[sacw] Book Review - Buddhist Fundamentalism and Minority Identies

[Harsh Kapoor]

=46YI
Harsh Kapoor
--------------------------

Buddhist Fundamentalism and Minority Identities in Sri
Lanka

Eds., Tessa J. Bartholomeusz and Chandra R. De Silva,
State University of New York Press,Albany, NY, 1998

Buddhist Fundamentalism is a series of essays edited
by Prof. Bartholomeusz of Florida State University and
Prof. de Silva of Old Dominion University in Virginia.
The editors, in their introductory chapter, use the
=46undamentalism Project of Marty, Appleby and others to
describe fundamentalism as 1) a reliance on religion
as a source of identity, 2) boundary setting that
determines who belongs and who does not, 3) dramatic
escatologies [stories which give meaning], and 4) the
dramatization and mythologization of enemies (p.2)
According to them, Sinhala-Buddhist fundamentalism is
different from other fundamentalisms in that there is
no insistence on strict behavioral standards and
believers do not form a coherent, readily identifiable
group. Although there is no =ECsacred=EE text or scripture
that serves as a blueprint for society, the authors
argue that the mythohistorical tract, the Mahavamsa,
carries canonical authority. Prof. Steven Kemper is
quoted as saying that =ECthe Mahavamsa has become the
warrant for the interlocked beliefs that the island
and its government have traditionally been Sinhala and
Buddhist=EE (1991, p.2).

The editors emphasize that Sinhala-Buddhist
fundamentalism is =ECdetermined not only by historical
tradition and ideology, but by politics as well... As
our essayists argue, Sinhala-Buddhist fundamentalism,
used as a platform for politicians and patriots since
the late nineteenth century, is concerned directly
with power and dominance, especially dominance by the
ethnic majority, the Sinhalese.=EE(p.8)

This book is concerned primarily with examining the
fundamentalists=ED Other - with the minority communities
of the island and how their identities have been
shaped by Sinhala-Buddhist fundamentalism. (The
=EBOther=ED is that which a group uses to define its
identity in opposition to. For instance, men define
themselves in relation to women. The editors=ED
definition of minority seems to include minority
Buddhist movements.)

Inexplicably, and this is the major weakness of the
book, there is no discussion of the one minority - the
Tamils of the NorthEast - which have refused to reach
a subservient accommodation with Sinhala-Buddhist
fundamentalism. There is so little acknowledgement of
this prominent exception that one is led to feel that
these Tamils now live in another land in the minds of
the authors and editors of the book.

George Bond of Northwestern University writes the
second article in the book, =ECConflicts of Identity and
Interpretation in Buddhism: The Clash between the
Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement and the Government of
Pres. Premadasa,=EE which is about two contrasting
interpretations of Buddhism. He calls them both
variations of Buddhist fundamentalism with one being
=EBpolitical=ED and the other =EBsocially engaged.=ED The
political strand emphasizes identity without requiring
that the government follow or enact Buddhist values,
while Sarvodaya emphasizes the primacy of values over
identity.

Chandra de Silva, in =ECThe Plurality of Buddhist
=46undamentalism: An Inquiry into Views Among Buddhist
Monks in Sri Lanka,=EE argues that =ECa) the variety of
views relating to the ideal social and political order
among Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka is often masked by
the great concern for an appearance of a =ECunified=EE
front; and b) the continuing tensions and
contradictions between the Buddhist doctrinal
tradition and twentieth-century nationalist ideology
among Sinhala-Buddhist monks illustrates not only a
different kind of fundamentalism, but also provides
clues on strategies that might be adopted to foster
greater tolerance.=EE(p.53) I guess there is not much
tolerance and the author wishes there were more!

Oddvar Hollup of the Nordland Research Institute,
Norway writes on =ECThe Impact of Land Reforms, Rural
Images, and Nationalist Ideology on Plantation
Tamils.=EE He says that =ECBecause the Sinhalas - the
majority and politically dominant group - historically
have failed to recognize (or at least have refused to
consider) Sri Lanka a plural society in its
implementation of a cultural policy and its definition
of nationhood, the situation for Sri Lankan ethnic
minorities generally has been one of negotiation and
accommodation.=EE(p.74) This =EBgenerally,=ED of course,
contains one big exception, which is really not
discussed in this book. Hollup analyses land reform of
the tea plantations on which hill country Tamils work
and ends with

=ECLand reform and the nationalization of the
plantations in Sri Lanka must be analyzed in
connection with the emergence of Sinhala-Buddhist
fundamentalist ideology and political patronage. The
ideology, based on mytho-historical interpretations of
the past, helped to create greater homogeneity by
constructing a =EBsingular identity=ED among Sinhalas
while at the same time excluding others. The past, in
terms of the myths and legends of Sinhala-Buddhist
chronicles, still plays an important role in the
construction of national identity, supported by a
fundamentalist ideology that conflates race, language,
and religion. These interpretations of the past, when
connected with rural images, representations of the
estates, and construction of the Other, can be helpful
in explaining the legislation of land reforms and the
nationalization of the plantations.

Land reforms and nationalization of the plantations
represent politically motivated means to build up
electoral support, especially since the distribution
of state resources has functioned as an important
means of political patronage. The state, defined as a
Sinhala-Buddhist one, became committed to support the
Sinhala peasantry as a moral obligation. As a result,
land reforms were conducted in the name of the
peasantry by the landed elite, rather than springing
from demands and discontent among the peasantry.=EE
(p.84)

Pradeep Jegananthan, a postdoc at the University of
Chicago, writes =ECIn the Shadow of Violence:
=EBTamilness=ED and the Anthropology of Identity in
Southern Sri Lanka=EE about how Tamils in Colombo live
in the constant expectation of violence and the coping
mechanisms they have to deal with this which differ
based on caste, economic status, place of origin, etc.
He gives a detailed case study of 2 families who lived
through the 1983 riots.

In =ECSufi and Reformist Designs: Muslim Identity in Sri
Lanka=EE Victor de Munck of the University of New York
at New Paltz defines Islamic fundamentalism as =ECthe
construction of an Islamic/Muslim identity based on a
=EBmemory=ED of a heroic Arabic past and an avowed
ideological commitment to Islamic doctrinal practices
and beliefs.=EE(p.110) de Munck hopes =ECto show how
identity can be differentially interpreted.=EE(p.111)
Based on fieldwork in a Muslim village in the Uva
Bintenne, de Munck discusses how a new urban-based
pan-Islamic fundamentalist identity seeks to subvert a
more localized Sufi-Muslim identity. According to de
Munck, in both Sinhala and Tamil contexts, the Muslim
is defined as being subordinate and in an
accommodating role in relation to the dominant Other,
so it is satisfying to be identified with a larger,
pan-Islamic world.

Tessa Bartholomeusz of Florida State University in
=ECSinhala Anglicans and Buddhism in Sri Lanka: When the
=EBOther=ED Becomes =EBYou=ED states that

=ECAs Oddvar Hollup comments in his essay, language,
race and ethnicity, rather than religion, as had been
the case until recently, are the most important
identity markers for Sinhalas and Tamils in
contemporary Sri Lanka...In this chapter, I analyze at
what point the majority of Sri Lankan Anglicans saw
themselves as a separate religious community. In
addition I explore why today they identify themselves
with Sinhalas, rather than the British, despite the
Sinhalas=ED association with Buddhism. As we shall see,
Sinhala Anglicans, much like other Sinhala groups,
have been forced to show their loyalty to the nation
through the revival of a shared =EBhistory,=ED and
language, rather than through religious
affiliation.=EE(p.133)

She ends with =EC...the history of this convert group is
best discussed in relation to the organization of
state power in Sri Lanka. In short, in the present
context, indigenization means Sinhalization, a
movement toward empowerment.=EE(p.142)

In his chapter on =ECCatholic Identity and Global Forces
in Sinhala Sri Lanka=EE, R.L. Stirrat of the University
of Sussex argues =ECthat an understanding of changing
Sinhala-Catholic identity has to place it within the
broad processes of =EBglobalization,=ED which involves not
just a three centuries-old increasing interdependence
of different parts of the world at an economic level,
but also the more recent phenomenon of a growing sense
of =EBglobal consciousness=ED in which distinctions
between the universal and the particular
collapse.=EE(p.147)

In her second chapter Tessa Bartholomeusz writes on
=ECBuddhist Burghers and Sinhala-Buddhist
=46undamentalism=EE and how some Burghers have become
Buddhists and some, especially A.E. Buultjens, have
even played critical roles in the development of
Sinhala-Buddhist fundamentalism.

John Clifford Holt of Bowdoin College in Maine
concludes the volume with =ECThe Persistence of
Political Buddhism,=EE a good portion of which is given
over to Pres. Kumaratunge=EDs message on Vesak Day of
May, 1997. Holt asks who are the Sinhala-Buddhist
fundamentalists and answers from his experience that
they are =EBmilitant and politically motivated Buddhists
of the more urbanized sections of the populace who are
heirs to the type of puritanical religiosity fostered
by an early twentieth-century reformer, the Anagarika
Dharmapala, and that the fundamentalists are something
of a minority, albeit a powerful minority.

=EC...our inquiries then seek not so much to identify
specific social institutions, individual people, or a
specific system of thought and practice, but rather
focus upon the designation of a religious trait or
propensity, a trait or propensity often articulated
through exclusive and uncompromising claims to truth
made on the basis of literalistic readings of sacred,
authoritative texts containing powerful and idealistic
mythic visions of the past. For the
fundamentalistically inclined, this vision of the past
is what also serves as a blueprint for the future and,
as H.L. Seneviratne has noted in another place, has
sometimes functioned as a rationalization for the
perpetration of violence against or the political
marginalization of others in the present. Being
fundamentalistic, then, denotes a particular way in
which some people claim their religiousness. But this
is a type of religiousness that seems also subservient
to militant and often intolerant political
machinations. It tends to breed, for instance, fear
(the =EBshadow=ED hanging over Jeganathan=EDs Colombo
Tamils), alienation (in Hollup=EDs Plantation Tamils),
an acquiescent assimilation (in Bartholomeusz=ED
Anglicans and Burghers or Stirrat=EDs Roman Catholics)
or a countering and correspondent fundamentalistic
antipathy (in de Munck=EDs Sinhala Muslims) in other Sri
Lankan communities.

>From the essays comprising this volume, we have also
learned that being fundamentalistic is also a
particular way in which some people who are religious
in the aforementioned regard are simultaneously
political...

While it can be argued that not all ways of being
religious, or more specifically not all ways of being
Buddhist, are inherently political in nature, we can
entertain the assertion that the quest for gaining or
maintaining political power is intrinsic to
Sinhala-Buddhist fundamentalist religiosity. Taking
this one step further, I tend to conclude, on the
basis of reviewing the previous essays of this volume,
that political power is usually the primary aim for
Sinhala Buddhists with the fundamentalist trait. In
fact, it seems to be their hallmark.

Laying claim to this conclusion, however, does not
mean that the dynamics of the current ethno-political
conflict in Sri Lanka can be understood strictly along
the lines of religious divides. While both Stirrat in
his essay and Bartholomeusz and de Silva in the
Introduction emphasize how religious and national
identities were conflated in the colonial context of
the late nineteenth century, virtually all the
contributors to this volume recognize that language,
race, and ethnicity [and class] are now just as
important factors in generating social identity and
alienation between communities in the present...That
is, communal identity, let alone ethnic or national
identity, is no longer necessarily coextensive with
religion, In fact, being Sinhala or being Tamil is
precisely what now divides virtually all Christian
communities in Sri Lanka, especially the Roman
Catholic.

What is primarily significant, then about contemporary
fundamentalistic Buddhists is that, like their late
nineteenth predecessors for whom religion and
ethnicity were largely conflated, their Buddhism is
intimately linked to political ideology=D6 In the
present, Buddhism is consciously invoked by
politically motivated Sinhalas to advance their own
empowerment (usually to the exclusion of other
communities) or to rationalize their agendas for
actions taken against other communities in post hoc
fashion. In the former nineteenth-century instance,
the revival of Buddhism contributed to the formation
of a new national political consciousness; in the
latter instance of the present, Buddhism becomes a
powerful trope [figure of speech] for expressing a
matured political ideology that may be more
appropriately identified as communal (since it is not
inclusive enough to be truly national for a
multiethnic society). Not only is this political
ideology that invokes Buddhism as a trope not really
broad enough in conception to be truly national in
scope, I would suspect, quite frankly, that it is not
primarily religious either, especially since its
avowed aims are not ultimately soteriological
[theology dealing with salvation] in nature.

The traditional Sinhala adage that =EBthe country exists
for the sake of the religion,=ED as a statement that
formerly characterized the rationale for Buddhist
kingship in Sri Lanka and other Theravada countries,
would no longer seem to hold in relation to the aims
of these political Buddhists. Rather, it may be more
accurate to say that for fundamentalistic Sinhala
Buddhists of the present, the religion exists for the
sake of those aspiring to control the state. Buddhism
is a trope of continuing powerful appeal in a world of
political expediencies.

Having said that, it also needs to be emphasized that
since the 1950s, politics among the Sinhala
constituency has been dominated by just such appeals
to Buddhism for the sake of legitimation and in the
service of expediency. Since that time Buddhism has
been afforded a special place in the nation=EDs series
of constitutions with each new government stopping
just short of declaring it, de facto, the official
religion of the state. In practice, or de jure, it has
functioned as such, at least publicly, for the
Buddhists in power.=EE (pps.187-190)

=EC... That is the historicization of mythic images
embedded in the Mahavamsa is continuously facilitated
by the institutionalization or ritualization of
national holidays celebrating landmark moments in the
mythologized history of Sri Lanka=EDs Buddhism. As long
as governments in Sri Lanka ritualistically promote
Buddhist holidays as celebrations of national
importance, pledge their resources and energies to the
propagation of Buddhist ideals, and invoke Buddhist
images of what constitutes a moral and just society,
then we can continue to expect the idealization of the
Buddhist past to be articulated as the blueprint for
the nation=EDs present and future. That is, we can
expect that that ritualistic invocation of mythic
imagery will continue to serve and inform
Sinhala-Buddhist political consciousness. In this
regard, it is highly relevant to recall Donald
Swearer=EDs observation (noted by de Silva) that =EBthe
primary =ECfundamentalism=EE extracted from the sacred
=ECsource texts=EE of Sri Lanka (the myths and legends) is
properly speaking more reflective of, and at the
service of, the nationalist rather than the Buddhist
worldview.=ED

Swearer=EDs observation is an important one, for it
signals what is, in fact, the basic dilemma faced by
what de Silva has referred to as the more =EBbenign=ED
orientation of the Sinhala-Buddhist community and
perhaps by President Kumaratunga herself. It is a
dilemma faced by Sri Lanka=EDs more secularized liberals
as well. The dilemma is this: How to construct an
inclusive nationalist discourse which recognizes the
importance of a Buddhist historical past yet
transcends its fundamentalistic myth and ritual
function as a blueprint for the present and future.
That is, How is it possible to transcend the sacred
canopy of Buddhist nationalist discourse so that a new
more inclusive discourse can recognize the diversity
of Sri Lanka=EDs various communities? What=EDs at stake is
the discovery of a new political vision for Sri
Lanka=EDs future, one that is not simply dependent upon
a pandering to ethnicity, language, and religion....

In the end, however, this may prove to be an overly
idealistic sentiment, much too much to expect in a
South Asian political climate which continues to be
fragmented or totalized by appeals to religion and
ethnicity. Sri Lanka is certainly not alone in this
struggle. Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Maldives are
essentially Islamic states, while India is witnessing
a surging wave of Hindu fundamentalist politics.
Whatever the future portends, more totalizing or
fragmenting politics or not, religion,
fundamentalistic or not, is certain to remain an
important player in the dynamic.=EE(p.193-4)

Avis Sri Jayantha
for Sangam Research