[sacw] TNI: Op. Ed on India's Dr Strangelove

[Harsh Kapoor]

=46YI
Harsh Kapoor
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The News International, Pakistan
Saturday, October 9, 1999
Opinion

India's Dr Strangelove

Brian Cloughley

Have you ever despised someone you have never met? I mean, really
disliked them because you loathe everything they stand for? I suppose
Pol Pot falls in to that category, for most of us, and a few others like
Stalin and Hitler. But I dislike Dr K Subramaniam not just because he is
a nuclear fanatic, but because he is arrogant, self-satisfied and
pompous with it.

The Times of India published his apologia for his flawed 'nuclear
doctrine' paper on Monday, and it is vintage Subramaniam, although he
does concede that the faults of everyone who has criticised his
paper--they have "subjective mindsets" he says--"no doubt apply" to
himself. He does not really believe this, of course, but he can be
assured that his paper is half-baked and that his mindset is at about
the same level. He claims that his 'National Security Advisory Board' is
'non-official.' Think about this. The NSAB, appointed by the Indian
government, with its members paid from the public purse, and its 'draft
doctrine' paper produced at vast expense and published throughout the
world by government agencies (see text at
http://www.indianembassy.org.policy/CTBT/
nuclear_doctrine_Aug_17_1999.html) is 'non-official'? It has the BJP's
fingerprints all over it and was released with government approval in a
shabby (and apparently successful) attempt to attract voters. Well done,
Subramaniam! What a man of principle you are, to be sure.

I well remember the Subramaniam reaction following the first time I
referred to him, in the Far Eastern Economic Review on November 24,
1983, in a piece called "Nuclear Sanity or Strangelove?" The article was
unsigned, for I was a serving army officer and had no permission to
write controversial things in magazines under my own name. (Permission
was given a week after the Strangelove article, which was an accolade I
valued.) The editor, the great Derek Davies, sent me a telex saying, "He
knows who you are and is prepared to reveal your identity; be careful."
I much admired Derek (and still do), but did not take his advice,
because such as Subramaniam need to be told that nuclear weapons are
evil. I repeat this without equivocation: they are evil, and those who
support their proliferation are either misguided or wicked.

In the 1983 piece I wrote that "On April 17 this year, just four days
after Subramaniam spoke so eloquently [at the Australian National
University] of the 'measured spread of nuclear weapons' being more to be
welcomed than feared, India launched a satellite into earth's orbit. The
launch vehicle has nothing like the capacity of the superpowers'
rockets, but its use was an adequate demonstration that India possesses
the capability to design and produce a warhead carrier." Now, sixteen
years later, we know that India's rockets (and Pakistan's) are
nuclear-capable. What a wonderful achievement, at the cost of national
development and the failure of both countries to raise enormous numbers
of their peoples over the level of mere existence. Moreover, Dr
Subramaniam has assisted the spread of nuclear weapons which he so
earnestly desired all these years ago. The word 'measured' is hardly
appropriate, and the rest of the world would hardly use the word
'welcomed' in the context of India and Pakistan testing and deploying
nuclear weapons, but he must be proud indeed.

Subramaniam claims there are three basic principles of India's nuclear
doctrine (and note that he does not say "draft" doctrine: make no
mistake; this dreadful paper is to drive India's nuclear posture, come
what may). These "pillars" are "no-first-use, credible minimum deterrent
and civilian control." Ho hum. But then he says that "all other
components=8Aare strict mathematical derivations from the above three
basic principles." This is nonsense. How can a "shift from peacetime
deployment to fully employable forces in the shortest possible time" be
a mathematical derivation from a wishy-washy draft concept that was
produced in a few weeks?

Subramaniam appears to have little idea of the complexity and detail of
nuclear force command and control. How could he? He has read some
theory, but nobody who has practised nuclear command and control would
ever speak with such as Subramaniam in other than general terms about
the real and terrible difficulties facing them. Years ago I was deeply
involved at the working level in such matters, but, even now, I would
not divulge the full extent of problems experienced in 39 Missile
Regiment concerning employment, deployment, nuclear safety and
communications. His reference to doctrine not involving "delegation of
powers" shows all too clearly his lack of understanding of the chain of
command. If the prime minister is going to be personally responsible for
targeting and release of every nuclear bomb and rocket he will require
supernatural powers. Subramaniam exists at a rarefied level, and it is
unfortunate for him--and his country--that reality and practicality
rarely penetrate that far.

Perhaps the most chilling of Subramaniam's words are that India must
have the "ability to carry out punitive unacceptable retaliation." He
justifies this by claiming that "It is now recognised that one bomb on
one city is unacceptable." Well, now, there must have been a decided
shift in world perception of 'credible deterrence.' Who recognises this?
Who has told K Subramaniam that one bomb is unacceptable? Is this policy
of the government of India? Has thought been given to the course of
action to be followed if the PRC, say, struck a single Indian city with
a nuclear bomb, concurrently making it clear that it would strike no
more unless there was an Indian response? Such matters are kept very
secret indeed, and only a tiny number of people are aware of the nuclear
destruction-acceptance level of any nation. There can be no transparency
about this, otherwise national interest will would be compromised.

Dr Subramaniam says that "The Indian nuclear doctrine totally rejects
the western (emphasis added) approach to nuclear theology (a phrase
cribbed from Mike Krepon, president of the Stimson Center in Washington,
from his comments on the Subramaniam doctrine), as is evident from
[reiteration of] Indian commitment to disarmament." Note that he uses
the positive words "totally rejects" rather than "in this draft
discussion paper we consider that the western approach might be flawed=8A"
which is another indicator that the Subramaniam 'non-official' paper is
set in the BJP's military programme. But it is the word "western" that
is even more perplexing. Is India's nuclear doctrine, as presented by Dr
Subramaniam, embracing Chinese--eastern--thinking about nuclear weapons
and their putative, possible employment?

Subramaniam's strange perceptions of nuclear capability are exemplified
by his reference to "sea-launched cruise missiles." These, he says, are
delivered by "nuclear hunter-killer submarines". Does he know anything
about submarines, and their costs and limitations, concerning delivery
of nuclear missiles? Apparently not, because he is massively insouciant
concerning their acquisition. India will not have an indigenous nuclear
submarine in service for another twenty years (which is the time it has
taken to develop an indigenous fighter aircraft that has not yet flown),
but he says there "is no reason why even a modest arsenal of 150 weapons
cannot be distributed over aircraft, mobile missiles and sea-based
assets." What does he mean?--50 air-delivered; 50 SSM; 50 sea-delivered?
Is there a different ratio? If so, what? And why? And how? Is there a
"mathematical derivation"? Of course not. What about strategic
connotations, cost-effectiveness of delivery, and tactical doctrine? The
figure of 150 was plucked out of the air, and this should make us all
uneasy.

The more one reflects on the 'non-official' draft nuclear doctrine, the
worse it appears, and this apologia of Subramaniam's only confirms
Michael Krepon's view that, "The objectives and means described to
attain these objectives in the current draft are completely
disconnected. India's stated objectives are 'minimal' nuclear
deterrence, but the means described are completely open-ended."
Subramaniam attempts to refute the Krepon comments, but gets himself
further into the mire by so doing.

Perhaps the most interesting of his comments is that "India was
compelled to go nuclear" because the nuclear weapons powers are obdurate
and have legitimised nuclear weapons, and, in a strange twist, because
there is a "rising trend in interventionism by the industrialised
nations in the affairs of the developing world." There might be an
argument for exploding nuclear devices because countries having nuclear
weapons are 'obdurate' and there might even be an argument for trying to
create a nuclear arsenal because nuclear weapons have been
"legitimised"--but to say that there was compulsion to go nuclear
because industrialised nations are intervening in the affairs of the
developing countries is bizarre. Can he mean that third world nations
should follow India down the nuclear route because developed countries
are intervening in their affairs? This is scraping the bottom of the
barrel for justification of India's nuclear weapons' policy, and Dr
Subramaniam is floundering in a quagmire of his own making. He calls his
'doctrine' "eminently sensible, extremely logical and moderate" but most
of those who have examined it consider it to be unwise, scrappy,
illogical and an ugly challenge to the rest of the world.

No amount of back-pedalling can obviate the fact that Dr Subramaniam
advocates "operationally prepared nuclear forces" which is a forceful
concept that does not sit easily with a "commitment to disarmament."
India seems inextricably bound to a nuclear weapons' policy that will
render the region even less stable than it is at present, while keeping
hundreds of millions of people in poverty and despair. Remember, this is
the man who said that the "measured spread of nuclear weapons" is "more
to be welcomed than feared." A tragic statement by a feverish and
fixated man.