[sacw] [ACT] sacw dispatch (20 March 00)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Web Dispatch
18 March 2000
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#1. India's Defence budget hike & its implications
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#1.

Special to Newsline [March 2000]

28 percent defence budget rise amidst war clouds

By Praful Bidwai in New Delhi

The unprecedented spurt in India's defence budget must be seen in the
context of nuclearisation, a hardening of strategic postures under the
communal BJP, and heightened military preparations.

Just one year after the event, the Vajpayee-Sharif meeting in Lahore seems
like a distant, hazy, blur-a brief interlude in a prolonged, sordid,
bloody, and yet escalating, confrontation. Even the slenderest of hopes
that India and Pakistan would moderate their rivalry now stands dashed. If
the Kargil conflict blew a huge hole right through the agenda for
conciliation and peace, bitterness on both sides has eroded it from the
edges inwards. The further hardening of belligerent postures since, with
rancour compounded by suspicion and hatred, may prove to be the last nail
in conciliation's coffin.

Not that Lahore was a great substantive achievement. The agreements it
yielded did not seek to stop, even slow down, the India-Pakistan nuclear
and missile races. They at best made them a little more transparent: the
two sides only agreed to exchange information about missile test-flights
and any "accidental, unauthorised or unexplained nuclear incident." They
did not even agree to a bilateral moratorium on testing, only to abide by
their unilateral offers not to test-subject to the "supreme national
interest", of course. But Lahore was symbolically, iconically, important.
It set the stage for what could have been serious nuclear restraint and
arms control measures. In the event, even its iconic significance was
crushed.

What followed Lahore was war masquerading as "conflict"; the enunciation
of offensive nuclear doctrines; furious military preparations; and the
resumption of aggressive military manoeuvres more recently, which have left
52 soldiers dead in the five weeks alone. Military experts and field
commanders expect serious border clashes in April and May when the snows
melt and the mountain passes fully open. Some even forecast a repeat of
Kargil 1999.

Amidst this degradation of the security environment comes India's budget
which sends military expenditure soaring by 28.2 percent (or by $3 billion
or Rs. 130 billion) to Rs. 590 billion-the highest such increase ever in a
single year. The defence budget spurt has come in for a fair amount of
criticism despite the elaborate excuses proffered for it, and the
government's high-pitched campaign against "cross-border terrorism". Many
Parliamentarians have questioned its rationale. Eminent economists,
including Left-winger Amiya Kumar Bagchi and Right-winger Meghnad Desai,
have equally sharply attacked it as perverse. Even the defence forces did
not expect the government to jack up the budget to Rs. 590 billion, their
wildest hope being Rs. 570 billion.

Steeply raised military spending makes a mockery of India's real
priorities, which lie in provision of drinking water, health, literacy,
education and other social services. The mere increase in this year's
military spending exceeds one-third of India's entire annual expenditure on
primary education. India's total social sector budget adds up to less than
the money set aside just to buy new weapons. Meanwhile chunks of last
year's education and health budget lie unspent because of negligence and
lack of serious commitment to the social sector. But thanks to Kargil, last
year's actual military spending exceeded the budget allocation by seven
percent.

Since 1996, India's military budget has doubled in nominal rupees-the
biggest such increase under any budget head. This is despite government's
lip-service to Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen's call to cut military spending,
and greatly raise allocations to literacy, health and education.

Unlike in the past, when a big chunk of the increase in military spending
was claimed by personnel salaries, about three-fourths of the rise this
time is on account of acquisitions of new weapons, modernisation and
"stores". Of the total defence expenditure, the army has been given 56
percent, the Air Force 25, the Navy 14 and Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO) a little over five percent. Allocations to Atomic
Energy and Space have been raised by 16 and 17 percent respectively.

Among new materiel to be acquired are Advance Jet Trainers, Mirage-2000s,
attack helicopters, unmanned aerial-reconnaissance vehicles, Russian T-90
tanks, 155mm artillery, frigates and possibly an aircraft carrier.

How much of the increased allocation will go into nuclear warheads and
missiles development is a matter of speculation. But considering that the
DRDO is the principal agency responsible, a further increase in its
allocations (over and above the 27 per cent rise in capital outlay of Rs.
8.3 billion) is not excluded. As the Finance Minister said: "More will be
provided whenever needed"-a trade-mark assurance of the BJP. Officials
quoted by The Economic Times say that the rise in budgeted spending this
year "is only the beginning. Normally, defence contracts take anywhere
between 18-24 months to complete. Defence orders are placed with a small
advance payment, which is what is accounted for in the current budget=8A the
real defence demand in the wake of Kargil will come in the next budget."

What is especially unconscionable about this generous increase in the
military budget-coupled with a 70 percent cut in food subsidies for the
poor and measly increases in social spending-is that much of it is pure
waste, besides being a drain on profitable public sector corporations.

There is enormous scope for cutting India's defence spending by eliminating
wasteful practices, "accumulated obsolescence" and the "scandalous" system
of defence procurement-in the words of an Australian military historian. An
official committee (Arun Singh) appointed 10 years ago had recommended a
20-25 percent cut in military spending. India has some of the world's most
fuel-inefficient aircraft and vehicles in its military. India's is one of
the few armies anywhere in which every officer has a private batman or
dedicated personal slave. Legal affidavits recently filed by military
officials document huge padding of procurement costs.

The latest military budget spurt is directly driven by sharpened rivalry
with Pakistan. Yashwant Sinha admitted as much on March 1 when he said it
Gen Pervez Musharraf "who has hiked [our] defence expenditure". No wonder
Islamabad has reacted adversely to his budget, accusing India of
"hegemonic" ambitions. If past trends are anything to go by, Pakistan will
try to match India by procuring more weapons too.

Such a military-spending spiral is liable to spin out of control if India
and Pakistan proceed to build, as declared, sizeable nuclear arsenals and
extremely expensive missiles and other delivery vehicles, including costly
submarines, citing Kargil-99 as a warrant for the highest level of military
preparedness.

Kargil, which saw the mobilisation of 35,000 troops, scores of air strikes
and the killing of 2,000-plus soldiers, was the world's worst ever
conventional conflict between two de facto nuclear weapons-states, beside
which the 1969 Ussuri river clashes between the former USSR and China pale
into insignificance. Kargil totally falsified the prediction that the
possession of nuclear weapons would improve the security environment in
South Asia, stabilise India-Pakistan relations, and deter overt
conventional conflict.
=0BKargil had a definite potential to escalate to the nuclear level. Indian
and Pakistani officials (ministers and high-ranking military commanders)
exchanged direct or indirect nuclear threats with another no fewer than 13
times during that conflict. The threats varied from statements of
"readiness" to defeat any form of aggression, to deliberate provocation and
reminders that "our nuclear weapons are not for display on the shelf".
(Pakistan minister Raja Zafrul Haq)
=0BYet, no lessons seem to have been learned from Kargil. Indian and
Pakistani leaders continue to make bellicose statements on nuclear weapons
at the drop of a hat. Indeed, these have become more aggressive and loud.
Thus, rather than exercise the utmost restraint even in minor skirmishes,
Indian leaders have begun to treat the outbreak of conventional conflict
with Pakistan as normal, routine and acceptable, perhaps the more so under
the newly acquired "nuclear shield".
=0BDefence Minister George Fernandes on January 24 propounded a whole new
doctrine-that of "limited war"--at a strategic studies conference in New
Delhi when he exhorted Pakistan to "absorb the real meaning of
nuclearisation", viz that nuclear deterrence does not rule out all wars,
only nuclear wars. He also boasted that India had proved in Kargil that it
can engage Pakistan in a conventional war "at any place and time chosen by
the aggressor", and win such a war.
=0BAs if in "retaliation", Pakistan too elevated its nuclear rhetoric. On
=46ebruary 3, it announced it had set up a National Command Authority (NCA)
to create command and control mechanisms for its nuclear weapons and
missiles. The NCA would be responsible for policy formulation and will
exercise "employment and development control over all strategic nuclear
forces and strategic organisations." This signalled Pakistan's intent to
move towards induction and possible deployment of nuclear weapons. =0B=0BThe
Indian "answer" followed within three days. It came from none other than
Vajpayee, the supposedly "sober" and "soft" face of the extreme-right
Hindu-chauvinist BJP. On February 6, Vajpayee thundered at Jalandhar:
"Pakistan is threatening a nuclear war, but do they even know what it
means? They think that they will drop one bomb and they'll win and we'll
lose. This won't happen. We said we won't be the first to use nuclear
weapons, but if anyone uses them against us, anyone threatens us, we will
not wait for our annihilation=8AWe are prepared for any eventuality=8A "
=0BThis vituperative statement represents a serious degradation of India's
much tom-tommed "No First Use" posture. It is the most sinister statement
of nuclear recklessness yet on the part of an Indian or Pakistani leader.
The fact that it could be so casually made in peacetime speaks to the
actuality of the nuclear damage in South Asia. One shudders to think of
what could happen during an outbreak of hostilities. Implicit in Vajpayee's
triumphalist discourse is the notion that nuclear wars are winnable, that
there can be victors. This is unspeakably dangerous. It is not a statement
even Ronald Reagan would give credence to. =0B=0BSuch statements have to be
seen in a larger context: the degeneration of India-Pakistan relations
after the October 12 coup in Pakistan and New Delhi's visceral opposition
to the Musharraf regime, as well as in the official stance on, amongst
other things, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). India seemed just a
year ago, even three months ago, inclined to sign the treaty. It is showing
growing signs of reluctance. The RSS has warned against immediate
signature. And the quality of the media debate on the CTBT has changed.

This is itself part of the coarsening, trivialisation and debasement of
India's entire strategic discourse. This bears a sharp contrast to the
fevered contestation over that very issue in 1995-96, in the months before
the treaty was adopted. The debate then too was largely one-sided and
steeped for the most part in hawkish nationalism. But it at least made a
reference to doctrines, principles, and long-term objectives, and stressed
nuclear disarmament. Today, that reference is absent.

This is the backdrop against which the recent hardline posturing by India's
Hindu Right must be seen. The phenomenon includes Vajpayee who, contrary to
appearances, is very much an RSS loyalist, and is becoming increasingly
vocal as one. Thus, it was no accident that Vajpayee openly said at
Darbhanga in Bihar (February 19): "We have categorically said no to a
dialogue till Pakistan returns the land it occupies in Kashmir. We want to
tell the world that we will not hold any dialogue with Islamabad till this
condition is fulfilled."

=46or Indian leaders, Clinton's visit is part of a long-term process, of the
US moving towards a de facto acceptance of India's "minimal nuclear
deterrent" as something related to the country's genuine security needs, or
if you prefer, the US initiation of India (and Pakistan) into the Nuclear
Club.

The "Draft Nuclear Doctrine" commits India to a huge, open-ended arsenal
with capabilities on land, air and sea. It makes nonsense of the idea of a
"minimum" deterrent. It is yet to be adopted by the Cabinet, even by the
National Security Council, but it sets the trend.

Two clear conclusions emerge. The nuclear danger in South Asia is very
real. India-Pakistan relations are today at their lowest in peacetime. They
are extraordinarily volatile and vulnerable to any number of domestic and
bilateral factors, including changing political moods, politico-religious
movements, low-intensity conflict in Kashmir, and generalised diplomatic
rivalry. The Hindu Right is consciously upping the ante and drawing the
region into an arms race.

The likelihood of accidental, unintended or unauthorised use of nuclear
weapons in South Asia is very real. There is little strategic distance
between India and Pakistan. Missile flight-time between them can be as
little as three minutes-too little for crisis defusion. Neither India nor
Pakistan has the wherewithal to develop reliable command and control
systems for nuclear weapons. They are both highly accident-prone societies.
The agencies involved in their nuclear weapons programmes have a remarkably
poor safety record, marked by breaches of regulations and a low degree of
reliability. This gives India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry a particularly
dangerous edge.

Secondly, such a situation calls for a far more radical and comprehensive
approach than mere confidence-building or crisis-defusion measures of the
conventional variety. Historically, even the success of CBMs has largely
been premised upon the willingness to trust and shared faith of adversaries
in their own military rationality. It is doubtful if these conditions
obtain in the sub-continent given the depth and range of mutual suspicion,
distrust and hostility.

That is why India and Pakistan must not drift into the super-hazardous game
of trying to "manage" their nuclear rivalry after inducting and deploying
nuclear weapons. They must stop now.-end-