could have pursued this logic still further. The fact is that
Pakistan does not need to test but India does. In fact, there was no
technical necessity for Pakistan to test last May because it possesses only
simple fission uranium weapons for which testing is unnecessary. One need
only recall that the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, which belonged to this
category, was never tested because US physicists were so totally confident
it would work. In the absence of further help from allies, Pakistan is
highly unlikely to develop boosted fission or thermonuclear weapons, which
do need testing. On the other hand, India has a much more ambitious program
than Pakistan's that includes such weapons. These advanced weapons require
repeated testing in order to be counted as militarily potent and therefore
scientists in the Indian nuclear establishment are opposing the CTBT
tooth-and-nail. On balance, India loses more than Pakistan in strictly
technical terms but calculates that the political advantages are
sufficiently great to offset this.

That General Musharraf may have privately nodded approval to Mr. Sattar is
highly likely. The reason is perfectly obvious: signing the CTBT is seen as
a way of decreasing Pakistan's estrangement from the international
community in general, and the United States in particular. While every
Pakistani government has exercised occasional rhetoric about
self-sufficiency, these governments have also been fully convinced that
further international credit is an absolute necessity, and that a
disastrous collapse of the economy would follow if credit lines were to be
disconnected. This reality is no less apparent to the present regime. Hence
the CTBT signing is viewed as a marginal, but necessary, concession that
allows business-as-usual to continue-and perhaps also brings with it a
small increase in external aid. Until that magic day dawns when the
country's innumerable crises are solved, this is the best that can be done.

This position is firmly rejected by Pakistan's jihadist school, which is
wedded to a vision of Pan-Islamism in which Islam is pitted in a struggle
against the rest. Quite correctly, it recognizes that there is no such
thing as a free lunch. Even if the CTBT were entirely innocuous and had
zero impact on Pakistan's nuclear forces, it is nevertheless a concession
to Western and US demands, and a dangerous first step down the steep
slippery slope. The jihadists fear that the next item on the Western agenda
will be to insist that the multitude of camps in Pakistan, where Muslim
militants fighting various Islamic causes receive training, be closed down.
In view of the developing nexus between India and the US on terrorism, the
jihadists open antagonism with the US, and with Kargil and the hijacking
incident being fresh in people's minds, this is a realistic expectation.
Qazi Hussain Ahmad of the Jamaat-I-Islami sees Mr Sattar acting at the
behest of the "US, Israel, and other anti-Islamic forces" because
"Pakistan's nuclear program belongs to the entire Muslim Ummah (community)"

Isolationism therefore flows inevitably from the jihadist position. The
outside world, with the exception of select Islamic countries, is seen as
inimical to their cause. Hence jihadists demand that international credit
lines be cut, and Pakistan should refuse to pay back past loans because
they were given to governments headed by corrupt leaders. They concede that
if retaliation causes external trade to cease, and the economy collapses,
there may be difficulties. However, jihadists consider these to be
temporary and a necessary sacrifice for ultimate victory in Kashmir and
elsewhere. Have not the Taliban won Afghanistan in spite of a hostile
Western world, they argue.

The logic of this isolationism is, however, unclear and contradictory. If
Pakistan defaults and breaks its economic ties with the West, will Islamic
countries like Saudi Arabia willingly bail out Pakistan, or at least pick
up the tab for weapon purchases? Given their weak response to Pakistan's
appeals for economic aid after the West imposed sanctions following the
nuclear tests, this does not seem to be likely. It is also unclear why,
after having argued ceaselessly for internationalization of the Kashmir
dispute, a sullen withdrawal into isolationism will be beneficial. But
articles of faith cannot be challenged by arguments based upon reason, no
matter how sound and well-argued. Perhaps this is what retired General
Hamid Gul meant when, criticizing Mr Sattar's position on the CTBT, he
declared that passion and politics should never be separated.

The CTBT signing is an emotive issue, full of sound and fury, but
signifying nothing for Pakistan as a nuclear arms control treaty. At most
signing it would be an affirmation that Pakistan prefers engagement over
isolation. It also carries some small cash value-perhaps a billion dollars
annually-provided Pakistan signs before India does. Signing is still
possible but unlikely. While the heavens will not fall if the government
backpedals away from the CTBT, the symbolism will not be lost. The message
this will radiate is that Pakistan's major foreign policy decisions
henceforth will be made not by its army leaders, and even less by its
foreign ministry. Instead it shall be the increasingly influential ulema
and jihadists in the country's mosques who will determine the course that
the country will take.

Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy is Professor of Nuclear and Particle Physics,
Quaid-e-Azam University
_____________

#2.

TALK WITH THE AUTHORS OF 'SOUTH ASIA ON A SHORT FUSE', IN BANGALORE

We invite you to a discussion on the process of nuclearisation in South
Asia, in the context of the recent release of a book : SOUTH ASIA ON A
SHORT FUSE. The authors of the book, Praful Bidwai & Achin Vanaik will
lead the exchange. The book is published by Oxford University Press and
the meeting is jointly convened by OUP and CED.

On : 18th Jan 2000 Time: 5.00 -8 p.m. At: Centre for Education and
Documentation No.7, 8th Main IIIrd Phase IInd Stage Domlur Bangalore
560 071 Phone 5543397 email: shubha@i...

Why then did India, with Pokhran II, cross the nuclear threshold? Is it
really a "coming out" of the closet? If it was supposed to be a deterrent,
why did Kargil and Kandahar happen? Why are we continuing to pursue a path
to make "better and more deadlier, state of the art" weapons of mass
destruction? Is there any chance towards lasting peace in the region?

And finally what does all of this mean to you and me? Is there anything we
can do these trends?

Let's talk about these and other questions regarding the nuclear issue on
the 18th. with the theme being "South Asia on a Short Fuse."

OUP and CED

Please confirm participation.

Directions to reach CED Get on to the Airport Road, at the New Shanti Sagar
Restaurant take the road bang opposite. You will have to follow this road
all the way. Some of the landmarks on the way are the Domlur Bus depot, the
Government High School on your right and the Sagar SuperMarket on the left.
At the end of the road you will see a stone wall and a rusty gate; at this
point the road will naturally turn left. Continue following the road and
we are at end of that road. It is tall brick building with green windows
that you have to look for. If you have to walk from Domlur Bus depot it
will take you ten minutes.
_____________

#3.

Times of India
Wednesday 12 January 2000

SPECIAL HEARING OF GAS TRAGEDY CASE BEGINS

The Times of India News Service
BHOPAL: A special five-day hearing of the criminal proceedings against
officials of Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) and its Indian subsidiary,
UCIL, for perpetrating the Bhopal gas tragedy began on Monday in the court
of the chief judicial magistrate.

The trial has been hanging fire since 1987. Among the accused are the then
UCC chairman Warren Anderson and his Indian counterpart Keshub Mahindra.
Close to 15,000 people lost their lives and thousands of people were
injured in the cataclysm at the UCIL plant on the fateful night of December
2, 1984.

According to Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila Udyog Sangathan (BGPMUS) convener
Abdul Jabbar, two years is the maximum punishment that can be meted out to
the perpetrators of the tragedy under Section 304A. And that too after 16
years. ``If this isn't a mockery of justice, what is?''

The case, quite obviously, has a long history. The CBI had filed the
chargesheet against the US multinational in 1987. Invoked against the UCC
and its subsidiary were Sections 304, 324, 326 and 429 of the Indian Penal
Code. The chargesheet was challenged by UCIL in the Madhya Paradesh High
Court. The company refused to agree that it was guilty of culpable homicide
not amounting to murder since trial under Section 304 would have been
tantamount to partially admittiing its guilt. Hearings continued for seven
years. In 1994, the HC ruled that the original CBI chargesheet was
perfectly in order.

The UCIL then appealed to the Supreme Court where another two years were
lost in pleadings. But in the apex court, Justice Ahmadi whittled down the
company's guilt to nothing more than negligence under Section 304A of IPC.
The case was back with the Bhopal CJM in 1997. At least 54 witnesses have
appeared in the intervening months and years, but the trial remained
incomplete since the star witness, Warren Anderson, failed to show up
despite persistent summons.

It is well-known that a warrant for Anderson's arrest had been issued in
1992. The CJM had also ordered the Indian government to seek his
extradition from the USA, but no action was taken. Anderson was later
declared an absconder.

Two years (1989-91) were earlier lost when as a result of the Bhopal
settlement between the UCC and the Indian government, the SC had quashed
all criminal proceedings against the accused. It was only after the BGPMUS
and other like-minded organisations filed review and writ petitions in the
SC against the ``unjust'' settlement that cases were revived in October
1991.
________________

#4.

DAWN
12 January 2000 Wednesday

WAPDA labour unions: ILO to get aid suspended if ban not lifted
By M. Ziauddin

ISLAMABAD, Jan 11: The International Labour Organization (ILO) has warned
Pakistan that if restrictions on WAPDA's labour unions were not lifted by
May this year it will be constrained to ask the World Bank and the IMF to
suspend aid to Pakistan "till the human rights of collective bargaining
and freedom of association are restored." The ILO experts' committee which
reviewed reports, received in case No 2006 in Nov 1999, had recommended
that the ILO governing body approve a six-point indictment against the
government of Pakistan and deplore the fact that it had violated its
obligations, arising from ILO convention Nos 87 and 98, pertaining to the
freedom of association and the right of collective bargaining. The case,
No 2006, was initiated on a complaint filed with the ILO by the All
Pakistan Federation of Trade Unions (APFTU) in Feb 1999. The Public
Service International (PSI) and the International Federation of Free Trade
Unions (CFTU) have also associated themselves with this complaint. The
=46OGSEW filed their complaint with the ILO on June 8, 1999. The ILO
experts' committee has also recommended that the promulgation of Ordinance
NoXX of 1998, which suspended the trade union rights of WAPDA workers and
prevented the WAPDA Hydroelectric Central Labour Union (HCLU) from
carrying out its normal trade union activities, be deplored. The committee
urged the government to immediately repeal ordinance V, replaced by the
subsequent Ordinance XIV of 1999, promulgated on Sept 24, with a view to
re-establish the registration of the Pakistan WAPDA HCLU. It also
requested the government to ensure that the practice of deducting trade
union dues was resumed without delay. The committee further urged the
government to reply, without delay, to the allegations of the Federation
of Oil, Gas, Steel and Electricity Workers (FOGSEW), contained in a
communication dated June 8, 1999. It also recommended deploring the fact
that certain WAPDA and KESC union officials were retired forcibly. The
APFTU had submitted a four-point complaint to the ILO committee, including
the charge that subsequent to the Ordinance, allegedly to check the
pilferage of electricity, the government recruited 35,000 army personnel
on salaries with perks "which were 150 times higher" than the regular
salaries of WAPDA workers. The then government made an exhaustive response
on Sept 2, 1999 to the four-point complaint of APFTU but the reply did not
answer this specific charge that it had recruited 35,000 army personnel,
on salaries with perks 150 times higher than regular salaries of WAPDA
workers. The government's reply, however, pointed out that the installed
capacity of electricity in the country was 14,957 MW out of which 20 per
cent was being lost because of technical reasons, such as line and system
losses and another 20 per cent because of pilferage and power theft. It
alleged that pilferage was made possible with the active connivance of the
WAPDA field staff who interacted actively with the public. Thus, rampant
corruption, inefficiency and the resultant adverse impact on agricultural
and industrial production, in the form of load-shedding and revenue losses
to WAPDA, had seriously affected the viability of the economy, the
government added. According to the government viewpoint, the WAPDA was
running a deficit of Rs45 billion which was expected to rise to Rs74
billion, resulting in a financial collapse which would have led to the
liquidation of WAPDA. The management, the government admitted, was
helpless in taking disciplinary action against the delinquents and corrupt
elements, largely due to interference and pressure exerted by the union.
Therefore, in order to avert a complete collapse of WAPDA, the g overnment
said it was constrained to seek the assistance of the armed forces under
article 245 of the Constitution. The involvement of the army in WAPDA, it
was explained had occurred in two phases. In the first phase, which ended
on July 25, 1999, 31,444 army personnel were deputed to WAPDA. After this
date, only 10 per cent of these were retained and the rest returned to
their units. As a result of the joint campaign, launched by the army and
WAPDA teams, the Authority made the following achievements: (a) A 43 per
cent increase in billing and receipts for the first six months of last
year, in comparison to Jan-June 1998, which in absolute terms amounted to
an increase of Rs20.9 billion in billings. (b) A reduction of Rs93 billion
in receivables. (c) Over 7 per cent decrease in line losses. (d) Reduction
of pilferage to less than 1 per cent. In addition to the above mentioned
reduction in negative trends, the following positive developments were
also registered, the GOP claimed : a) 406,805 new electricity connections
were given in January-June 1999 as against 235,066 for the same period in
1998; b) consumer complaints dropped by 48,837; and c) there is no
load-shedding anywhere in the country. The ILO experts' committee,
however, was not impressed by these arguments, put forward by the
government in its defence, and while making its recommendations to the ILO
governing body it observed: "More than a year has lapsed since the
military authority assumed charge to rectify conditions in WAPDA. "The
government of Pakistan will have to decide soon whether it is worthwhile
to continue suspending trade union activities and restraining the freedom
of association and the collective bargaining rights of more than 100,000
WAPDA employees. "Under the changed circumstances these employees, if
given an opportunity, would like to help WAPDA restore its financial
position. The affected WAPDA employees claim that what happened in the
past was primarily because of management failures rather than union
activities."

__________________________________________
SOUTH ASIA CITIZENS WEB DISPATCH is an informal, independent &
non-profit citizens wire service run by South Asia Citizens Web
(http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since1996.