[sacw] sacw dispatch #1 (4 Dec.99)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Web Dispatch #1
4 December, 1999
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#1. Ten years into Kashmir's bloody uprising
#2. To be or not to Be - The Conversion Debate in India
#3. Mitti Ka Khuda (Audio Cassette)
#4. [Indian] Navy to induct 2 more aircraft carriers
--------------------------------------
#1.
TIME - Asian Edition
December 6, 1999 Vol. 154 No. 22

STATE OF UNREST
Ten years into Kashmir's bloody uprising, India, Pakistan and the rebels
are as far apart as ever. Now matters are spiralling out of their
control
By Aparisim Ghosh (Kashmir)

James Nachtwey/Magnum Photos for TIME
A woman tries to identify the body of a slain rebel in Kashmir, where
locals long for an end to the bloodshed.

Summaya and Muhammad Ashraf Bazaz should have been celebrating the birth
of their third child about now. Ashraf, a 30-year-old bank executive,
had booked a room for Summaya, 25, at a Srinagar maternity hospital for
the third week of November. A final consultation with the family
gynecologist early in the month had confirmed that the pregnancy was
progressing without a hitch. After the visit, the Bazazes hired an
auto-rickshaw to take them to the home of Summaya's parents.
They were stopped at a police checkpoint at Nowhatta, a congested
borough of old Srinagar. There had been some shooting farther up the
road, the policemen said, so the rickshaw should wait. A little later,
they were told it was safe to proceed. The three-wheeler had traveled
barely 20 m when it came under a barrage of gunfire from the rear. The
terrified driver, Ghulam Rasool, raced away from the scene, not pausing
to check on his passengers until they were a kilometer away. When he
finally looked back, the young couple were dead, their bodies riddled
with bullets and splattered with blood.
Who did it? Fingers pointed at once to a nearby bunker of the
paramilitary Border Security Force. The BSF said the Bazazes were caught
in the crossfire in a gun battle with separatist militants. But press
reports suggested a drunken trooper had gone trigger-happy. Even as the
state government of Jammu and Kashmir ordered an investigation, the
funeral of the young couple became a political event. Hundreds gathered
to protest the military presence in Kashmir and to demand independence
from India. Mirwaiz Omar Farooq, head priest of Kashmir's largest mosque
and a leading figure in the separatist movement, delivered a fiery
impromptu speech. "Such inhuman acts by the usurpers of our birthright
will only bring the dawn of freedom closer," he thundered.
Not likely. Ten years into the uprising that turned Kashmir from a
tourist paradise into a killing field, there's little sign of a dawn; if
anything, the outlook is darker than ever. The three sides in the
conflict--the Kashmiri rebels and the governments of India and
Pakistan--are locked into intractable, antagonistic postures that have
yielded nothing but grief for all concerned. Delhi says Kashmir is a
part of India and accuses Pakistan of fostering the insurgency.
Islamabad says the people in the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir are
being brutalized by the military and should be allowed a referendum to
decide their fate--all the while backing groups that desire a merger
with Pakistan. The Kashmiri rebels, grouped under an umbrella
organization known as the Hurriyat Conference--hurriyat meaning
freedom--detest India's actions and distrust Pakistani platitudes in
equal measure.
These positions were hardened further by this summer's border clash in
Kargil, where Indian troops repelled a group of Pakistani army regulars
and insurgents who had sneaked over to the Indian side of the Line of
Control that divides Kashmir. Having declared itself the victor of that
conflict, Delhi is in no mood to talk of compromise. Humiliated by their
defeat, the Pakistani military--whose leader, General Pervez Musharraf,
seized the government in a bloodless Oct. 12 coup--is in no mood for
parleys, either. The Hurriyat Conference continues to issue
pox-on-both-your-houses broadsides. As the three parties to the dispute
paint themselves into the farthest corners, ordinary Kashmiris are left
stranded, their lives stuck in a decade-long limbo.
In that time, the rebellion has taken at least 34,000 lives, mostly
Kashmiri. Before Kargil, there had been a long lull in the fighting;
Delhi even claimed that the part of Kashmir under its control was once
again safe for tourism. Lately, the rate of killing has accelerated: for
the first three weeks of November alone the body count was 48.
And it's about to get a whole lot worse. Over the past year, the
militancy has taken a decidedly dangerous turn, with
foreigners--religious warriors from Afghanistan, Sudan and other Muslim
nations--joining the fray. The newcomers have sophisticated arms, h
igh-tech communications equipment and the motivation of suicide squads.
Delhi believes some of them are financed by Osama bin Laden, the
Afghanistan-based Saudi millionaire. Bin Laden's hosts, the ruling
Taliban militia, are angered by Delhi's support for their enemies, the
Afghan warlord Ahmed Shah Masood and former President Burhanuddin
Rabanni. Indian media reports claim the Taliban are encouraging the
faithful to rescue Muslim-majority Kashmir from the clutches of
Hindu-majority India.
Nobody is quite sure how many foreigners have entered the Kashmir
valley, the tiny strip of land that is the hotbed of the rebellion.
Indian estimates range from 1,200 to 2,000, but some Hurriyat leaders
say there are many thousands--and more arriving every day. Whatever
their numbers, the foreigners seem to be doing most of the fighting in
the valley. "The insurgency is now coming entirely from across the
border," says Ashok Jaitly, chief secretary of India's Jammu and Kashmir
state. "There are hardly any local men among the fighters." The
outsiders have been greeted with warmth by some Kashmiris, though many
are deeply suspicious of their motives. "We did not invite them," says
Yasin Malik, a leading figure in the Hurriyat Conference and the
valley's most famous homegrown rebel. "We don't agree with their
agenda."
But the Hurriyat Conference says it can't control the newcomers. And
this, ironically, unites him with the Indian military that once jailed
and tortured him: both worry that the mujahedin could take the rebellion
in a new, extreme direction from which there might be no return.
However, it is much easier for a trigger-happy army to tackle the
foreigners. Says Lieut. General Krishan Pal, head of army operations in
Kashmir: "We can show some clemency for our Kashmiri boys, but the
foreign chaps will be hunted down." The locals are fighting for a chance
to decide Kashmir's future: whether it is to remain an Indian state,
become a part of Pakistan, or attain azadi, independence. The foreigners
are fighting for a jihad, or holy war: they want to die for Islam. It's
not hard to guess which group is more likely to be amenable to peace
talks.
While the mujahedin represent a new, dangerously physical threat to
hopes for peace in the valley, a more formidable psychological barrier
has been 10 years in the making. Almost unnoticed, an entire generation
of Kashmiris has grown up with no experience or understanding of peace.
Today's teenagers have only the faintest memory of what it was like not
to have soldiers in the streets and sandbag bunkers at the major
intersections. With every passing year, their parents' stories about
peacetime pleasures--staying out late, earning good money from the
tourist trade-seem more and more like fairy tales. "The children are
used to hearing gunfire, to seeing dead bodies in the streets, to having
their parents being pushed around by soldiers," says Mushir, a Srinagar
tailor who described himself as pro-Indian and refused to give his full
name. "For them, insurgency is a way of life."
Raised in an atmosphere of violence and hatred, Kashmir's kids are wise
before their time--and deeply cynical. Take Mushir's son Anwar, a shy,
sad-eyed 14-year-old with a well-developed sense of irony. Could he
conceive of a life in which he might never come across an armed soldier?
"Yes, but I also think of a world without hunger and poverty," he said,
with a sardonic smile. "There's no ban on fantasizing, is there?" Mushir
raised his face, as if addressing Heaven: "Listen to this boy! At his
age, I was dreaming of being the world's best goalkeeper..." Anwar
interrupts: "I will be the world's best mujahid." He receives a hard
slap on the back of his head from Mushir. "See? See?" the tailor says,
plaintively. "I worry so much about this boy."
Businessman Ghulam Mohammad Bhat worries for his two nephews, aged 10
and 11 years. In 1990 their father, his brother Farooq, disappeared
after being arrested. Bhat went to the BSF, the army and the police to
appeal for his brother's release, but they all claimed not to know where
he was. Incensed, Bhat's teenage son Nazir quit college and joined the
militants. When he returned from training in Pakistan, he had grown a
beard and become a landmine expert, as well as an important leader in
the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, a particularly extreme Islamic group. Nazir was
eventually shot dead by the Indian army. Now, Bhat looks after his
brother's sons. The older of the two, Hild Ahmad, vaguely remembers that
their father was "very nice and very tall." The boys listen to their
uncle describe the mild-mannered Farooq, but their hero is cousin Nazir,
the martyr. They have vivid memories of his coming home to dinner with
some gun-toting followers. Do they want to be gunmen, too? The boys
giggle. Their uncle looks worried and says, more in hope than
conviction, "I will try my best to stop them."
To young Kashmiris who dream of becoming martyrs, the enemy is
India--specifically its army. Boys like Anwar and Hild Ahmad have had
little or no interaction with Indian civilians: in their eyes, the
military is India. And they see plenty of it. There are soldiers
everywhere in Kashmir. The 15th Corps, based in Srinagar, is responsible
for the security of the valley. The 14th Corps is based in the Ladakh
region near the border with China. The BSF guards parts of Srinagar, but
the state police is primarily responsible for keeping the peace within
the city. All told, there are an estimated 200,000 Indian security
forces in Kashmir--or one for every 20 Kashmiris in the valley.
Indians have always regarded their soldiers in Kashmir as brave; after
Kargil, the men in uniform were elevated to the status of
all-conquering, self-sacrificing heroes. Even now, open criticism of the
military at a Delhi dinner party or a Bangalore pub can get you into
serious trouble. For many Kashmiris, however, the Indian soldier is an
object of fear and loathing. The BSF troops and residents of Srinagar
don't even talk to each other, and the only looks exchanged are filled
with suspicion and anger. Locals tell unending stories of atrocities
allegedly committed by the Indian troops; everybody knows somebody who
has suffered at their hands.
Independent groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
have repeatedly accused Indian soldiers of widespread human-rights
abuses--rape, torture, extortion and murder--in the valley. Delhi
acknowledges some excesses by troops but insists most of the allegations
are exaggerated and unsubstantiated. Rights monitors admit that it's
sometimes hard to know who's telling the truth. But, as is often the
case with human rights issues, perception can count as much as
proof--and many Kashmiris believe the rights organizations' reports to
be, if anything, understated. It may be weeks before the magistrate
investigating the killing of the Bazazes produces a report, but the word
on the streets of Srinagar is that a drunken BSF trooper did the
shooting.
Soldiers say they are more sinned against than sinning. They claim many
locals are in league with terrorists, giving them shelter and
information on troop movements. Some soldiers allow that the Kashmiris
may be helping the rebels under duress. "What can they do?" says a BSF
trooper. "If they give us information, the militants get angry. If they
don't give us information, we get angry."
Anger is already too plentiful in Kashmir, and it is getting nobody
anywhere. Plainly, guns and bullets aren't going to provide any
solutions, just more funerals. One of the three protagonists must step
up with a new plan, a workable alternative to the mindless posturing
that plunged the valley into a decade of despair. Which one will it be?
Not Delhi, which insists the ball is in Pakistan's court. In an
interview with TIME last week, Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh said there
is only one solution in Kashmir: "stop cross-border terrorism."
Not Islamabad, now under the dictatorship of the architect of the Kargil
incursion, General Musharraf. Shortly after he overthrew his country's
civilian government, Musharraf spoke of easing tensions along the border
with India--but insisted that Pakistan's position on Kashmir remained
unchanged.
Not the Hurriyat Conference, which seems to have no fresh ideas about
how to attain azadi. The umbrella body was willing to call a ceasefire
in 1993 if India agreed to hold unconditional talks with Kashmiri
representatives, but it has not yet presented a cogent alternative to
armed rebellion. Malik and Farooq say their best hope is that an outside
agency--the United Nations, the United States--will force India and
Pakistan to leave the Kashmiris alone. "The international community has
failed in its responsibility to the people of Kashmir," says Malik. "But
we still hope it will do justice." As little Anwar said, there's no ban
on fantasizing.
Meanwhile, Kashmiris continue to die--some, like Nazir Bhat, for the
cause; others, like Summaya and Ashraf Bazaz, just because.
With reporting by Meenakshi Ganguly and Yusuf Jameel/Kashmir

------------------------------
#2.

To be or not to Be - The Conversion Debate

by P.R.Ram

Conversions have been in the news from last two years or so. The general
points being raised are that there are great many conversions due to the
inducement and allurement of the Christian priests, that these conversions
are contrary to the spirit of the constitution, that these forcible acts
of the missionaries also go on to create the conflict between the
converted and their old communities. Though there is a freedom to profess,
and practice ones' religion, the conversions show disrespect and
intolerance for others religions.
Most of the assumptions in this argument are based on the constructs which
have nothing to do with the reality. First let us note that the bogey of
conversions has begun all of a sudden from 1997, when churches begun to be
attacked, Bibles were burnt and Christian priests were attacked. The very
suddenness and countrywide spread of the phenomena definitely needs to be
given a careful thought, more so after the realisation that there is no
particular increase in the conversions to Christianity as reflected in the
census data and the data from Justice Wadhava Commission of inquiry. As
per this we note that the All India Christian population in 1971 was-2.6%,
in it was 1981-2.44% and in 1991 it stood at 2.32%. This shows a marginal
decline in the all India population of Christians. It is remarkable that a
tirade against conversions can be raised when there is an actual decline
in the population of Christians. Secondly, in Manoharpur in Keonjhar
district, where Pastor Dr.Stains was doing his work amongst the lepers,
where he was burnt along with his two minor sons on the charge that he was
indulging in conversions, Justice Wadhava report gives an interesting
statistics. As per this report there is a rise of Hindu population by
2.52%, and that of Christian population by.008% between the years 1991 to
1998. These figures totally demolish the foundation of the argument that
massive forced conversions are on. The second point to be noted is that
the conversions are projected to be a purely passive process in which the
poor Adivasis are converted by inducement and allurement. This again is a
point which gives the image that those converted are mere passive beings
bereft of intelligence just because they are poor and so susceptible to
the anti- National activities of the missionaries. A slight peep in to
history of conversions in India will make the matters clear for us:
whether conversions are active or a passive process. If we recall a while
ago the major component of anti-Muslim tirade was that Muslim Kings
converted the Hindus by the sword, and this was the major component of the
propaganda, which formed the base of the anti Muslim sentiments in the
social common sense. Before we go into the historical process whereby
Islam spread in India lets have a look at the opinion of Swami Vivekanand
on the issue (Collected works- Vol. VIII, page 330). Says Swamiji "Why
amongst the poor of India so many are Mohhamedans? It is nonsense to say
that they were converted by the sword, it was to gain liberty from
Jamindars (Feudal lords) and priests." Islam, contrary to the popular
belief came to India through the Arab traders who used to visit the
Malabar coast for trade, and it were the Hindu Kings who built the initial
Mosques to sustain the trade. Also there are still communities in the
coastal areas who practice mixed, Hindu and Muslim, rituals. The major
spread of Islam in India took place through the Sufi saints whose
spiritual strength and attitude of being close to the people attracted the
lower castes to embrace Islam in the hope of escaping the Brahminical
oppression of which they were the victims. There is no doubt that some
conversions also took place out of fear of the invading Muslim Kings and
also out of the anticipation of reward from the Muslim Kings, but surely
this number is inconsequential. Similarly even today there are some
insignificant boisterous Christian groups who blow their trumpet and
propagate in an aggressive way. Again their impact is insignificant.
It is interesting that Sikkhism, which drew heavily from Islam as well as
Hinduism attracted more of low caste untouchables in big number. Many of
them converted to Sikkhism in the early part of twentieth century despite
stiff opposition from the Arya Samaj and other elite Hindu streams. The
case of Ambedkar and his followers embracing Buddhism needs a bit of
recounting. Dr. Ambedkar tried his best to have a place in the Hindu
social order. In this direction he led the Chavdar Talav movement, to
have access to public drinking water, he led the Kalaram temple agitation,
to gain entry to Hindu temples. The violent reaction of the upper caste
Hindus to these agitation's made him to say that that though I was born a
Hindu I will not die as a Hindu. Further he went on to burn Manusmriti and
later decided to convert to Buddhism.
Dr. Ambedkars' trajectory is the classical example of low caste Hindus
adopting a different religion by choice. And this is what has been the
phenomenon all through-attempts by the low castes to escape the
Brahminical Social Order by embracing different religions. Be those
religions of Indian origin or be they of foreign origin, what is important
is that the oppressed have been active partners in the process and not the
mere object for the conversions. As for the conflict amongst those
converted and their previous communities, this writer happened to a part
of the fact-finding team to investigate the forced conversions in
UlhasNagar(near Mumbai). To his surprise he found that not only that the
charge of forced conversions was highly exaggerated close to being
baseless but also the fact those who adopted Christianity are happily
living with their Hindu brothers and sharing the same business most of the
time.

Communal forces under different guises have used conversions. Hindu
communal forces take the do take cake in this matter. As such Hinduism is
based on caste system and Brahminism has been its dominant factor. It is
not a prophetic religion, and there by spreading it is not the norm of the
religion. Earlier Brahmin groups, being the elite, insisted more on
'exclusion' of others rather than on proselytisation. Other 'Indian'
religions, which were prophetic (Jainism, Budhhism and Sikkhism), did
believe in propagating and that's how Budhhism in particular spread far
and wide, to other countries. Hindu and Muslim political forces in early
part of 20th century did undertake conversions (shuddhi to Hinduism and
tanzim and tabligh to Islam). The shuddhi was more to attract those low
castes' that had adopted Islam or Sikkhism as their religion. The current
Gharvapasi campaign of VHP draws it legitimacy from the assertion that
Adivasis are Hindus. If religion is determined by ones' belief systems,
deities, holy books, and communitarian function than in which way the are
the Adivasis Hindu? They generally are beef eaters, are unaware of Ram and
other deities of Hindu religion, are unaware of Diwali and other Hindu
festivals, are oblivious to the Hindu holy books i.e. Gita, Ramayan, Maha
Bharat, and Vedas, and are practicing the animism in their own way. As
per the obligatory criterion of Religion they cannot be called as Hindus.
But they are being labeled as Hindus as a part of the phenomenon of
political will and for the necessities of Hindutva (not Hinduism, and note
that they are different categories) onslaught which is trying to match
Islamic fundamentalism in its pernicious methods. Gharvapasi is a
proselytisation allright. The adivasis are being Baptised in newer ways
(Holy baths, washing their feet with sacred water etc.) and this being
backed up with teaching them the Hindu ways, i.e. making them aware of the
Hindu deities, Hindu holy books Hindu festivals etc. Today, despite the
claims to the contrary some followers of Hinduism are indulging in
proselytisation. Christianity and Islam are not the only religions today,
which proselytise. Hindutva, which is Brahminical Hinduism based
Nationalism has used the conversions to strengthen Hinduisms' flanks by
co-opting the low castes and Adivasis earlier through shuddhi and now
through Gharvapasi. It is to its 'credit' that its propaganda machinery
can 'successfully' project these proselitisations as this that and the
other phenomenon simultaneously claiming that Hinduism is implicitly
superior to other faiths as it does not indulge in conversions. It also
claims that conversions done by others spread discord in the communities
and that conversions show disrespect to others' religions. Bravo! Gobbels
has been beaten at his own game.
What is remarkable is not that conversions as a marginal phenomenon have
been a part of Indian reality from ages but the fact that political
phenomenon called Sangh Parivar can make an issue out of it even today.
What is remarkable is that this political multiheaded hydra (Sangh
Parivar) can make the 'forced conversions' an issue to build its political
base even at a time when the actual percentage of those being targeted is
on the decline.
------------------------------
#3.
From: Cabeiri deBergh Robinson, Cornell University
Subject: Asher Mahmood's Poetry Available

** MITTI KA KHUDA: ASHER MAHMOOD KE SATH EK MEHFIL-E-NAZM (Audio Cassette) **
** Cabeiri deBergh Robinson, Cornell University (Editor & Producer) **

The forthcoming publication of Asher Mahmood's first collection of poetry,
Mitti ka Khuda, was first announced in literary journals and newspapers in
1997. Various Pakistani publishing houses offered to publish this
collection provided Asher remove several poems which have religious or
political implications that various publishing houses anticipated might be
found objectionable and incur government censure. Asher refused to release
his collection without these poems and the collection therefore remained
unpublished. Changes in the cultural economy of the Urdu literary world
have led to a growing dependance on print media in the last decades.
Correspondingly, increasing state control over print and electronic media
in Pakistan has effectively mixed political expediency with artistic
considerations and independent publishers in Pakistan have increasingly
become the front line of (unofficial) government censorship.

I became involved in this publication project for two reasons. Firstly, I
wanted to support Asher's efforts to publish his collection and to fulfill
what he sees as his responsibility to speak the truth about the society in
which he lives. Secondly, Asher is a gifted young poet whose work speaks
to and about contemporary Pakistani society while maintaining an aesthetic
link to both modern Urdu poetic forms and Sufic poetic sensibilities.
Asher draws on a subcontinental tradition of devotional poetry which
transcends the political borders of modern South Asia. In short, his is a
collection highly deserving of publication.

I sought a form of publication that would permit the distribution of
Asher's collected poetic work beyond the immediate and limited context of a
particular poetry reading and also highlight the aesthetic and cultural
context from which his poetry grows and about which it speaks. As one of
the people that Asher requested review his collection as he prepared it for
publication in 1996, I was well familiar with his work. I had also
attended several musha'irahs (group poetry readings) in which he
participated, and I have often noted that his poetry has an even stronger
impact in oral presentation than in written form because of his sensitivity
for the inherent musical qualities of words. In Pakistan, a continuing
vibrant culture of musha'irahs is still the foundation of local literary
communities, and participation in such readings is the basis of entrance
into the literary circles within which a young writer develops a mature
literary sensibility. I decided that a cassette recording of Asher reading
his poetry would be an excellent way to both publish his collection and
highlight its aural qualities.

The most aesthetically successful publications are those in which the
artist maintains ultimate control over the composition and production of
his or her work and thus I worked closely with Asher Mahmood throughout the
conceptual and production stages of this recording. The cassette was
professionally recorded at The Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan Foundation in a live
reading setting. We invited a group of local poets well acquainted with
Asher's work to a sound studio for a live recording of this mehfil-e-nazm.
Accompanying it is a brochure in English which explains the political and
artistic impetus behind the project and provides and introduction to Asher
Mahmood who, despite his young age, already has a strong reputation in
Pakistani literary circles for the quality of his poetry and for his
activities as the independent publisher of the monthly "Literary News".

This cassette was released in the US and Europe in October 1999 and will be
released in Pakistan on November 25, 1999. The decision to release the
cassette overseas was taken in the light of Asher's experience, as an
editor and journalist, of unofficial censorship in Pakistan in which
semi-independent institutions act to impede the production and release of
information in such a way as to make legal remedy in the courts irrelevant.
By distributing the cassette overseas in the South Asia diaspora and by
widely publicizing its release in Pakistan, we seek to create an
environment in which any criticism must be made openly and to which we will
have a chance to respond. We are confident that given a chance, our
project will be successful.

Income from the sale of this cassette, once production costs are recovered,
goes directly to Asher Mahmood to support his continued literary endeavors.

Thank you for your support.

To Order This Cassette:

Cassette Cost: $8.00/ cassette
Shipping & Handling: $2.00/ cassette; $1.75/ cassette for 3 or more

Send Order Request and Payment to:
Dr. Grace Clark
5511 Roland Avenue
Baltimore, MD 21210
USA

Make Checks or Postal Money Order Payable to:
Cabeiri Robinson
("Mitti ka Khuda" in subject line)

For more information please contact:
Cabeiri deBergh Robinson
PhD. Candidate, Department of Anthropology
265 McGraw Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853
USA
Email:cdr3@c...

------------------------------
#4.

INDIA PAK ARMS RACE & MILITARISATION WATCH NO.3
(4 December 1999)

[information & news for peace activists on Arms sales to the region,
defence budget figures, acquisitions & updgrades of weapons systems,
development and deployment of new weapons, implications of militarisation;
the developments on the Nuclearisation front and the doings of the
'intelligence' agencies. Bringing this information to wide public knowledge
is our goal here. No to secretive & exclusive control of this information
by technocrats, planners who plot national security hidden from public
scrutiny.
Please help us in the information gathering work for wide public
dissemination in South Asia.
Send Information via e-mail for IPARMW series to: aiindex@m... for
inclusion in the Emailings]

Deccan Chronicle
4 December 1999

[Indian] Navy to induct 2 more aircraft carriers

New Delhi: The Indian Navy plans to induct at least two aircraft
carriers by 2010, Naval chief Admiral Sushil Kumar said here on Friday.
It would also equip its 'Kilo' class warships with Cruise missiles and
explore the possibilities of inducting nuclear-powered submarines
depending on the political will of the government, the Admiral said,
unveiling broad outlines of the naval strategy for the new millennium.

These measures would make the Indian Navy a "blue water" Navy by then,
he said.Admiral Sushil Kumar the doctrine would be based on the concept
of "preventive deterrence" and a combination of "maritime diplomacy,
robust forward presence and dominant manoeuvre".

Stating that India's vital maritime interests were largely threatened
from the sea, he said while the country's geographical position situated
it on the "most vital waterways" of the world, 97 per cent of its trade
was seaborne, 70 per cent of its oil came via sea and the Navy had
tremendous policing requirements right from the Persian Gulf to the
Malaccan Straits.

"The new silk route of the next millennium runs from the Persian Gulf
via the Indian Ocean and through the Malacca Straits," Admiral Kumar
said, adding it was time that "India looked south and remind ourselves
of our maritime destiny."

Speaking of the impending acquisitions, the Navy Chief said Russian
aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, on sale to India after refits, would
soon become an "important and good asset" for the Navy and added that
all modifications and repairs would be carried out within "a reasonable
time-frame".

Kilo class ships like INS Talwar would be fitted with Russian Klub
cruise missiles "which will be available very shortly." The Klub
missiles have a range of about 300 km and a warship can fire them right
inside the enemy land from deep sea.On aircraft carriers, Admiral Kumar
said it was absolutely essential that the force acquired at least two
operational carriers before 2010 by when the life span of INS Viraat
ends.

"By that time, we will have our own indigenously-built aircraft carrier
and Admiral Gorshkov. We will start construction of the third carrier
immediately after the first one is constructed," he said, adding the
acquisition of 'Amur' class submarines would be decided at the political
level.Refusing to reply to questions on nuclear-powered submarines, the
Navy Chief said, "we will keep our aspirations alive... It is a
strategic decision and the Indian Navy can only give professional advice
to the government."

He, however, said the Navy "can be a blue water Navy without nuclear
submarines".On whether Pakistan's acquisition of Agosta class submarines
posed enhanced threat to India, Kumar said, "it fits in very well in
Pakistan's operational scheme of sea denials. It is an important asset
for them. The Indian Navy has taken it into consideration."
__________________________________________
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