[sacw] [ACT] saanp (21 March 00)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asians Against Nukes Post
21 March 2000
------------------------------------------
#1. People's conference calls for a nuclear-free Asia
#2. Clouds of Nuclear War Over South Asia
------------------------------------------

#1.

Inter Press Service
February 2000

People's conference calls for a nuclear-free Asia

By Praful Bidwai in Dhaka

Now that India and Pakistan have become de facto nuclear weapons-states
(NWSs), South Asia has no alternative but to live with their atomic
rivalry; at best, they can be asked to control mutual hostility, make their
nuclear weapons safe, and exercise restraint until the five "official" NWSs
move towards complete nuclear disarmament.

Right? Sounds reasonable? Yes, say many policy-makers in India and
Pakistan, and even some strategic experts with their eyes focused on
"realistic" options before states.

Wrong, say people's organisations and Asian disarmament activists, with
their emphasis firmly on the immorality, illegality and strategic
irrationality of nuclear weapons, and their focus on comprehensive or human
security.

That is the principal conclusion of more than 150 activists and scholars
>from 14 countries of South and Southeast Asia who met in Dhaka on February
18-20 at a nuclear disarmament conference, the first of its kind to to be
held after India and Pakistan conducted their nuclear tests in 1998.

The Conference gave a call for a nuclear-free Asia, stressed that nuclear
weapons everywhere generate insecurity, not security, and demanded that
India and Pakistan immediately freeze and dismantle their programmes to
develop nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, as well as sign the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and other restraint measures, and return to
the global disarmament agenda.

The three-day Conference, with the motto, "Peace Builds, Bombs Destroy",
discussed a range of issues pertaining to nuclear weapons, society and
security. It deliberated on the grave danger from the global arsenal (with
its 35,000 nuclear weapons) and the state of the international nuclear
disarmament negotiations, (which is marked by an impasse after the May 1998
South Asian tests, the subsequent enlargement of NATO, and the rejection by
the US Senate of the CTBT.)

The Conference explored the connections between nuclear weapons,
militarism, human rights and democracy and endorsed both comprehensive and
international approaches to global nuclear weapons abolition. The former
involves a Nuclear Weapons Convention. And the second, the step-by-step
approach, includes No First Use commitments, de-alerting of nuclear
weapons, separating warheads from delivery systems, stopping production of,
and eradicating, all fissile materials, as well as regional approaches such
as nuclear weapons-free zones (NWFZs).

The Conference stressed the relevance of negotiating NWFZs for all regions
in the Northern hemisphere, including South Asia, and called upon
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka to explore joining the already signed Bangkok
Treaty for an NWFZ in Southeast Asia. It recommended that Nepal be declared
a nuclear-free zone of peace.

The Dhaka Declaration, issued at the end of the Conference, condemned India
and Pakistan for "embracing the doctrine of deterrence, and undertaking the
development of nuclear weapons and their delivery system" and thus "gravely
endangering their own and the region's security and setting back the global
nuclear disarmament agenda. This nuclearisation imitates hegemonic states
whose nuclear weapons represent the gravest danger to global security."

The Declaration deplored "the recent hardening of nuclear postures in the
region" as expressed in India's August 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine and
Pakistan's announcement of a Command and Control structure.

It noted that "nuclearisation has escalated mutual suspicion and hostility
between and Pakistan, as witnessed in the Kargil conflict. It has
strengthened communal, militarist, authoritarian and centralising political
tendencies within the two countries. The rapidly worsening security
environment cannot be redressed by standard confidence-building and
crisis-defusing measures. This is why the Conference calls for an immediate
freezing and dismantling of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear and missile
programmes."

Although the main emphasis of the Conference resolutions was on South Asia,
the location of the Conference and of a large number of its
activist-participants, the meeting also underscored the need for a global
coalition of peace and anti-nuclear activists, which works at the Asian and
international levels too.

It called "on the US, Russia, UK, France and China to honour their
disarmament obligation under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty as re-emphasised by the 1996 World Court Judgment, and to ratify,
and live up to the spirit of the CTBT by closing down their test sites and
halting development of new weapons designs". It said the P-5 "must also
immediately undertake further steps towards disarmament such as the fissile
materials treaty, taking nuclear weapons off alert and work towards a
convention to abolish nuclear weapons. We oppose all proposals for
ballistic missile systems, including research. The US and Russia must
further the START process. Japan should cease cooperation with the US on
Theatre Missile Defence systems."

The Dhaka conference was organised by "Focus on the Global South" (Bangkok
and Mumbai) and Community Development Library (Dhaka). "Focus" has been
actively campaigning for the past four years on alternative concepts of
security as well as connection between security, economic policy and trade.

Among the issues discussed at length was the nexus between nuclear weapons
and nuclear power generation. These are Siamese twins. Nuclear power
creates the infrastructure for weapons development; and hence, the
"abolition of nuclear weapons cannot be sustained without ending reliance
on nuclear power generation which has damaging social and ecological
impacts. [The Conference) therefore calls for pursuing alternative,
sustainable, energy paths in the region."

In particular, the Conference demanded that Bangladesh reject the proposals
made by certain lobbies to set up a nuclear power generation plant at
Rooppur---an unpopular project which without economic or ecological
rationale, spells serious environmental health hazards.

The Conference brought together varying groups of activists: survivors
>from Hiroshima and Nagasaki; peace, environmental and human rights
activists from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal, besides India and Pakistan;
alternative security and anti-nuclear groups from Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines and from the South Pacific; besides international initiatives
such as the Hague Appeal for Peace and the International Association of
Lawyers against Nuclear Arms attended it.

The Conference concluded with what was probably the first-ever two-in-one
demonstration in Asia at both Indian and Pakistani missions. This colourful
march, with multilingual slogans, was an expression of solidarity among
different Asian groups. The demonstrators offered memoranda to both the
missions. Pakistan diplomats agreed to receive them. The Indian refused.

The Dhaka Conference represents a growing phenomenon: increasing solidarity
and joint action among public-spirited, progressive activists and scholars
on issues that until recently were considered outside the purview of civil
society intervention, including security, trade, labour and environmental
standards, and women's rights. It prefigures increased coordination among
nuclear abolitionists and intensive joint lobbying and advocacy in regional
and international forums.

India's and Pakistan's overt nuclearisation, one of the most dangerous
developments to have occurred in recent years, which has led to a
deterioration in the immediate security environment of 1.3 billion people,
may then have a silver lining to it: it seems to have triggered a nuclear
peace movement in South Asia, and impelled Indian and Pakistani activists
to work jointly with one another and with others in the neighbourhood as
never before.-end-
_________________

#2.

Clouds of Nuclear War Over South Asia

Dr. Inayatullah

A nuclear war between India and Pakistan can erupt in four different
situations. One of the two countries can start it intentionally. Both
could be sucked into an un-intended war. Inaccurate information and
miscalculation about the intention of the adversary can trigger it.
Finally it could occur accidentally and due to a failure of some
technical device.

Deterrence theory on which so much trust is generally placed for
preventing a nuclear war deals only with intentional nuclear war. It
assumes that two or more nations locked in mutual adversial relations
and equipped with nuclear weapons will not intentionally start a nuclear
war for fear of mutual assured destruction. This is a weak assumption.
In certain situations humans do destroy themselves willingly to inflict
greater loss on the enemy as is the case with "suicide bombers". Some
humans sacrifice their lives for sacred or secular causes seeking
martyrdom. Such people exist in both the countries and seek destruction
or disintegration of the other country regardless of its cost to their
own country. They may not be in power now but their influence over state
has considerably increased during the last decade. If they come to power
even in one country, chances of intentional nuclear war will certainly
increase.

Even without such people in power an intentional nuclear war may erupt
due to the declared nuclear doctrine of India and formally undeclared
but known doctrine of Pakistan. Indian doctrine commits the country to
expand its nuclear programme and develop a second strike capability.
Having at least a quantitative edge over Pakistan and perceived
capability of withstanding first nuclear strike, India conveniently
proclaims that it will not initiate a nuclear attack. Lacking material
and technical resources comparable to India, Pakistan has committed
itself to a policy of nuclear restraint and not to further develop its
nuclear programme. However, to ensure full deterrent effect of its
arsenal on India it declares that it will be compelled to use nuclear
weapons when its integrity and survival is at stake. Many Pakistani and
Indian strategists know that this is the point when larger Indian
conventional forces are about to overrun Pakistan's smaller forces.

Knowledge of the situation in which Pakistan will strike first may
induce India to make a pre-emptive strike before that situation arises
regardless of its declarations to the contrary. Not trusting Indian
declaration of no first strike and to reduce the damage such a strike
will do to it, Pakistan may not wait for the emergence of the situation
it specifies and may strike even before. Besides, the minds of political
and military elite of the two countries who are to make such decisions
are so conditioned by bitter past memories and suspicion of each other
that mutual assured destruction may not prevent them from striking first
for punishing the other country.

More than fifteen threats of use of nuclear weapons since 1998 tests by
the leaders of the two countries further compound the already dangerous
situation. These apparently empty and rhetorical threats were not too
far from an intentional war during Kargil clashes. Assessment of a
British Minister Peter Hain of Kargil clashes is that it brought
Pakistan and India "very close" to a nuclear exchange. The deposed Prime
Minister of Pakistan felt that way too when explaining his sudden visit
to Washington and his order to withdraw forces from Kargil.

Given the instability-producing doctrine and mistrusting mindsets of the
elite of the two countries, the festering dispute over Kashmir that led
to two wars before may precipitate an un-intended nuclear war as it did
in 1965 conventional war. The declared objectives of both countries
concerning Kashmir have set them against each other. India is determined
to keep the part of Kashmir it holds regardless of its cost to it. It
contends that only issue concerning Kashmir is its vacation by Pakistan
of the area held by it. It demands that Pakistan should stop
infiltration of militants allegedly trained and armed by it without
which there would be no dialogue. Pakistan on the other hand is
determined to wrest Kashmir from India through UN promised plebiscite
and failing that through moral and diplomatic support of Kashmiris'
right of self-determination. Such support often goes beyond the declared
limits.

If Indian leaders take their stands seriously, their forces may attack
Pakistan administered Kashmir or engage in hot pursuit of militants into
Pakistani territory. This may lead to a conventional war drifting into a
nuclear one.

An unintended nuclear war can occur due to miscalculations and wrong
information. Conditioned by memories of earlier wars the political and
military leaders of both countries are predisposed to misinterpreting
any information emerging from the other side as a well researched study
of Operation Brasstacks shows. During this Operation the military
leaders in both countries misinterpreted the reason behind the movements
of the armed forces of the other country. Confidence-building measures
that were in place during the crisis were not used. Whenever they were,
both sides thought that adversary was giving it false information to
mislead or deceive it. Their intelligence agencies further re-enforced
this suspicion by deliberately feeding wrong information. Pakistan took
the movement of Indian forces during the Operation so seriously that
according to several reports emerging from Pakistani sources it
threatened to use nuclear weapons against them.

Lack of well developed and unambiguous command and control structure,
foolproof safety mechanisms, early warning system and reliable means of
communication further raises the danger of nuclear war due to
miscalculation and wrong information. Even if they develop such a system
that appears to be beyond their technical and financial resources, it
may prove ineffective at the critical moment. The few minutes in which
their missiles have to fly to hit their targets is too small a time for
their decision-makers to reverse a nuclear attack after discovering that
it was launched on wrong information.

Finally a nuclear war can occur accidentally, due to technical failure
or misreading of data from a technical device. Such misreading happened
several times during the cold war between US and USSR. Even after the
end of cold war era it happened at least once. In January 1995 Russian
forces mistook a scientific rocket launched from Norway for US attack
leading to activation of Yeltsin's nuclear 'suitcase.' If correction was
not made in time, nuclear war may have started.

The argument that the fear of mutual assured destruction that prevented
nuclear war between US and Soviet Union during last fifty years will
also prevent such a war in South Asia is misleading. If the two
superpowers did not actually launch a nuclear war they were on the brink
of it during Cuban missile crisis. The decision-makers on both sides
were working on wrong assumptions about the intentions of each other as
was later revealed by some of them in a meeting organised by McNamara in
1989. The Soviet commanders in Cuba were authorised to use nuclear
weapons if US attacked Cuba. With 6000 nukes targeted on each other and
ready to be fired, a nuclear war between US and Russia can still happen
any time in future. Russian president's reminder to US when it
criticised economically weakened Russia during its attack on Chechnya
that it was dealing with a nuclear power is not very assuring in this
regard.

If nuclear war did not occur between US and USSR due to whatever reason,
it can occur in South Asia with the presence of certain factors that
were missing in the case of US and USSR. The US and USSR had no
territorial dispute before or during the cold war. India and Pakistan
have an explosive one over Kashmir. US and USSR had no historical
animosity and sharp religious divisions before the Cold war. India and
Pakistan have. Heroes of one country are villains of the other.

With the danger of a nuclear war so evident the two countries still
resist any idea of denuclearisation. At best they want to keep their
weapons at a level required for Minimum Credible Deterrence (MCD) which
they refuse to define in qualitative or quantitative terms. But elusive
MCD, if possible at all, can be maintained only in a stable balance of
terror that the two countries afflicted with a high degree of mistrust
will find hard to maintain. The level of MCD of a country at one point
of time has to be raised as the adversary raises its level. This starts
a race which both countries will loose probably the weaker and smaller
sooner than the larger and stronger one.

The nuclear weapons have given nothing to India and Pakistan but have
cost them a lot. Instead of ensuring mutual security they have
undermined it. They have not even reduced military tensions on their
borders that remain unabated. Undetermined but huge amounts spent on
their development and maintenance have impoverished the masses and
distorted their national priorities.

Only a total and simultaneous renunciation of nuclear weapons by both
countries can avert the danger of nuclear war within South Asia. This
can happen if the elite, intelligentsia and people of the two countries
realise the dreadful consequences of such a war for them, their people
and countries and they stop looking towards the world community to save
them from this catastrophe. After all it is their people who will be
subjected to it. Rest of world will suffer only some side effects of it.

Given the inflexible mindset of South Asian elite the other road to
denuclearisation of South Asia is by accelerating the process of global
denuclearisation starting with US that has the largest nuclear arsenal
and advanced nuclear technical capability. If US gives up nuclear
weapons, Russia and China would have no reason to keep them. If China
renounces them India followed by Pakistan may do the same. But turning
the vicious cycle of nuclear proliferation into an accelerated benign
cycle of denuclearisation is not an easy task. But if this benign cycle
is not started quickly and at an accelerated pace, the clouds of nuclear
war will continue hanging over the two countries. The fear of mutual
assured destruction may not stop them from drifting into that ultimate
and final war that leaves no survivors to talk about peace.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

South Asians Against Nukes:
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/NoNukes.html