[sacw] sacw dispatch #1 (11 Jan 00 )

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Web Dispatch #1
11 January 2000
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#1. A New Beginning In South Asia
#2. 2 Articles on Nuclear Safety Regulation in India
#3. Dissenting Voices: A convention on literature & Human rights (New Delhi)
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#1.
(Brookings Institution - Policy Brief #55 - January 2000)

A NEW BEGINNING IN SOUTH ASIA
By Stephen P. Cohen

Since the end of the Cold War American policy towards South Asia has been
overshadowed by more troublesome or more economically significant regions.
The dominant American objective in South Asia has been to prevent India and
Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons, although this policy was
dramatically defeated in May 1998, when each exploded a number of nuclear
devices.

A U.S. policy that responds only to the region's development of nuclear
weapons and the risk of nuclear war will fail, and forfeit other important
American interests in the process. A heightened engagement with India and
Pakistan, dealing with the causes of regional conflict and not only its
symptoms, might not only reduce the risk of war but also could promote
important American economic, strategic, and humanitarian interests. Such a
fresh start in South Asia would accord India a more important place in
America's world-view, but would not ignore Pakistan. It could begin with a
high profile visit by the U.S. president to the region, an
institutionalization of the strategic dialogues between Washington and New
Delhi, and the strengthening of economic and strategic ties between the two
democracies. As for Pakistan, which faces the prospect of instability to
the point of chaos, the United States should take the lead in helping
develop its civilian institutions by responding positively to the new
Pakistani government's efforts to eradicate corruption, reform its economy,
and over time restore democracy.

Beyond the Cold War:
=46or more than 40 years, American policy toward India and Pakistan was
shaped by the Cold War. But when the Soviets left Afghanistan early in
1989, the dominant American policy became one of preventing New Delhi and
Islamabad from "going nuclear" and on two occasions, in 1990 and 1999,
managing regional crisis. While the second Clinton administration made an
attempt to engage India over a broader range of interests, nonproliferation
issues still dominated American policy. It was assumed that the president
would visit India and Pakistan once they adhered to the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT), now signed by over 150 countries and ratified by fifty,
although not by the United States itself.

This expectation was dashed by a dramatic series of events. First, in 1995,
the Indian government retreated from its earlier support of the CTBT, and
in 1996 rejected the treaty. Then, in May 1998, India and Pakistan declared
themselves nuclear powers and proved it with a series of underground atomic
weapons tests. Finally, a trip by India=D5s prime minister to the Pakistan
city of Lahore in February 1999 held out the promise of regional
rapprochement. But this hope dimmed when severe fighting, initiated by
Pakistan, broke out in the Kargil region of Kashmir four months later. In
October 1999, Pakistan's already enfeebled democracy was swept away by a
military coup.

These developments underscore the need for a fresh look at U.S. policies in
South Asia. It is clear that pursuing ambitious non-proliferation goals
without a full appreciation of regional interests and dynamics has not
worked, as both India and Pakistan have demonstrated an ability to resist
outside pressures perceived as inimical to their vital interests.
Washington's policymakers need a better understanding of both the
opportunities for and the limitations on American power in the area. New
thinking is called for on four issues: the spread of nuclear weapons, the
India-Pakistan conflict, India's emerging stature as a major power, and the
dilemma of coping with a potentially chaotic Pakistan.

Handling a Newly Nuclear Region:
The development of Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs raises three
immediate and one long term concern for the United States: 1) that the two
nations not use their nuclear weapons in a crisis; 2) that their nuclear
weapons not add to regional instability or figure in an inadvertent
detonation; and 3) that the technology to produce these weapons not be
transferred to any other nations or non-sovereign rogue groups. Implicit in
this enumeration is a recognition of the fact that nuclear disarmament is
not a realistic option in South Asia.

In the last decade, India and Pakistan have had two serious crises, and in
both cases the United States played an important role in defusing the
tension. The first incident (in Kashmir) occurred in 1990, when each of the
two countries possessed a few unassembled nuclear devices, and American
diplomacy helped calm the situation. Then, in the Summer of 1999, India and
Pakistan engaged one another in a short but bitter war in the Kargil region
of Kashmir. Once more the United States intervened diplomatically, urging
both sides to forgo military escalation and resume their political
dialogue. Washington demanded that Pakistan withdraw its forces from
positions it had seized on the Indian side of the "Line of Control" (the
line that separated the two armies in Kashmir when their 1971 war ended).
The United States also urged India to refrain from crossing the Line of
Control or attacking Pakistan elsewhere.

This diplomatic effort succeeded because the United States had established
intimate dialogues with both India and Pakistan after their 1998 nuclear
weapons tests. The eight rounds of talks between Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott and the Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh were the
longest sustained discussions ever conducted between U.S. and Indian
government officials. Later, when President Bill Clinton met with Pakistani
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during the latter's emergency visit to
Washington in July 1999, Clinton kept Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari
Vajpayee informed by telephone.

In addition to urging restraint during a crisis, there are other ways to
reduce the risk of accidental or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. Some
are technical: better command-and-control arrangements would enhance Indian
and Pakistani confidence that nuclear weapons would be used only when
intended. The best arrangement (from the perspective of crisis stability)
would be if neither actively deployed its nuclear arsenal, perhaps by
leaving warheads unassembled and separated from their delivery systems. The
United States should be prepared to share its experience in developing
command and control arrangements and nuclear doctrine to assist the two
states in maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent with the fewest number
of weapons and the highest level of stability.

Stabilizing the India-Pakistan nuclear relationship is all the more
important since in a few years both may have medium-range ballistic
missiles capable of reaching other countries. There is also an American
interest in making sure that these new nuclear systems not interact with
those of other Middle Eastern or Asian powers-Israel and Pakistan, for
example, or India and China. The United States must also remain concerned
about the transfer of nuclear weapons expertise, fissile material, and
whole devices from South Asia to other states, legitimate or rogue. While
both India and Pakistan have pledged to enforce legislation prohibiting
such transfers, the fact is that four of the world's five declared nuclear
weapons states (Britain being the exception) have assisted one or more
other countries with their nuclear programs.

These wide ranging problems call for a strategy that moves beyond one of
mere prevention of South Asian proliferation to one that enlists India and
Pakistan in limiting the further spread of weapons of mass destruction and
the problems raised by the introduction of ballistic missile systems. This
strategy will have to combine incentives with sanctions.

One incentive is status. India, in particular, craves a seat at the nuclear
"high table," and both that nation and Pakistan want the legitimacy of
their nuclear programs to be recognized. However, neither can be members of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) which defines a "nuclear weapon
state" as a country that tested nuclear devices before 1967. Nor should
either be included in strategic nuclear reduction talks. That said, both
India and Pakistan should be associated with the various international
nuclear and missile control regimes and the larger effort to contain
weapons proliferation, and the United States should be prepared to discuss
with the Indian government various ideas for promoting nuclear stability,
including a greater role for defensive systems and India's stated
preference for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

Another incentive would be the provision of civilian nuclear technology to
these energy starved states. It would not be a violation of the NPT to
assist South Asian countries with their civilian nuclear programs, once the
civilian programs are separated from military nuclear programs. The U.S.
did this in the case of an NPT violator, North Korea. Affording India and
Pakistan such assistance could also be part of a tradeoff that brought them
into the various international nuclear and missile control regimes and
encompassed the larger effort to contain weapons proliferation. Finally,
the prospect of a continuing positive relationship with the United States
provides another incentive for these states to restrain their military
nuclear programs and join in global non-proliferation efforts.

Prospects for Peace and War in Kashmir:
Kashmir is widely regarded by senior U.S. officials and intelligence
analysts as the world's most likely flashpoint for a nuclear war. The
conflict over Kashmir dates back to 1947-48, when Britain departed South
Asia, leaving behind the dominions of India and Pakistan. The hundreds of
residual princely states were to choose between joining India or Pakistan,
taking into account geographical proximity as well as the religious makeup
of the state's population. The Hindu ruler of the largely Muslim state of
Jammu and Kashmir toyed with declaring independence until raiders from
Pakistan invaded his territory, leading him to opt for India and its
military protection. At the time, New Delhi said that Kashmir's accession
would be conditional, promising the United Nations it would hold a
plebiscite to determine the wishes of the Kashmiri people. To date that
vote has not been held, as India argued that Pakistan first had to vacate
its portion of the state and, more recently, that its 1972 Simla agreement
with Pakistan provided a new mechanism for settling the dispute. Then as
now, a plebiscite probably would result in a vote for independence-an
outcome opposed by both Pakistan and India.

Wars have been waged over Kashmir in 1947-48 and 1965, with additional
skirmishes in 1971. The Kashmir crisis took a new turn in 1989 when a
popular separatist movement challenged Indian rule in the prized Valley.
This raised Pakistani hopes that India could be pressured into serious
negotiations over Kashmir, ultimately resulting in a war in Kargil-with
more than a thousand casualties-in the summer of 1999.

What makes Kashmir such a difficult issue is that it is not only about
contested territory and populations, but because it also touches upon
competing national identities: India as a secular state, Pakistan as an
Islamic one. Settling the Kashmir problem means, ultimately, dealing with
these larger issues, a task which is well beyond the reach of any outside
power.

There has been no broad U.S. initiative on Kashmir since the early 1960s.
=46or years the situation was seen as both intractable and marginal to
American interests. This lack of interest in Kashmir satisfied the Indian
government, which strongly opposed any outside intervention, but it
disappointed Pakistan. However, Pakistanis have proved even more reluctant
than Indians to discuss solutions other than a plebiscite leading to
accession to Pakistan.

America's engagement in the dispute over Kashmir needs to be raised several
notches, while avoiding intruding too far into an issue that can only be
settled by the parties involved. The following is a guide to such an
engagement.

=46irst, U.S. officials should continue to publicly exhort both countries to
resume their dialogue on Kashmir.

Second, Washington should privately but actively work towards a resumption
of talks, perhaps by serving as an informal channel of communication
between Delhi and Islamabad.

Third, there are aspects of the Kashmir conflict that are more amenable to
solution than the core problem, the final status of the Valley and its
inhabitants. These include a reduction of incidents across the Line of
Control, withdrawal of forces from the frozen wastes of the Siachin
Glacier, and improving economic ties between both parts of Kashmir. The
United States can provide its good offices, and even technical assistance
that may facilitate agreement on these issues.

=46ourth, a special American coordinator for Kashmir should be appointed. Th=
e
coordinator should not attempt to mediate the dispute, but he or she could
harmonize American policies with those of other states, serve as a clearing
house for ideas and policies, and promote Track II diplomacy-unofficial but
informed dialogues between Indians and Pakistanis. If the American
experience in other regions is a guide, this coordinator's role will extend
over several administrations; just the appointment would convey the
impression that a process leading to the resolution, or at least
amelioration, of the Kashmir problem had begun.

India as an Emerging Power:
There is little reason to doubt that India is emerging as a powerful state
that will dominate South Asia politically for some time to come. India's
economic growth underlies its enhanced significance. Following the
implementation of economic reforms in 1991, India has reached respectable
growth rates of 6 to 7 percent, which, if sustained, will give New Delhi
considerably more weight in the region and abroad. Although its national
economy will remain much smaller than China's for the foreseeable future,
India's sizable middle class-estimated at between 200 and 300 million
people-and its requirements for several hundred billion dollars in foreign
investments make the subcontinent a market not to be ignored.

In addition, the prospect that India might be torn asunder by ethnic,
regional, or religious conflicts has receded. India is a socially complex
federal system, with pragmatic coalitions functioning at both the state and
national levels, with all of the problems and virtues of such systems. Yet
each national election-and there have been three in the last three
years-has shown that Indians are capable of managing coalition governments.

The stage is thus set for an important change in U.S.-Indian relations.
Differences remain, but there are common interests as well. India needs
American investment and technology, which it is likely to get as it becomes
a more attractive market for American businesses as well as a critical
supplier of software and other computer products. There may even be a
convergence of views on Pakistan. Indians came to appreciate the balanced
and effective U.S. diplomacy that helped end the 1990 and 1999 crises.
While India certainly doesn't want a powerful, aggressive, military-ruled
Pakistan on its border, a weak and unstable neighbor teeming with threats
from loose nuclear weapons, Islamic terrorism, and a potential flood of
millions of migrants is not in New Delhi's best interests either.

America's new approach to India should operate at several levels:
strategic, operational, and economic.

Strategically, the United States should regard India not as another South
Asian state comparable to Pakistan, but as a player in the larger Asian
sphere. India may not be China, but neither is it an insignificant "Third
World" state. A presidential visit in the first half of 2000, the first
since 1978, would go a long way toward acknowledging India's growing
importance.

An altered strategic relationship between the U.S. and India also implies a
reexamination of basic policies. There are important differences in their
strategic world views, but both countries are essentially status quo
powers, and should try to coordinate their views on issues such as nuclear
proliferation, coping with the new military government in Pakistan,
terrorism, and dealing with larger issues of Asian stability and order. As
for terrorism, both the United States and India have been singled out as
enemies by Osama Bin Laden.

This recognition of overlapping interests requires practical application. A
small start was made recently with the first consultations ever held
between the United States and India over the Afghanistan problem. But
Washington and New Delhi need to get into the habit of regular consultation
over a range of issues. It would be well to expand the frequency of
meetings of American and Indian defense experts, policy planning staffs,
terrorism and arms control specialists and parliamentarians in both
countries to break down prevailing misperceptions and stereotypes.

As for economic ties, these will eventually provide the ballast for a more
stable U.S.-Indian relationship because the economics of the two countries
are complimentary. But because the economic relationship is still fraught
with distrust (on the part of India) and irritation (on the part of the
United States), both countries should support and fully utilize the
conflict resolution procedures available in the World Trade Organization.
These can help resolve differences between the two states over allegations
of discriminatory tariffs, unfair trade practices, and violations of
intellectual property rights.

Pakistan: Rebuilding Democracy:
Pakistan is not a failed state, but its political and social institutions
have been in decline for some time. The recent military coup is another
"last chance" for Pakistan, an opportunity to move its institutions toward
social and economic reform and political coherence. Unlike Mohammad Zia
ul-Haq's coup in 1977, the 1999 army takeover was popular. Yet Pakistan's
generals would be wise to plan on an early withdrawal, although they will
likely retain a formal role in a successor civilian government, possibly
along the lines of Turkey's National Security Council. If the present
Pakistani military leadership fails to manage this transition, it is not
likely to be replaced by a more liberal group. The prospect of the
situation turning far worse has tempered American, Chinese, Iranian, and
even Indian reactions to the coup. It is in every country's interest to see
Pakistan hold together, although it is in no one's interest to see it
challenge India again, serve as a base for radical Islamic movements, or
become an unstable entity armed with nuclear weapons.

The United States should institute three major policy initiatives toward
Pakistan. All would aim to help stabilize Pakistan by restoring a more
effective civilian government that would be compatible with improved
U.S.-Indian relations.

=46irst, the United States should focus on the reconstruction of Pakistan's
civilian institutions. There are considerable opportunities for American
foundations, universities, and other public and private entities to expand
their support for the institutions that sustain democracy in Pakistan. Care
should be taken to ensure that sanctions against Pakistan do not restrict
such support.

Second, the United States should restore U.S.-Pakistan military training
programs. These programs send Americans to study at Pakistani military
schools and bring Pakistani officers to the United States. Studying in an
American institution does not ensure democracy, but the overall record
shows that Pakistani officers who have been trained in the United States or
Great Britain have a more balanced perspective on the role of the armed
forces, a more secular outlook, and a better sense of the changes occurring
in the wider world.

=46inally, the United States should judge Pakistan's present regime on its
merits, not its uniform. To the degree that Islamabad's military rulers
move to reform the political system, root out corruption, restrain
extremists, and pursue a conciliatory policy on Kashmir, there should be
proportionate symbolic and material support for Pakistan. If Islamabad
moves in this direction it should also receive high level, even
presidential, attention in 2000. While no U.S. president has visited India
in over 20 years, none has gone to Pakistan in over 30 years. India has
been neglected by American policymakers, but correcting that error should
not mean neglecting Pakistan, which is not only nuclear-armed, but by 2002
will be the world's sixth largest state, and perhaps once again its fourth
largest democracy.

[Stephen P. Cohen is a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the
Brookings Institution. He is also the author of many books and articles on
India and Pakistan, including the forthcoming India: Emerging Power; The
Pakistan Army (second edition, 1998), and Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception
and Management of Crisis in South Asia (1995)].

[The views expressed in this Policy Brief are those of the author and are
not necessarily those of the trustees, officers, or other staff members of
the Brookings Institution.]

[The Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC
20036 - Telephone: 202-797-6000 - Facsimile: 202-797-6004 - E-Mail:
brookinfo@b... ]
_____________

#2.
Date: 11 January 2000
=46rom: "Dr. A. Gopalakrishnan"
Subject: ARTICLES ON NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATION IN INDIA

Greetings!. During the last two months , Dr. B. Subba Rao has
written two articles in the Indian newspaper "The Observer of
Business & Politics", published from New Delhi & Bombay. Both
articles dealt with civilian nuclear safety and its regulation in
India. Dr. Rao holds a Ph.D degree in nuclear engineering and he
once worked for the Indian navy on the development of India's
indigenous nuclear submarine. He left the navy, obtained a law
degree subsequently , and is presently practising as a lawyer in
India's Supreme Court. The titles of these articles and the web
addresses at which you can access and read them are given below,
in case you are interested in browsing through them:

1. "IS OUR NUCLEAR REGULATOR EFFECTIVE ? " [ Dec 09 ,1999]
Web Site: http://www.observerindia.com/news/9912/09/agenda01.htm

2. "WHY IS NUCLEAR SAFETY A STATE SECRET ? "[ Jan 06, 2000]
Web Site: http://www.observerindia.com/news/200001/06/agenda02.htm

Best Regards,
GOPALAKRISHNAN
[Dr. A.Gopalakrishnan (Hyderabad, INDIA) [Ex-Chairman/Atomic Enery
Regulatory Board]]
_____________

#3.

DISSENTING VOICES:
A CONVENTION ON LITERATURE AND DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS - IN MEMORY OF C.V. SUBBAR=
AO
Dear Friend
We are holding a convention on "Dissenting Voices: Literature and
Democratic Rights" on January 23rd, 2000. The daylong convention is in
memory of C.V. Subbarao and will focus on the connection between
literature and peoples movements in various parts of the country.
Literature has always been a source of inspiration for different kinds of
movements and has often articulated peoples aspirations in a variety of
ways, through poems, songs, ballads stories theatre etc. Likewise all
peoples movements such as those led by peasants, workers, women and dalits
have influenced the form and content of literature. Literature has also
been a space where prevailing notions of democracy are contested and
redefined. Not surprisingly this space has time and again come under
attack from the state and powerful vested interests. The recent attacks by
communal fascist groups on artistic expression is just the latest in a
long history of attempts to suppress this democratic space. This
convention is celebration of the space literature provides to help forge
and and give a voice to peoples aspirations and struggles.
C.V. Subbarao or Subba is a name that many people connected with the
democratic rights movement know. He was a long time activist of PUDR who
met an untimely death on January, 17, 1994. Subba was also a well-known
literary critic in Andhra Pradesh, under the pen-name Sura. His love for
literature and his deep understanding of different literatures has been a
constant source of inspiration for young activists in PUDR. Dedicating this
convention to Subbas memory is a way of keeping him alive for us in these
dark times.
We hope to be able to represent and reflect the wide variety of
literatures - poetry, songs theatre etc - engendered in the wake of
different kinds of peoples movements - those of peasants, tribals,
workers, dalits and women. We will have different speakers reflecting on
these different literary trends and movements as well as songs, poetry
readings and performances throughout the day. We hope you will be able to
participate in this convention. Donations will be welcome.
Looking forward to seeing you
Harish Dhawan Rakesh Shukla
VENUE: Indian Institute of International Law
9 Bhagwan Das Road (Opp Supreme Court)DATE: 23 January 2000
TIME: 9.30 a.m.till the evenin
PARTICIPANTS: Sumanto Bannerjee, Gaddar (Jan Natya Mandali), K.Venu
(AILRC), Mahashweta Devi, Malini Bhattacharya, Rajendra Yadav, Katyayini,
Volga, GP Deshpande, Asmita, Disha Sanskritik Manch (Haryana), Vikalp
Sanskritik Manch and others.
__________________________________________
SOUTH ASIA CITIZENS WEB DISPATCH is an informal, independent &
non-profit citizens wire service run by South Asia Citizens Web
(http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since1996.