[sacw] [ACT] Hindutva's foreign tie-up in the 1930s (Part II)

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Tue, 21 Mar 2000 23:47:59 +0100


FYI
(South Asia Citizens Web)
---------------------------------

[Posted below is the second and final part of the article]

Hindutva's foreign tie-up in the 1930s
Archival evidence

MARZIA CASOLARI

(courtesy Economic and Political Weekly, January 22, 2000)

The reference to the German minorities in Czechoslovakia was an implicit
comparison with the Indian situation. As Savarkar asserted in a speech in
the presence of some 4,000 people at Pune on October 11, 1938 if a
plebiscite had taken place in India, Muslims would have chosen to unite
with Muslims and Hindus with Hindus. This was a consequence of the
principle according to which it was not enough living together for a few
centuries to form a nation as the common desire to form a nation was
essential for the formation of a nation (MSA, Home special department,
60D(g) Pt II, 1937 extract from the weekly confidential report of the
District magistrate dated the October 21, 1938).
During Savarkar's presidentship the anti-Muslim rhetoric became more and
more radical and distinctly unpleasant. It was a rhetoric that made
continuous reference to the way Germany was managing the Jewish question.
Indeed speech after speech Savarkar supported Hitler's anti-Jewish policy
and on October 14, 1938 he suggested the following solution for the Muslim
problem in India:
A nation is formed by a majority living therein. What did the Jews do in
Germany? They being in minority were driven out from Germany (MSA, Home
special department, 60 D(g) Pt III, 1938 translation of the verbatim speech
made by VD Savarkar at Malegaon on October 14, 1938).
Then towards the end of the year in Thane in front of RSS militants and
local sumpathisers right at the time when the Congress expressed its
resolution against Germany. (16) Savarkar stated that in Germany the
movement of the Germans is the national movement but that of the Jews is a
communal one (MSA, Home special department, 60 D(g) Pt III, 1938, a report
on the meeting held on December 11, 1938). And again the next year on July
29 in Pune he said:
Nationality did not depend so much on a common geographical area as on
unity of thought, religion, language and culture. For this reason the
Germans and the Jews could not be regarded as a nation (MSA ibid, Extract
from the BP weekly letter n 31, dated August 5, 1939).
Without this unity not even Muslims and Hindus could be regarded as
belonging to the same nation. Indian Muslims should rather resign
themselves to be considered as a minority the recognition of whose rights
should depend on the magnanimity of the majority.
Finally at the end of 1939 on the occasion of the 21st session of the Hindu
Mahasabha, Savarkar made one of the most explicit comparisons between the
Muslim question in India and the Jewish problem in Germany:
The Indian Muslims are on the whole more inclined to identify themselves
and their interests with Muslims outside India than Hindus who live next
door like Jews in Germany. (17)
One can find a certain continuity between the ideas of nation and
nationhood expressed in Savarkar's Hindutva (18) and the content of these
declarations. Indeed in his book Savarkar referring to the Muslims asserted
that their holyland is far off in Arabia or Palestine. Their mythology and
godmen, ideas and heroes are not the children of this soil. Consequently
their names and their outlook smack of foreign origin (Hindutva: Who is a
Hindu? 4th ed, Bharat Mudranalaya, Pune 1949, p 94).
A feeling of admiration for the Jewish policy of Germany seems to have been
shared by the entire circle of Hindu nationalism at the end of the 1930s.
In we our nationhood defined Golwarkar who would have become general
secretary of the RSS a year later declared that German national pride has
now become the topic of the day. To keep up the purity of the nation and
its culture Germany shocked the world by her purging the country of the
semitic races the Jews national pride at its highest has been manifested
here. Germany has also shown how well-nigh impossible it is for races and
cultures having differences going to the mot (?) to be assimilated into one
united whole a good lesson for us in Hindustan to learn and profit by
(Nagpur, 1939, p 37).
This had its roots in the idea that being a Hindu was a matte of race and
blood not only a matter of culture. In turn that was an idea which was
strikingly similar to the racial myths elaborated in Germany more than in
Italy.
As demonstrated by Jaffrelot (op cot, pp 53-54), Golwarkar drew his idea of
nation and nationalism from the works of a German lawyer Johann Kaspar
Bluntschli.
Golwarkar's position regarding Muslims was even more extreme than
Savarkar's: in one word they (Muslims) must cease to be foreigners (19) or
may stay in the country wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation claiming
nothing deserving no privileges far less any preferential treatment not
even citizen's rights (op cit p 52).
Apart from the militants of the main Hindu organisations there is reason to
think that the Indian and particularly Marathi public opinion also was
exposed to the views of some newspapers which echoed Savarkar's
declarations (20) or published articles in favour of the dictators. In 1939
The Mahratta published a series of articles in favour of the international
policy of Italy and Germany (21) while Kesri of December 8 and 15, 1939
published an article bearing the title failure of democracy and rise of
fascism. There the same interpretation already expressed during the 1920s
was repeated according to which fascism arose from the crisis of democracy.
Fascism of obviously considered superior to democracy.
While this literature still focussed on both the dictators and their
policies already from the spring of 1939 the Savarkar-led Hindu Mahasabha
seemed to have finally chosen Germany as its main reference point at the
international level. On March 25, 1939 the Hindu party made the following
statement:
Germany's solemn idea of the revival of the Aryan culture the glorification
of the Swastika her patronage of Vedic learning and the ardent championship
of the tradition of Indo-Germanic civilisation are welcomed by the
religious and sensible Hindus of India with a jubilant hope. Only a few
socialists headed by Pandit J Nehru have created a bubble of resentment
against the present government of Germany but their activities are far from
having any significance in India. The vain imprecations of Mahatma Gandhi
against Germany's indispensable vigour in matters of internal policy obtain
but little regard insofar as they are uttered by a man who has always
betrayed and confused the country with an affected mysticism. I think that
Germany's crusade against the enemies of Aryan culture will bring all the
Aryan nations of the world to their senses and awaken the Indian Hindus for
the restoration of their lost glory (The declaration contained in
Auswartiges Amt-Politischen Archiv (AA-PA, Bonn)/Pol VII statement by the
spokesman of the Hindu Mahasabha, March 25, 1939 is quoted by M Hauner, op
cit p 66).
The aggressive racial policy carried out by Germany must have played a
fundamental role in this shift of interest from Italy to Germany.
At the practical level this shift was represented by the attempt made by
Savarkar to get in touch with other Hindu nationalist forces working
abroad. Throughout 1938 Savarkar had a considerable exchange of letters
with one of the historical leaders of the revolutionary movement abroad:
Rash Behari Bose (On Rash Behari Bose see Uma Mukherjee, two great Indian
revolutionaries, Firma KLM, Calcutta 1966). Rash Behari who had lived in
Japan since 1915 and had obtained Japanese nationality in 1923 was in touch
with the Japanese extreme right in particular with the Association of the
black Dragon (ASMAE, AP, Giappone (Japan) b6, 1934 b Movimento Panasiatico
(Pan-Asiatic Movement) express telegram n 166/113 from Italian embassy,
Tokyo, February 24, 1934 to the ministry of external affairs signed Auriti).
According to our sources Savarkar and Rash Behari were in touch at least
from March 1938. A couple of letters from Rash Behari to the president of
the Hindu Mahasabha were published by The Mahratta for propaganda purposes.
(22) The expected effect of the publication of the two letters was that
All Hindu Sanghatanists in India find themselves strengthened in their
views and activities to see you advocating the cause of Hindu Sanghatan and
taking up such a far seeing and insighted a view of the Indian situation
political and social (NMML, ibid, August 18).
In the summer of 1938 Rash Behari informed Savarkar of his intention to
open a branch of the Hindu Mahasabha in Japan. Even if the number of the
militants was small it could nevertheless become an authorised
international mouth piece of the Hindu Mahasabha and Hindudom as such in
Eastern foreign countries (NMML, ibid).
Savarkar's reply was favourable: the president of the Hindu Mahasabha
invited Rash Behari to realise his objective as soon as possible and
advised him that the Japanese branch of the party should be depend upon the
main office in India (NMML, ibid letter from Savarkar to Rash Behari Bose,
November 14, 1938 signed president Hindu Mahasabha).
In winter the closeness between the two leaders was such that Savarkar
asked Rash Behari to send a message to the Hindu Mahasabha session of
December 28 (NMML, ibid).
The contacts that Savarkar tried to establish with the consulates of the
axis powers in Bombay did not bring any noticeable result. Most probably
this happened because the outbreak of the war made collaboration with
foreign powers much more difficult.
The only result of these contacts which could materialise only through the
German consulate was most probably the circulation of the already mentioned
speech of Savarkar in the German newspapers (23) in exchange for articles
in favour of Germany's Jewish policy in the Marathi newspapers. (24) The
person in charge of contacting the axis representatives was Jugalikishor
Birla (NMML, ibid, letter from Savarkar to Birla, November 2, 1938 signed
by hand VDS) while the two Germans in charge of dealing with the Hindu
Mahasabha were GL Lesczeynski representative of the German news agency and
P Pazze officially manager of a company located in Bombay. These two agents
had been responsible for the publication of Savarkar's speech in the
Vokischer Beobachter (NMML, ibid letter from the secretary of the Hindu
Mahasabha to Pazze, November 19, 1938 and with the same date letter from
Leszczynski to Malekar).
The most evident sign of these contacts was the despatch of a copy of Mein
Kampf from Leszczynski to Savarkar.
Waiting for the right enemy
The literature promoted by militant Hinduism is trying nowadays to compare
the attitude adopted by the Hindu Mahasabha towards the totalitarian
regimes with Subhas Chandra Bose's position towards the axis powers.
According to this literature the evidence in favour of such interpretation
is a meeting which took place between Bose and Savarkar in Bombay in June
1940. (25) On this occasion Savarkar is supposed to have suggested to
Subhas that he should go to Europe and seek the dictators support. Whereas
the authors connected to the above-mentioned school of thought consider
this claim a matter of fact I could not find any record of the talks
between the two leaders. According to a short article in the Times of India
of June 24.
Bose had also talks with VD Savarkar president of the All India Hindu
Mahasabha at the latter's residence at Dadar on Saturday evening. It is
understood that the discussions related to the present political situation
in the country and the steps the Hindu Mahasabha and the forward bloc
should take in cooperation with other parties. The results of the talks it
is stated were not encouraging. The episode as always did not go unnoticed
by the police who gave a brief account of it:
Subhas Chandra Bose arrived in Bombay on June 22nd and had discussions with
MA Jinnah and VD Savarkar with a view of exploring the possibilities of
cooperation between the Forward bloc and the Hindu Mahasabha respectively.
Bose's efforts were apparently productive of no result. The Bombay forward
bloc endeavoured to arrange a meeting on June 23rd at which Subhas Chandra
Bose would speak but it was necessary to abandon the meeting on account of
lack of support (MSA, Home special department, 1023, 1939-40, SA dated June
29, 1940 Forward bloc).The absence of accounts by the Hindu Mahasabha on
the meeting can be explained by the fact that both the leaders being
involved in anti-British activities it would not make sense leaving records
of sensitive matters. Not even among Bose's papers and writings is there
any reference to the meeting. It is therefore impossible to reconstruct the
content of the talks between the two leaders unless we trust the only
source available. This is the speech made by Savarkar on the occasion of
the dissolution of the Abhinav Bharat in 1952. It is weak evidence because
it is not supported by any written proof and was given several years after
the event.
My impression of the episode is that it is a sort of historiographic
invention directed to legitimise the otherwise ambiguous position of the
Hindu Mahasabha during the war. Asserting that Netaji's project had
Savarkar's sanction means not only that Savarkar has a sort of patronage on
Bose's activities in Europe but more important that Savarkar played an
important role in the freedom fight.
Certainly the meeting did take place and very possibly the two leaders
discussed Bose's intention to go to Europe and seek the support of the axis
powers. However all this is far from meaning that Savarkar inspired Bose
who right from 1933 had his own connections with the dictators governments.
The president of the Hindu Mahasabha put forward his claim on the content
of his meeting with Netaji four years after Gandhi's assassination when the
image of the Hindu Mahasabha and its affiliations were badly damaged by the
suspicion of their involvement in the murder. Accordingly it makes sense to
think that the organisations of militant Hinduism must have perceived the
necessity to rehabilitate their political past and re-invent a more
clear-cut anti-British stand. What stronger argument therefore could be
available than the assertion that the Hindu Mahasabha was secretly ready to
support Bose's plans?
The involvement in Gandhi's assassination was not the only reason of
crisis: the image of Hindu nationalism was indeed already damaged by the
ambiguous attitude adopted in the war period. The policy actually followed
by Hindu nationalism during the war namely responsible cooperation was from
being unambiguous on both transfer of powers and relations with the
British. In fact the ambivalence of responsive cooperation was made
explicit by Savarkar himself in a 1942 presidential speech. On that
occasion Savarkar stated that: the policy of responsible cooperation covers
the whole gamut of patriotic activities from unconditional cooperation to
active and even armed resistance (LG Khare (ed) Hindu Rashtra Darshan,
Bombay 1949 p 266). It comes as no surprise that this ambiguous stand
raised almost universal suspicion towards the forces of militant Hinduism
and invited the charge of collaboration. (26)
Immediately after the outbreak of the war the Hindu Mahasabha decided that
its working committee of September 10, 1939 should adopt the following line
of conduct:
no reference should be made to the justice or otherwise of the claim of
residents of Danzig to return to the Reich for in principle we shall have
to support the action of the Germans of Danzig not that we should denounce
this but then under no circumstances can we take part in this war on the
side of British (NMML, Savarkar papers, microfilm, rn 12, cit, letter from
Mandlekar to Savarkar, September 7, 1939).
The working committee of September 10 decided which steps should be taken
in order to prepare the nation to face the emergency provoked by the
outbreak of the war:
As the task of defending India from any military attack is of common
concern to the British government as well as ourselves and as we are
unfortunately not in a position today to carry out that responsibility
unaided there is ample room for wholehearted cooperation between India and
England (NMML, Moonje papers subject files n 51).
The preliminary condition for such cooperation was the devolution of full
powers to a central Indian government by the British. Later on the Hindu
Mahasabha would be less strict than the Congress on this issue.
The committee wished for the realisation of the militarisation of Indian
society and the Indianisation of the army. It requested a reform of the
Arms act along the lines prevailing in the UK. It demanded also that
territorial forces and paramilitary groups be strengthened that new
military organisations be created in those provinces where they did not
exist before and finally that more Indian students be accepted in the
military academics. The Hindu Mahasabha requested the government to
increase the local production of modern armaments so that India could equip
its army without depending on imports from other nations.
Soon after this resolution the Hindu Mahasabha started to work for the
creation of a national militia. Naturally enough Moonje became the person
in charge. Inviting party members to attend a preliminary meeting for the
foundation of the militia in Pune on October 8 Moonje described the future
organisation in the following terms:
I have the pleasure in bringing to your notice a resolution of the Hindu
Mahasabha for the organisation of the Hindu militia in the country for the
purpose of taking part in the defence of India both from external and
internal aggression whenever an occasion of emergency may arise during the
course of the Anglo- German war.
I believe that it will be quite in the fitness of things in view of the
historic All-India military leadership of the Maharashtra that a beginning
should be made in the Maharashtra so that the lead may be taken up by the
whole of India afterwards (NMML, ibid, circular letter dated September 27).
Who could be the internal aggressors if not the Muslims? The answer seems
to be contained in a letter from Moonje to Khaparde of October 18:
the Moslems are making themselves a nuisance. The Congress government will
not stand up but will yield to them. We cannot expect any consideration at
the hands of the Congress government. We shall have to fight both the
government and the Moslems just as the Khaskars are doing in the UP. The
Hindu Mahasabha will give its support to such fights as the Muslim league
is supporting the Khaksars: you must prepare the volunteers in your towns.
The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh may be useful and handy (NMML, ibid).Moonje
expressed in more explicit terms his hostility to the Congress:
But there is one worry which is menacingly uppermost in its mind at the
present moment and that is what will happen if in the mutually antagonistic
and clashing ideologies the Charka were to come into conflict with the
rifle? (NMML ibid, circular letter).
Charka as a Gandhian symbol was metaphor for the Congress.
The theme of the internal enemy is a further element of affinity between
the ideology of fascism and of Hindu nationalism expressed by a similar
rhetoric. It seems nevertheless that the Sanghatanists were inclined to
fight the Muslims and the Congress rather than the British.
According to Moonje's plans the RSS should be involved in the creation of
the national militia. Indeed in a letter of October 18 to general Nanasahib
Shinde of Baroda, Moonje affirmed I am glad to note that you approved of my
idea of a Hindu National militia for Maharashtra as is being organised by
the Hindu Mahasabha. I have been myself thinking of the Rashtriya Swamsevak
Sangh and I am corresponding with their leader. They may have their
peculiar (sic) difficulties and the point is that the militia should be
organised under these circumstances whether the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
can undertake the task or not (NMML, ibid reply to a letter from Shinde to
Moonje dated October 16, 1939).
During this preliminary phase Moonje consulted Hedgewar with whom he
exchanged several letters and whom Moonje consulted Hedgewar with whom he
exchanged several letters and whom Moonje hoped to meet in order to discuss
the participation of the RSS in the militia (NMML, ibid letter from BS
Moonje to Hedgewar, October 18, 1939).
On October 27 a militant from Lahore informed Moonje that we have at
present in Punjab several Dals and Sanghs the total number of members of
which is approximately about 50,000 but they are not working under a single
organisation. There are Rashtriya Sevak Sangh, Atma Sangh, Mahabir Dal,
Seva Sangh and Akali Dal working under different leaders. They have a sort
of military organisation. The Akali Dal is armed with swords: but the
others have other weapons. The Rashtriya Sevak Sangh has only lathis. The
first thing to do is to bring all these sanghs on a uniform basis working
under a single leadership though not of one man but of a council (NMML,
ibid). In spite of such mobilisation the Hindu militia had not been formed.
The government did not withdraw the existing restrictions imposed on
military and paramilitary organisations and schools.
It is difficult to establish if the organisations of militant Hinduism were
arming themselves against possible foreign invaders the internal enemy or
the British. Most probably they were carefully hedging their best ready to
take advantage of any future development. However it is a fact that at a
meeting with Linlithgrow in Bombay on October 9, 1939 Savarkar adopted a
decidedly conciliatory position vis-a-vis the British. According to
Linlithgow the situation he said was that His Majesty's government must now
turn to the Hindus and work with their support. After all though we and the
Hindus have had a good deal of difficulty with one another in the past that
was equally true of the relations between Great Britain and the French and
as recent events had shown of relations between Russia and Germany. Our
interests were now the same and we must therefore work together. Even
though now the most moderate of men he had himself been in the past an
adherent of a revolutionary party as possibly I might be aware. (I
confirmed that I was). But now that our interests were so closely bound
together the essential thing was for Hinduism and Great Britain to be
friends and the old antagonism was no longer necessary. The Hindu Mahasabha
he went on to say favoured an unambiguous undertaking of Dominion status at
the end of the war. It was true at the same time that they challenged the
Congress claim to represent anything but themselves (India office (IO), Mss
Eur F 125/8 1939, letters to the secretary of state for India: the letter
is dated October 7 but the report of the meeting is in the postscript on
October 9).
In 1940 the Hindu Mahasabha declared its intention to take part in the
viceroy's executive council and the war office. We should not forget that
neither the Hindu Mahasabha nor the RSS took part in the Quit India
movement. The position they maintained in that period is clearly depicted
by Savarkar's declaration of February 17, 1942 when he asserted that if
Japan after having approached the Indian borders and invaded the country
had been ready to declare the independence of India it would have
incredibly boosted Indians imagination. The British should therefore give
the impression that fighting for freedom. (27) It seems in other words that
the Hindu Mahasabha (and probably its affiliations) was more interested in
succeeding the British if possible with their complicity rather than
fighting them.
The other side of this ambiguous stand was a blatant admiration for the
European dictators. According to a police report of May 1942 regarding the
activities of Poona officers training camp of April-May.
Dr PC Sahasrabudhe addressed the volunteers on three occasions. On 4.5.42
he announced that the Sangh followed the principle of dictatorship.
Denouncing democratic government as an unsatisfactory form of government he
quoted France is a typical example and praising dictatorship he pointed to
Japan, Russia and Germany. He particularly praised the Fuehrer principle of
Germany. On 21.5.42 he drew attention to the value of propaganda quoting
Russia and Germany as examples and again extolled the virtues of the leader
principle citing Mussolini's success as a further example (NAI, Home poll
dept 28.8.1942, Summary of a report on the officers training camp of the
Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh held in April/May 1942 at Poona, copy in MSA
home special dept, 822 IInd 1940-41).
When in the 1940s the totalitarian regimes had already revealed their true
colours the attitude of the organisations of militant Hinduism towards
fascism and nazism was still benevolent. In spite of the already even if
only partially known atrocities committed by Hitler and Mussolini the main
organisations of Hindu nationalism still praised the dictators and their
regimes. This position could be justified had it been part of a coherent
and strong anti-British policy. However as I have tried to demonstrate the
forces of Hindu nationalism seem to have concentrated their efforts more
against the so-called internal enemies Muslims and Congress rather than the
foreign invaders. While Bose's alliance with the axis powers had mainly an
anti- British function the Hindu Mahasabha used its support to the
dictators as an instrument to blackmail the British.
Conclusions
The preceding discussion has shown that (a) the main historical
organisations and leaders of Hindu nationalism had a distinctive and
sustained interest in fascism and nazism (b) fascist ideological influences
on Hindu nationalism were present and relevant and (c) to a certain extent
these influences were channelled through direct contacts between Hindu
nationalists and members of the Italian fascist state. No doubt beginning
with the early 1920s and up to the second world war, Hindu nationalists
looked at the political reality of fascist Italy and subsequently of Nazi
Germany as a source of inspiration.
One of the results of the contacts between fascism and Hindu nationalism
was the attempt to militarise Hindu society and to create a militant
mentality among the Hindus. If it is true that the Hindu society elaborated
its own patterns of militarisation I refer to the shakas as a typically
Indian phenomenon it is equally true that a most relevant result of fascist
influence was the transmission of a more functional organisation and a
stronger political character to the already existing organisations of
political Hinduism.
At the ideological level the most meaningful effect of the fascist
influence is represented by the way in which Hindu nationalism developed
its own concept of diversity, transforming diverse people into enemies. Of
course the concept of internal enemy is already implicit contained in
Savarkar's Hindutva. Nevertheless the continuous reference to German racial
policy and the comparison of the Jewish problem in Germany with the Muslim
question in India reveals the evolution of the concept of internal enemy
along explicitly fascist lines.
In my opinion if one wants to understand the evolution of Hindu radicalism
in the post-independence period one has to take into account both the
domestic roots of his phenomenon and the external influence on its
development.
In the 1920s and 1930s fascism was an international phenomenon. As such it
was bound to influence the ideology and practice of similar movements all
over the world. Since many of Bal Thackeray's most outrageously anti-Muslim
and racist statements are literal quotations of Savarkar's speeches and
theories it is legitimate to conclude that such influence is still alive in
today's militant Hinduism.
Notes
My stay in India for collecting material for the present paper was made a
lot easier and more profitable by Partha Sarathi Gupta. TR Sareen, AR
Kulkarni and Bhanu Kapil. While writing this paper in Italy I was able to
count on Michelguglielmo Torri's criticisms and suggestions which formed me
to considerably rework my first draft. I wish to warmly thank all of them
for their help and friendship. Of course the usual disclaim stands that I
am the only one responsible for the contents of and any error left in this
article.1 In the following pages I will treat the Hindu Mahasabha and the
RSS as two different organisations belonging to the same political milieu.
This in spite of the attempt made by the BJP or RSS oriented intellectuals
and scholars to deny or at least to minimise any reciprocal affinity
between the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha. Speaking about a a topic which has
nothing to do with the relations between the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha I
will indirectly show that the two organisations shared a specific
ideological background.
2 Regarding this aspect Jaffrelot asserts that as distinct from Nazism the
RSS's ideology treats society as an organism with a secular spirit which is
implanted not so much in the race as in a socio-cultural system. Finally in
contrast to both Italian fascism and Nazism the RSS does not rely on the
central figure of the leader (op cit, pp 63-64).
3 The details mentioned in the text are in Kesri, May 13, 1924 June 24
November 10 and 24, 1925. I will put summarise the contents and the
articles having had this material translated from Marathi by a young Indian
colleague of mine.
4 The article quotes a speech of Mussolini without specifying its date.
5 Regarding this aspect see Paolo Beonio Brocchieri and Giorgio Borsa (eds)
Garibaldi, Mazzini e il Risorgimento nel risveglio dell Asia e dell Africa
(Garibaldi, Mazzini and the Italian Risorgimento in the awakening of Asia
and Africa), Franco Angeli, Milan 1984.
6 Unfortunately there is no Italian report of the meeting not even among
the prime minister's papers. But there are the routine papers recording
Moonje's request for an audience dated March 16, 1931 and the response of
the cabinet of the minister of the external affairs dated March 18: Archivo
Storico Minstero degli Affari Esteri (Historical archives ministry of
external affairs ASMAE), Rome Udienze (Audiences) 1930-33, bundle 27,
letter from the British embassy in Rome to the ministry of external affairs
March 16, 1931 and reply from the cabinet of the minister n 1102, March 18,
1931. The British authorities in Rome managed Moonje's audience.
7 It was indeed Moonje who brought up the young Hedgewar in his own house
and later sent him to Calcutta officially to study at the National medical
college but with the secret aim to get in touch with the revolutionary
organisations in Bengal (BV Deshpande and SR Ramaswamy, Dr Hedgewar the
Epochmaker, Sahitya Sindhu, Bangalore, 1981, pp 14-32).
8 The Mahratta, April 12, 1931, Dr BS Moonje on Round table conference.
Special interview for the Mahratta, paragraph entitled National militia. A
report of Moonje's tour of Europe is in MN Ghatate, Dr BS Moonje tour of
European countries in NG Dixit (ed), Dharamveer Dr BS Moonje, commemoration
volume. Birth centenary celebration 1872-1972, Nagpur 1972 p 68.
9 Moonje was interested in the problem of military education already by the
end of 1920s. He was in favour of Indianisation of the army. In 1927 he
worked at the foundations of the Aeroclub of India while in 1929 he was a
member of the commission for the selection of candidates to Sandhurst
military academy. In the same year he founded the Rifle association in
Nagpur (see correspondence in NMML, Moonje papers, microfilm, letters rn 7,
1926-28).
10 Reference to the above-mentioned activities of the Italian consulates in
Bombay are in Giovanni Gentile foundation, Rome correspondence from third
parties to Gentile, f Carelli Mario undated letter certainly written on
June 29, 1938 and letter dated October 11, 1938.
11 The articles are in the issues of July 6, August 10 and July 27, 1939
respectively: Central state and archives (ACS, minculpop (Ministry of
popular culture) b 17 bis f 26, Gran Bretagna, subfile t4, R Consolato
Bombay (Royal consulate Bombay) report n 1904/St 3, August 4, 1939 from
Italian coloniate, Bombay to the ministry of popular culture, Aeopy of
Carelli's article is in MSA, Home special dept 830 (I) 1939.
12 Di idee fasciste, ha fondato un organizzazione da lui chiamata Iron
guards prendendo a modello le nostre, ma adattandole alle peculiari
condizioni dell'India. Egli e i suoi amici vestivano la camicia nera: le
prime camicie nere dell'India. Lo sviluppo di questa organizzazionee stato
compromesso dallo scoppio della guerra: ACS, Minculpop, 17 bis, cit, report
n 2298/St 3 from Italian Consulate, Bombay, October 4, 1939 to the ministry
of popular culture.
13 It seems moreover that Hedgewar was deeply influenced by the ideas
expressed in Savarkar's Hindutva. When Hedgewar decided to found his
organisation he went to Ratnagiri to meet Savarkar in order to obtain from
him suggestions and advice. Subsequently during Savarkar's internment in
Ratnagiri, Hedgewar had continuously been in touch with Babarao Savarkar.
See respectively Deshpande-Ramawamy, op cit, p 65 and 74: Walter K
Andersen, Shridhar D Damle, The brotherhood in saffron: The Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu revivialism, Vistaar publications, New Delhi
1987, p 33; Dhananjay Keer, Veer Savarkar and His Time, Popular Prakashan,
Bombay 1988, pp 170-71. Among Hedgewar papers in Nagpur, I found several
letters exchanged between Hedgewar and Babarao Savarkar who was closely
connected to the RSS.
14 On several occasions after having been released, Savarkar congratulated
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh of Dr Hedgewar of Nagpur on its work and
discipline. At the guru purnima celebrated by the RSS on July 29, 1939
Savarkar gave a speech to approximately 5,000 people while several years
later during the RSS officers training camp (OTC) which took place in Pune
during May 27 to 29, 1943 in the presence of Golwarkar, Babarao Savarkar,
BS Moonje and about 5,000 people, the former president of the Hindu
Mahasabha expressed his pleasure to see the display by Swayamsevaks in
great number and said that he was proud to see the branches of the Sangh
spread throughout India during his visit to various places. He was pleased
to see the Hindu youths, boys and girls joining the institutions based on
Hinduism in great number. Militants had also the habit of collecting
donations for their leader. In August 1937 in Pune the local Hindu
militants and sympathisers offered him Rs 250. Several years later on the
occasion of Savarkar's 61st birthday considerable donations were collected
by the exponents of the Hindu organisations Savarkar visited during one of
his propaganda tours. At the above-mentioned OTC camp where Savarkar
celebrated his birthday Rs 1,80,000 had been collected by Hindu
organisations, Pune municipality and private citizens. Respectively in MSA,
Home special dept 60 D (g) Pt II 1937, extract from the Bombay secret
abstract for week ending January 15, 1938 entitled Hindu affairs and
summary report of the meeting held in the Tilak Smarak Mandir on behalf of
Poona students, August 3, 1937 Mahasabha state archives (MSA), Home special
dept, 60 D (g) Pt III, 1938, extract from the Bombay province weekly letter
No 31 dated August 5, 1939; MSA, Home special department 1009 III 1942
police report entitled A summary report of the concluding ceremony of the
Officers training camp of the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh at Poona on the
May 27, 1943 and note from the home department special dated June 10, 1943.
15 NMML, Savarkar papers, microfilm, rn 23, part 2, miscellaneous
correspondence January 1938-May 1939. Press note issued by the Hindu
Mahasabha office Bombay branch, undated a summary of Savarkar's speech is
also in MSA, Bombay, home special department 60 D (g) Pt III 1938. Extract
from the Weekly confidential report of the District magistrate, Poona dated
the August 11, 1938.
The Italian consul in Calcutta sent to the ministry of external affairs in
Rome an accurate abstract of an article about Savarkar's speech reported in
Ananda Bazar Patrika of August 3. The abstract is entitled Critiche al
viaggio di Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in Europa (Critiques of Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru's trip to Europe) in ASMAE affairi politici (political
affairs AP), India b 7, 1938 resoconto della stampa indiana (summary of the
Indian press) enclosure to express telegram n 3489/46 from Italian
consulate, Calcutta, August 12, 1938 to the ministry of external affairs.
16 Immediately after the great anti-Jewish pogrom of November 9, 1938 known
as Crystal night the Congress expressed its condemnation of December 12 and
subsequently supported the concession of asylum in India to the Jews.
Regarding this matter see Milan Hauner, India in Axis strategy: Germany,
Japan and Indian nationalists in the second World war, Klett-Cotta
Stuttgart, 1981, p 67.
17 A summary of the presidential speech is in Bombay Chronicle of December
29, 1939.
18 Hindutva had been written clandestinely during Savarkar's detention at
the Andamans sent to India secretly in 1917 and published underground in
1923.
19 Savarkar as well as most of the militants belonging to his milieu
considered the Indian Muslims either as successors of the Mughal invaders
or as original Hindus who were forcibly converted to Islam. In any case
according to the main ideologies of political Hinduism the pole of
attraction of Indian Muslims was outside India and Hindu system of values.
Not only was Islam a foreign religion which had its main institutions
outside India but the Indian Muslims were according to Savarkar and his
companions more interested in creating a separate nation instead of
recognising India as their homeland. Apart from the fact that this must
have not been the attitude of most of Indian Muslims, militant Hindus had
exaggerated claims towards the Muslims. For militant Hindus it was not
sufficient that Indian Muslims considered themselves first Indians and
secondly Muslims as most of them probably did. According to the Hindu
fundamentalists indeed Muslims should conform themselves to the Hindu
system of values which was of course unacceptable.
20 An article entitled The Savarkar method of rejuvenation of the Hindudom:
New drive in Hindu thought and action published in The Mahratta of January
6, 1939 repeated the opinions already expressed by Savarkar in the speech
of December 11, 1938.
21 April 28, 1939 why Italy invaded Albania? May 26, how Germany's National
socialism arose? and inciting Mussolini against Hitler, May 29 and June 2,
Germany-Rome Axis strengthened and German-Italian pact concluded: Reaction
to encirclement policy at p 51 of his book Jaffrelot quotes some articles
in favour of Franco, Mussolini and Hitler published by the Hindu Outlook of
November 2 and 30, 1938 and The Mahratta of November 6, 1939.
22 To the two letters dated March 7 and August 11, 1938 respectively there
is a reference in NMML, Savarkar papers, microfilm, r n 23, letter dated
May 23, 1938 from the secretary, Hindu Mahasabha, Bombay office to Rash
Behari Bose unsigned letter dated August 11 to the editor of The Mahratta,
Gajanrao Ketkar, August 18 from JD Malekar, secretary of the Hindu
Mahasabha to Rash Behari Bose.
23 Copy of the press note containing the text of the speech had been sent
also to Rash Behari so that he would not only publish but also show it to
the Japanese government: NMML, Savarkar papers, rn 23, cit letter from the
secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha to Rash Behari Bose, November 4, 1938.
24 NMML ibid letter from Malekar to Leszczynski, December 7, 1938 and reply
December 9, 1938. At the ministry of external affairs in Rome among the
papers from the cabinet of the ministry I could find a copy of Savarkar's
The Indian war of independence of 1857; it is not possible to establish if
the book arrived in Italy during this period before or later. We are
however allowed to suppose that Savarkar was not totally unknown to the
Italian authorities; ASMAE, Gab 409, b3.
25 In favour of this thesis are: (1) Vikram Savarkar, Vinayak's grandson
whom I met in Bombay in March 1997 (2) Veer Savarkar INA's source of
inspiration in Savarkar commemoration volume published by Savarkar Darshan
Pratishthan, Bombay, 1989, pp 147- 51. In the same volume (3) Shivramu
(pseud) Savarkar's role in the British quitting India, pp 183-88; (4) D
Keer, op cit, p 257; (5) NB Khare, political memoirs, Nagpur 1959 p 52; (6)
U Mukherjee, op cit pp 159-60; (7) SV Bhalerao, Savarkar: His
socio-political thought and leadership, a PhD thesis submitted to the
Nagpur university, faculty of social sciences, p 234-35.
26 Regarding the collaborationist attitude of the Hindu Mahasabha and the
RSS see DR Goyal, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, Radha Krishna Prakashan, New
Delhi 1979 p 86.
27 NMML, Savarkar papers, microfilm, rn 24. Unfortunately the photocopies
of this document have never been mailed to me by the staff. I could only
summarise from my notes instead of quoting the original text.