[sacw] South Asians Against Nukes Dispatch - 23 dec.99

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asians Against Nukes Dispatch
23 December 1999
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#1. Nuclear Pretender To Power Broker: Comment on book on the Indian Bomb
#2. Specter of a nuclear conflict in the sub-continent,
#3. Anti-nuclear meeting in Calcutta
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#1.
=46inancial Times (London)
December 20, 1999, Monday USA Edition 2
Comment & Analysis; Pg. 15

=46ROM NUCLEAR PRETENDER TO POWER BROKER: A WELL-RESEARCHED STUDY CHARTS
INDIA'S DELIBERATIONS OVER NUCLEAR POWER TO ITS MOMENTOUS 1998 BOMB TEST,
WRITES:

By PETER MONTAGNON

"You are all mad doctors," Rajiv Gandhi once told a group of India's top
nuclear scientists. "Our people need drinkable water and you spend all your
time on these bombs." It was a revealing remark which went to the heart of
the debate over nuclear policy that India has wrestled with almost since it
gained independence in 1947.

As George Perkovich recounts, even the pacifist prime minister Jawaharlal
Nehru was privately reluctant to forgo the nuclear option completely.
Thanks to the persistence of Homi Bhabha, the obsessive and brilliant
Cambridge-educated physicist, the beginnings were made in the Nehru period
on a project that was to lead to the nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998.

Perkovich argues that India's struggle to become a nuclear power was not a
carefully considered response to a perceived strategic threat. Rather it
was born out of a desire to acquire status in the world and end what
successive Indian leaders called the nuclear apartheid system, whereby
weapons were held only by white imperial nations. That ambition had to be
balanced against doubts among the Indian public and polity about whether it
was right to spend so much money on research in the light of the country's
acute development needs. Many also doubted whether India should forgo the
high moral ground won by its pacifist beliefs.

Last year's tests were the outcome of the decades-long battle between these
countervailing considerations which Perkovich charts in this meticulously
researched and readable volume. In the early days, public justification for
the nuclear programme resided in its application to electric power
generation, but this still gave successive prime ministers the chance to
retain the nuclear option. Thus was born the ambiguity which kept India's
military aspirations alive.

The drift towards nuclear armament received another shove in 1964 when
prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri authorised research into peaceful
nuclear explosions, which could be used, for example, for blasting canal
beds. But the problem was both that Bhabha and his successors in India's
nuclear science establishment continually failed to deliver promised
supplies of nuclear power. As the peaceful programme failed, so it was
increasingly necessary to rely on security justification.

With China's acquisition of the bomb and the deep mutual hostility between
India and Pakistan, India was driven inexorably towards pursuit of its
nuclear option. The first "peaceful" test in 1974 was hardly a lasting
success. It became clear that the power of the explosion had been
exaggerated and, perhaps in response to the harsh international reaction,
Indira Gandhi, the then prime minister, decided not to allow any more.

Two decades later, Atal Behari Vajpayee, the leader of the Hindu
nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, secretly authorised a nuclear test when
he was briefly prime minister as early as 1996, but the authorisation was
withdrawn when he realised his interim government would not survive. Once
he was well established in power in early 1998, the stage was set.

The blasts in the Rajasthan desert brought initial jubilation. L.K. Advani,
the BJP home minister, was seen to brush away a tear at the news. But the
fact remains that one of the most momentous decisions undertaken by an
Indian government was reached without any real strategic planning. Only a
few at the top of government knew what was happening. Vajpayee did not
consult the military, nor did he ask the finance ministry about the likely
cost of international sanctions. As Perkovich writes: "A handful of
politicans, instigated by a handful of scientists with little experience in
international affairs was pushing India across a portentous strategic
threshold whose implications they did not fully appreciate."

One must remain wary of Perkovich's suggestion that the tests did not
enhance India's international standing. Perhaps their impact was not clear
at the end of 1998 when this book is closed off. India has used its
diplomatic influence to win support for its case against the
Pakistan-backed infiltration of the Kargil region of Kashmir. US President
Bill Clinton is due to visit next year. These days, Indian officials are
privately proud of the response they have achieved.

Yet the question of how India will use its new status remains. It always
resisted joining test-ban and nonproliferation treaties because it believed
they left too much power in the hands of those colonially-minded powers
that already possessed nuclear powers. Perhaps now India has a declared
nuclear capacity it will be able to change the debate and put pressure on
other nuclear states to dismantle their arsenals.

Perkovich suggests this is the opportunity India now enjoys. The rest of us
must hope it is put to good use.

India's Nuclear Bomb, by George Perkovich. Published by University of
California Press.
=46T bookshop: (44) 208 324 5511

(Copyright 1999 The Financial Times Limited)
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#2.
THE INDEPENDENT
15 December 1999

SPECTER OF A NUCLEAR CONFLICT IN THE SUB-CONTINENT
by Brigadier M Sakhawat Hussain ndc, psc (retd)

In 1974 India rocked the sub-continent by exploding the area's first- ever
nuclear device. Late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi took the credit for
taking India onto the nuclear path, the dream that her father Jawaharlal
Nehru saw years before. It was Dr. Bahava who impressed Nehru into
initiating the nuclear research in independent India , a year before the
partition. Once Nehru became Prime Minister of free India , he went ahead
with the research that resulted in the test at Pokhran, better known as
Pokhran-1.Pakistan followed suit to start nuclear research. The then Prime
Minister of Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, vowed to attain parity with
India at any cost. The nuclear race thus started between two rival
countries and India became the harbinger of the nuclear arms race. 24
years latter in 1998, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Prime Minister of India , took
the world by surprise when he revealed that India had successfully carried
out the series of weapon-grade nuclear tests, for the second time at
Pokhran, named Pokhran II.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the leader of hard-line Hindu nationalist BJP
(Bharatiya Janata Party) coalition government, was cheered by party
members and the nation at large. Hindu nationalism got a boost with the
perception of India becoming a nuclear power and that it would be counted
among the mightiest of mighty. Even a personality like George Farnandez,
Defence Minister of India , a man throughout his political career known
for his anti-nuclear stance, gleefully explained the need of this
deterrence. He explained the need to acquire nuclear power primarily
against threats emanating from China. He publicly termed China as enemy
number one,' then modifying his statement to perceived enemy'. Pakistan
was waiting in the wings but until then it did not its their nuclear
prowess. India became the catalyst in initiating the nuclear race, a
country that in the past coined such buzz words like nuclear , free
sub-continent' and supported zone of peace' concept.

What was surprising was that the government of Vajpayee did not face any
substantial opposition or came under any strong criticism at home for
embarking upon such an expensive weapons option. Indian leadership seems
to have accepted the fact that to maintain a nuclear deterrence there
would be a huge expenditure from national exchequer when 20 to 30 per cent
of the population are living below poverty line, deprived of even basic
necessities like drinking water, medical care and education. It did not
take many days for Pakistan to follow the path of its arch-rival, India ,
with whom three wars were fought, the last one resulting in dismemberment
of the then East Pakistan giving birth to the independent Bangladesh. The
nuclear program that was initiated by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1974 amidst
threat and pressure from USA saw the culmination in a series of successful
tests conducted under deposed civilian Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The
USA tried to prevent Pakistan from retaliating India 's tests but without
result. No pressure worked. With Pakistan going nuclear , the race in the
sub-continent came into the open. No power was able to prevent these two
impoverished countries from going nuclear. It was surprising that when
both the countries adopted a path of proliferation, no world power took
any notice or tried to restrain them, except some restrictive measures
that the USA took against Pakistan's nuclear program in the form of Presler
Amendment.

The amendment required the US President to certify that Pakistan was not
pursuing weapons-grade nuclear technology for Senate to allow US military
sales to Pakistan. The restriction was strictly observed for a few initial
years since initiation of the nuclear program by Bhutto, but was relaxed
during the regime of General Zia-ul-Haque and was waived during Benazir
Bhutto's democratic tenure. On the contrary, India went unabated with its
programs and claims that its nuclear program is of indigenous technology
without outside assistance. Never the less, India did not stop at tests
only. A few days before the national polls and in the backdrop of Kargil
conflict, the caretaker government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee declared the
draft nuclear policy for adoption. With this declaration India formally
proclaimed herself as a nuclear power and its determination to arm its
forces with nuclear weapons. The draft policy of India envisages mainly
four principles. (1) No first strike (2) Maintain minimum nuclear
deterrence as needed (3) Use nuclear weapon when attacked by other nuclear
weapon states or states that are militarily aligned with nuclear states
(4) not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear state (As reported in
the news media).

The preamble of the policy mentions the perceived Chinese nuclear threat
against India , to justify India 's going nuclear and to maintain a
minimum nuclear deterrence. Point to notes India suffered humiliating
defeat in a border conflict with China in 1962 over territorial disputes
and a large portion of Ladakh has been occupied by China since then.
Sino-Indian relation hardly improved thereafter. China maintains the claim
over 40,000 square miles of Indian territory. Surprisingly, there was
hardly any serious concern shown by the rest of the world except routine
reaction from USA rejecting India 's justification of going nuclear.
Partial ban on trade and complete ban on military sale, which was imposed
by USA, continued for a few months and ultimately lifted. In contrast,
Pakistan was quietly observing the situation that was created by India 's
draft policy. The government of Nawaz Sharif was under constant pressure
from donor countries not to follow India 's path. In doing so Nawaz Sharif
not only succumbed to outside pressure and adopted a line of least
resistance but ultimately ended up with the recent military takeover. Only
recently Pakistan's junta-appointed Foreign Minister in a press briefing
mentioned the determination of Pakistan to maintain a minimum nuclear
deterrence for its defence, though its nuclear policy is yet to be
formalised.

Both Pakistan and India are up to the same ploy to avoid signing CTBT.
Both the countries have indicated that their decision on this issue would
only be taken after the assessment of the public mood. Interestingly
enough, democratic India and the military-dictatorial Pakistani regime are
speaking in unison on an issue that is superficial in countries like these
two. India says it has gone nuclear to deter Chinese threat and Pakistan
is using the India card to arouse national sentiment to maintain parity
with the arch-enemy. Whatever reasoning India might advance in support of
deterrence, the reality is quite different. It is the Nehru-Indira-Rajib
doctrine that Vajpayee is doggedly pursuing to legitimise India 's claim
to represent South Asia in the UN Security Council as the sixth permanent
member. Indian leaders of the past and present have always emphasised that
Indian voice should be heard and taken into account by the rest of the
world as every fifth person in the world is an Indian. Added to this is its
long-cherished aspiration to control the Indian Ocean for ensuring its
defence. India 's Naval Chief, Admiral Shushil Kumar, while elaborating
India 's naval expansion plan has confirmed the fact.

(Reported in The Independent on 4 Dec, 1999). This bizarre nuclear race
that was initiated by India and joined by Pakistan went almost unprotested
from the regional countries, especially from those which are within the
peripheral distance of these nuclear states. South Asian countries,
especially the members of the SAARC, not only remained silent but also
oblivious of the danger of a holocaust that may fall on the region. Sri
Lanka, the exponent of Zone Of Peace concept, which was floated in 1968
Cairo Non-Aligned Summit and subsequently adopted as UN resolution in
1971, remained a silent witness to the nuclear proliferation and the danger
that would be looming above the generations to come. If Sri Lanka would be
able to raise the issue in the next NAM summit or not is worth watching.
=46or years Nepal has been advocating the sub-continent to be a nuclear fre=
e
zone' but did not do much, neither did Bhutan or Maldives except
expressing concern over the development. Bangladesh being the second
largest country in South Asia, in terms of population, could hardly take
any positive step to restrain any of these countries from pressing ahead
with the nuclear program. In spite of the fact that the Prime Minister of
Bangladesh visited New Delhi in an attempt to restrain India from further
nuclear development and to discuss the situation that arose, it hardly
made any impact.

However at least the Prime Minister of Bangladesh expressed her concern,
but it is amazing to note that not much has been said by non-government
quarters to voice our anguish. Bangladesh and Nepal would be the most
affected nations should there be an Indo-China nuclear conflict. It is
imperative for us, firstly, to look at our security parameters; secondly to
recast and review our foreign policy keeping in view the dangerous
development that has taken shape in the sub-continent. In the coming
millennium there could be a larger conflict that is likely to embroil
India-China-Pakistan resulting in the use of nuclear arms. The Presler
amendment famed, US Senator Presler, in a recent interview with an Indian
television channel echoed such a dear. In his assessment Presler perceives
a nuclear war in the region within the first quarter of the next
millennium. He also expressed concern over the possibility of further
proliferation of nuclear weapons in countries like Iran and Myanmar,
adding that many ex-Soviet Central Asian republics have inherited nuclear
weapon installations. The dangerous trend that has been set by the two
giants of the sub-continent may force other smaller countries of South Asia
to seek nuclear protection or invite outside interference in the region
driven by perceived insecurity. Bangladesh, one of the most concerned
countries, is likely to host the NAM summit next year. Though NAM has lost
much of its credence in the present global context since the visible end of
Cold War, yet peace-loving citizens of South Asia in particular, and the
world at large, would expect leaders attending the ensuing NAM summit in
Dhaka to take up the issue.

Copyright 1999 THE INDEPENDENT
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#3.
Anti-nuclear meeting in Calcutta: A report

Calcutta: 22 December =20
After a year-and-a-half of sporadic protests, it is now time to string
together the small cores of anti-nuclear movement formed across India. The
point, made by Delhi-based anti-nuke campaigners Achin Vanayak and Praful
Bidwai, was well taken by their Calcutta counterparts. Vanayak and Bidwai,
on a lecture tour coinciding with the release of their book South Asia on
a short fuse, addressed a seminar organised by the Pakistan-India Peoples'
=46orum for Peace and Democracy in Calcutta. Explaining the political
process which has brought the Bomb home to the subcontinent, the authors
made a passionate plea for the forces of peace to come together to save
South Asia from the impending disaster. States go nuclear because of two
reasons, Vanayak said. One is a self-perception as a big power and the
other is a threat perception from another state. While the United States
and India were motivated by the former, the USSR, China and Pakistan were
prompted by the latter to take the step. For India, however, the process
has been paradoxical. It has been playing the big brother in South Asia
for a long time and nuclearisation is in a way consistent with its
ascending aspirations. One the other hand, it had remained committed to
non-manufacture of nuclear weapons and condemned them as illegitimate and
immoral as recently as in 1995 at the International Court of Justice. The
change in the nuclear doctrine came visibly with the forces of Hindutva
coming to power at the Centre. Detailing on this, Bidwai reversed the
Sangh Parivar's [the Hindu Far Right] favourite twin imagery of the Babri
Masjid demolition and the Pokhran explosion. For them these events stand
for (hindu) national pride; for us both symbolise destruction. The common
people of India and Pakistan have no interest in this destructive game.
Ever since the explosions at Pokhran [Indian Nuclear test site] and
Chaghai [Pakistan's Nuclear test Site], protests have been heard in
different corners of both countries. The seminar initiated a move to bring
the Indian anti-nuclear activists together in a democratically organised
national convention and subsequently join hands with those across the
border. =20