[sacw] Policy Brief - Preventing a Nuclear Arms Race in South Asia

[Harsh Kapoor]

=46YI
South Asians Against Nukes
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The Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of
Notre Dame announces the publication of:
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PREVENTING A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN SOUTH ASIA:
U.S. POLICY OPTIONS
Policy Brief #2, January 2000
By Samina Ahmed and David Cortright
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available on the web at <http://www.nd.edu/~krocinst/policybrief2.html>

Recommendations:
- The United States must unequivocally demand that India and Pakistan join
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states.

- The United States should retain punitive sanctions which target Indian
and Pakistani institutions and policymakers responsible for their nuclear
weapons programs.

- Targeted incentives should be provided that seek to diminish internal
support for nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan.

- The United States should fulfill its obligation under Article VI of the
NPT to achieve global nuclear disarmament.

U.S. nonproliferation policy faces a major challenge as an all-out nuclear
arms race threatens to break out in South Asia. An Indian draft nuclear
doctrine released by an officially constituted advisory panel to the Indian
National Security Council on August 17, 1999 envisages a nuclear triad in
which nuclear weapons would be delivered by aircraft, submarines and mobile
land-based ballistic missiles. While it is not certain that New Delhi will
opt for such broad capabilities, the current direction of policy is clearly
toward nuclear weapons deployment. Since Pakistan's nuclear policy is
India-centric and reactive in nature, the introduction of nuclear weapons
and their delivery systems within the Indian armed forces would greatly
increase the likelihood of a retaliatory Pakistani deployment. Operational
nuclear weapons and delivery systems will result in a South Asian nuclear
arms race that could have serious consequences for regional stability, the
stability of the Middle East, and global peace.

=46or the past three decades, India and Pakistan have been engaged in a
nuclear rivalry that is both a symptom and a cause of their bilateral
discord. India and Pakistan have a long history of conflict including three
wars and a long-standing territorial dispute over Kashmir. Each Indian and
Pakistani step up the nuclear ladder introduces new tensions in their
troubled relationship. India's decision to acquire nuclear weapons and to
demonstrate its nuclear weapons capability in 1974 resulted in the
Pakistani adoption of a nuclear weapons program. As their nuclear weapons
capabilities grew, so did their mutual suspicions and animosity. In May
1998 as India and Pakistan held nuclear tests, abandoning nuclear ambiguity
for an overt nuclear weapon status, relations between the two states were
seriously strained. From May to July 1999, India and Pakistan came
perilously close to war during a major military clash near Kargil in the
disputed territory of Kashmir, a conflict that had the potential of
escalating into a nuclear exchange. Since mistrust and hostility continue
to mar their relationship, as the recent controversy over the hijacked
Indian airliner underscored, the potential for a conventional war remains
high. Nuclear weapons deployment will fuel a nuclear arms race between
India and Pakistan and at the same time heighten the chances of an
intentional or inadvertent nuclear exchange.

Since a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan will further
destabilize a violent and conflict-prone region, there is a pressing need
for the U.S. to dissuade India and Pakistan from deploying nuclear weapons
and to reverse their nuclear course. Beyond the immediate threats posed by
such an arms race to the one-fifth of humanity which resides within South
Asia, nuclear weapons deployment in India and Pakistan would also have a
far-reaching impact on the nuclear dynamics in the region and beyond,
threatening vital U.S. national security interests. The deployment of
nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in Pakistan, for instance, would
strengthen the position of nuclear advocates in neighboring Iran. The
deployment of nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable ballistic missiles by
India would influence China's nuclear doctrine. An India-Pakistan nuclear
arms race could therefore result in a parallel Pakistan-Iran and
Sino-Indian nuclear arms race. A South Asian nuclear arms race would also
erode the global non-proliferation regime, embodied in the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), undermining the confidence of signatory
states in the treaty's ability to buttress their security. For all these
reasons, the U.S. must prevent the incipient nuclear arms competition in
South Asia from becoming an all-out arms race.

U.S. Policy and Nuclear South Asia
Some analysts and policymakers argue that the United States has failed to
prevent nuclear proliferation in South Asia because of flawed policy
directions and an over-reliance on sanctions as an instrument of U.S.
influence. Since the initial U.S. emphasis on the rollback and elimination
of Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons capabilities failed to contain
South Asian nuclear proliferation, these analysts contend, the U.S should
accept nuclear weapons in South Asia and adopt the more realistic goal of
"arms control," which merely seeks to limit their number and
sophistication. According to this view, Washington should concentrate on
encouraging India and Pakistan to refrain from a nuclear arms race and
seeking ways to reduce the risk of nuclear war. At the same time,
incentives should replace sanctions as the primary means of influence. U.S.
interests would be best served, according to this view, by a policy of
engagement with India and Pakistan that goes beyond the one-point agenda of
nuclear non-proliferation.

To prevent India and Pakistan from embarking on a nuclear arms race, it is
indeed important to examine the previous shortcomings of U.S.
nonproliferation policy in South Asia and to identify alternative policy
options. This must not mean, however, abandoning non-proliferation goals in
favor of arms control. Any U.S. attempt to promote an India-Pakistan arms
control regime is unlikely to succeed. Aside from the challenges posed by
conventional and nuclear asymmetries between India and Pakistan and the
integration of a reluctant China into a South Asian arms control
arrangement, a formal India-Pakistan nuclear restraint regime requires at
the very least the absence of war and a modicum of mutual trust. On the
contrary, relations between India and Pakistan are shaped by an ongoing,
decade-old, low-intensity conflict in the disputed territory of Kashmir and
three near-war situations since the 1980s.

It is imperative for the United States to dissuade India and Pakistan from
going further down the nuclear road. Washington cannot achieve this goal
through the abandonment of non-proliferation, and the tacit acceptance of
India and Pakistan's nuclear weapons status. Proliferation may have
occurred already in South Asia, but India and Pakistan can be convinced to
cap, rollback and even abandon their nuclear weapons programs if the
reasons that prompted them to acquire nuclear weapons are addressed. Indian
and Pakistani decisions to acquire nuclear weapons were the outcome of
cost-benefit analyses of the presumed benefits of nuclearization. The
United States can play a major role in influencing the present and future
directions of nuclear proliferation in South Asia by convincing Indian and
Pakistani decision makers that the costs of nuclearization far exceed its
benefits. This will require clearly defined non-proliferation goals and the
use of the most appropriate instruments to reverse the nuclear directions
of India and Pakistan.

In the past, U.S. policy goals and objectives were contradictory. As a
result, the tools of U.S. policy, sanctions or incentives, failed to
dissuade Indian and Pakistani decision makers from pursuing their nuclear
ambitions. Cold War strategic considerations often took precedence over
non-proliferation objectives. U.S. policy shifted from elimination to
rollback and then to the current emphasis on a cap on Indian and Pakistani
nuclear weapons capabilities. Each shift in U.S. policy emboldened India
and Pakistan's nuclear advocates.

Washington's use of policy instruments was also ineffective. Sanctions and
incentives only succeed if they are properly targeted and consistently
applied. These preconditions were not present in South Asia. Washington's
reluctance to sanction India after its nuclear test in 1974 motivated
Pakistan to follow the Indian nuclear example. In the 1980s Washington
again sent the wrong signal to Indian and Pakistani decision makers. The
United States not only failed to sanction Pakistan for its nuclear
development but showered billions of dollars of military aid on the Zia ul
Haq dictatorship as part of the struggle against Soviet involvement in
Afghanistan. In the 1990s Washington offered incentives to India and
Pakistan to encourage nuclear restraint, despite accumulating evidence of
each country's continuing nuclear weapons development.

=46ollowing the May 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia, Washington imposed
mandatory sanctions on India and Pakistan and identified five benchmarks
for their removal: curbs on the further development or deployment of
nuclear-capable missiles and aircraft, Indian and Pakistani accession to
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), participation in Fissile Material
Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) negotiations, curbs on the transfer of nuclear
technology and hardware, and an India-Pakistan dialogue on normalization of
relations. The imposition of sanctions initially led to Indian and
Pakistani concessions, including their declared willingness to accede to
the CTBT and the resumption of an India-Pakistan dialogue. The United
States subsequently failed to sustain these punitive measures, however.
India and Pakistan backed away from their earlier pledges to join the CTBT,
while their normalization dialogue became the casualty of the May-July 1999
undeclared war in Kashmir and the presence of hardline governments in both
states.

With tensions in South Asia remaining high, the United States must clearly
state its opposition to the presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia.
Washington must demonstrate its resolve through targeted, consistently
applied sanctions and incentives designed to influence the cost-benefit
analysis of Indian and Pakistani nuclear decision makers. A failure to do
so will result in the deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery
systems in India and Pakistan and the likelihood of the first use of
nuclear weapons since 1945.

Policy Recommendations
1. In its policy toward India and Pakistan, the United States must
unequivocally demand that India and Pakistan join the NPT as
non-nuclear-weapon states. The current U.S. emphasis on South Asian nuclear
restraint is being misconstrued or deliberately misrepresented by the
Indian and Pakistani governments as a tacit acceptance of their nuclear
weapons status.

2. In an amendment contained in the U.S. Defense Appropriations Bill,
Congress has given the President indefinite waiver authority to lift
military and economic sanctions, including those imposed automatically
under earlier legislation on Pakistan and India. This waiver authority must
be used judiciously. Broad and sweeping economic sanctions that adversely
affect the weaker segments of Indian and Pakistani society should be
removed. But Washington should retain those punitive measures that target
Indian and Pakistani institutions and policymakers responsible for their
nuclear weapons programs. These include curbs on the sale and supply of
military hardware to Pakistan, the transfer of dual-use technology to
India, and military and scientific exchanges with nuclear entities and
actors in both states.

3. Targeted incentives should be provided, conditional on progress towards
nonproliferation, that would seek to diminish internal support for nuclear
weapons in India and Pakistan. These could include the partial forgiveness
of India and Pakistan's external debt, increased U.S. assistance for social
sector development, and enhanced U.S. support for developmental loans and
credits from international financial institutions to India and Pakistan.
Such assistance should be linked to concrete steps toward military and
nuclear restraint.

4. In re-committing itself to the goals of non-proliferation, the United
States should fulfill its own obligation, under Article VI of the NPT, to
achieve global nuclear disarmament. This will encourage the advocates of
denuclearization in both India and Pakistan and strengthen the norm against
the development and use of nuclear weapons not only in South Asia but
throughout the world.
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SAMINA AHMED is a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. A
political scientist who works on South Asian nuclear proliferation, Ahmed
recently authored "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and
Nuclear Choices," International Security 23 (Spring 1999), and she and
Cortright co-edited Pakistan and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear
Options (Notre Dame Press, 1998). She can be contacted at
samina_ahmed@h...

DAVID CORTRIGHT is President of Fourth Freedom Forum in Goshen, Indiana and
a research fellow of the Kroc Institute. Cortright has authored and edited
several books, including The Price of Peace: Incentives and International
Conflict Prevention (Rowman & Littlefield, 1997) and, with George A. Lopez,
The Sanctions Decade: Assessing Security Council Strategies During the
1990s (Lynne Rienner Publications, 2000). He can be contacted at
dcortright@f...

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