[sacw] SACW Dispatch

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Web Dispatch
September 9, 1999
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Contents:
#1. Impact of communal politics in Bengal (Book review)
#2. On the proposed Press Council in Pakistan
#3. India's Nuclear Doctrine: A Recipie for Disaster
#4. Pakistan Jihad and Ethnicity
#5. India: Alternative Schools Net Girl Dropouts 
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#1.
(From: The Hindu, September 7, 1999, Features)

Impact of communal politics in Bengal 

COMMUNAL RIOTS IN BENGAL, 1905 -1947: Dr. Suranjan Das;
Oxford University Press, ``Oxfort House,'' 219 Anna Salai, Chennai-
600006 [India]. Rs. 225. 

AS THE author says an examination of the communal riots in the
undivided Bengal helps one to understand the impact of communalism
and how it has influenced the course of national politics in the 20th
century under the Raj. Under its regime, Bengal had the largest
concentration of Muslim population in India. It is noteworthy that the
State has witnessed communal amity under the Left Front Government
since it assumed power in 1977, something that none of the earlier
regimes could accomplish. 

In the first half of this century, the social, economic and religious
factors helped the elitist and religious groups to promote communal
consciousness in the community. The author says Bengal had one of
the worst records of communal riots before the Partition of the country.
It was only in Bengal that the Muslim League succeeded in forming
``relatively'' stable ministries in the two decades before the British quit
in 1947. 

Communal and caste politics run along the same lines, ``initially
expressed in elite conflicts, jobs and political concessions.'' The first
recorded communal riot in modern Bengal took place in an industrial
suburb of Calcutta in May 1891. It was followed by the Bakr-Id
disturbances in 1896 and the Tala outbreak in 1897. The then
prevailing socio-economic situation, the attitude of the British
administration, the impact of Islamic reform and Hindu revivalist
movements, the development of institutional politics under the Raj and
role of the media et alhave been discussed in chapter one. 

The colonial rulers discriminated in favour of or against particular
communities to suit their political interests. They evinced little interest
in eradicating communal violence. The mullas or the Muslim clergy had
a role to play when tensions grew between the traditionalists and the
fundamentalists ``following a clash'' in the early and the mid-18th
century. The author observes this ``imparted a strong Islamic identity
to the Bengali Muslim.'' 

This growing assertiveness was reflected among the Bengali Muslims
at the turn of the century by the rising tendency to substitute Arabic and
Persian names by ``local first names'' which were till then common
only among the poorer sections of the community. Perhaps the seeds
of the two-nation theory, which was later developed as the political
philosophy of the Muslim League by M.A. Jinnah were sown during
this period. 

The emergence of the Arya Samaj and the spread of ``Hari'' and
``Sanatan dharma sabhas'', besides the ``Go samrakshana'' or cow
protection campaigns were seen as the signs of Hindu revivalism and
orthodoxy. Interestingly, the author says the secular movements of the
19th century Bengal reinforced the Hindu revivalism but this view can
be contested by the scholars. The Hindu revivalism embraced the
secular concepts in Bengal more generously than elsewhere. 

The British exploited the Hindu-Muslim antagonism to suit their
political expedience. In analysing the pattern of riots during the period
(1905-47), the author has focussed on the development of communal
politics. The Mymensingh riot is taken as the starting point for the
study as it helps to understand the complexities of communal violence. 

In this instance, the author sees a class basis as the Muslim peasants
were seen as the poor section of the community dependent on their
Hindu landlords or zamindars. The Muslim peasantry's attacks on their
masters had an economic basis. They demonstrated a strong class basis
but the conflicts were communal in character. The author says that the
Mymensingh riot ``anticipated the nature of the first phase of
communal rioting in the 20th century Bengal.'' 

The 1872 Census revealed that Muslims accounted for nearly half of
the total population of Bengal. They inhabited the marshy low- lying
areas of the East Bengal, now Bangladesh. In some districts like
Mymensingh, Pabna, Bogra, Backerganj, Noakhali and Chittagong
more than 60 per cent of the population were Muslims. But
``demographic predominance was not, however, reflected in the
socio-economic and political structures of the province.'' The riots in
Calcutta, Pabna and Dhaka between 1918 and 1926 and how the
growing communal violence shaped the political events are discussed.
The incidents reflected in varying degrees the convergence of
community and class identities. But the outburst of violence in Dhaka
in 1941, according to the author, marked a turning point in the history
of Hindu-Muslim strife in Bengal. 

As the Hindu-Muslim antagonism had a historic basis, its impact on the
political developments had to be viewed from this perspective. Under
the two-nation theory ``there had never been a confluence of Hindu and
Muslim civilisation and the Muslim separatist movement which led to
the establishment of Pakistan was, therefore, a natural and expected
develolpment.'' But this was true only of societies where religion was
seen as ``a means of ordering the world.'' The author says
``communalism per se, though was a product of the 19th and 20th
centuries, which saw the gradual manifestation of a sense of
community in overtly separatist forms involving a degree of intolerance
for those outside the communal boundary.'' 

In the name of religion, newspapers wrote provocative editorials
inciting violence. The war cry of ``jehad'' was raised and the Hindu
revivalist or fundamentalist organisations did not lag behind.
Provocative leaflets were distributed and Calcutta was at the edge of a
volcano in 1946. The Great Calcutta killing rapidly transformed the
political situation in the country. The General Secretary of the
Communist Party of India (CPI), P.C.Joshi, saw in the Calcutta riots a
grave warning to all freedom fighters, Hindus and Muslims alike. The
author has dealt with the Noakhali- Tippera riots which shook the
nation and how Mahatma Gandhi's crusade accomplished the
seemingly impossible task of restoring communal amity in the riot-hit
areas. Even highly respected Muslim leaders like Fazlul Huq wondered
how Gandhiji could carry on with his mission in the riot-torn areas. He
had earlier described Gandhiji as Gandhipoka, an insect with an odious
smell. The aftermath of Noakhali and Tipperah riots hastened the
Partition of Bengal and the country. 

In the concluding chapter the author observes how the communities
living together in peace for centuries are divided by communal or
religious passions and by vested interests among the political class. He
says the Partition of India was not merely the result of ``tortuous
negotiations between the British, the Congress and the Muslim League,
but also a reaction to ``pressures from below.'' This well-researched
book first published at the turn of this decade will be found very
informative by students, practising politicians and bureaucrats alike, if
they want to know how communal riots affect the community and
shape the political events. 

M. VINAYAK 

-------------------------------
#2.
(From: The News on Sunday, 5 September 1999)

Ethical concerns
By Hussain Sajjad

As the government hands over the proposed draft of a press council in the country to the representatives of the editors, a seminar in Lahore seeks to offer the working journalists' view on the issue 

A responsible press has to serve as a linkage between state and society so that a peaceful coalition of the two could progress in the direction of sustainable human development. This role gets more significant when an apathetic state seems to be in conflict with a hostile society. Burning down of a police station by people in Gilgit in reaction to the arrest of fifteen people, who had staged a demonstration against non-availability of basic necessities, is just one recent example to quote. 

Before the role of the press could have been determined, the 'media-friendly' government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has proposed a press council, whose prime responsibility would be enforcement of a code of ethics to ensure responsible journalism. The proposed draft, which has now been handed over to the Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors (CPNE) for suggestions, has generated heated debate in the journalist circles. While certain journalist groups have lauded the efforts of the government, the representative bodies of working journalists outrightly reject Press Council. 

To have a clear-cut version of the journalists on the issue, the Journalists Resource Centre (JRC), in collaboration with the Punjab Union of Journalists (PUJ), organised a dialogue on the proposed press council in Pakistan at Nisar Osmani Auditorium of the Lahore Press Club on August 28. Journalists, including office bearers of the journalists union, and academics participated in the dialogue. 

The participants maintained that any press council proposed or formulated by the government will not be acceptable to the journalists, unless the governments agrees to end the state monopoly of electronic media and abolishes all the existing anti-press laws and censors. 

"Non-representation of working journalists' on the proposed press council has made the council's character and scope quite dubious," said President Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists (PFUJ) I. H. Rashid. He warned that the formulation of the council will pave way for further anti-press laws and asserted that in case of any forcible imposition, journalists will resort to agitation. He also feared that the powers of the press council could be abused both by the government and the newspaper owners for their political and commercial benefits. 

Dr Mehdi Hasan, renowned intellectual and a former teacher at the Punjab University's Journalism Department, said it is the fifth attempt by any government to make a press council in Pakistan. "The earlier attempts failed, as there was no representative of the working journalists on the council," he commented. "The latest effort will also fail for the same reason." 

Apprising the audience of the press councils in different countries, Dr Hasan said that such councils are formulated voluntarily by the journalists in those countries where there is no press law, so that the media might not ignore its social responsibility. "In Pakistan there are 16 laws that control the freedom of the press in one way or the other," he pointed out. "These laws were introduced by the colonial regime in emergency times, which were later made permanent by the successive governments in Pakistan." 

He stressed that funding of the press council by the federal government is in fact an attempt to 'buy out' journalists -- in the same tradition where journalists were awarded plots, financial favours and other privileges by the governments of the past. Whereas he maintained that a code of conduct for the press was necessary, he questioned the effectiveness of the press council in enforcing it.

Secretary PFUJ Fouzia Shahid said that the institution of professional editors should be restored and journalists should be given access to information. Any press council, whether it includes working journalists or not, will not be acceptable to the journalists. 

She said that it is indeed surprising that a party which had promised to disband the Information Ministry before entering the corridors of power, is now insisting on formulating a press council, instead. "When almost all the institutions of the country have been corrupted, why does the government want to make a special arrangement for the press," she asked. 

Chief news editor of Jang Lahore, Khawar Naeem Hashmi rejected the idea of a press council and noted that it would have made sense only had it been propounded either by the journalists or by the people. Criticising the government claims of being a supporter of the press freedom, he said that the freedom enjoyed by the Pakistani press today could be gauged from the fact that the key posts of every newspaper are filled by government's own men. 

He also claimed that press advice to the editors is still operative in Pakistan, where officials of the government control news like the past dictatorial regimes. "The present government, in its attempt to harness the press has resorted to such measures that were not even followed during the dictatorial regime," he added. 

President Lahore Press Club Saqlain Imam maintained that since legislation in Pakistan is based on circumstances rather than on principles, the proposed draft lacks vision. Freedom of press is neither a propriety right of the newspaper owner, nor a privilege of the journalist; it is an offshoot of the law regarding freedom of expression. He admitted that there were manipulations of facts by journalists for vested interests, in the absence of a code of ethics -- political manipulations being the worst of all -- but added that a free press requires no control on media; it needs protection of the rights of journalists and better working conditions for them. He said the United States has no press council, in fact the editor's representative body rejected the idea on the premises that it would create elitist values for the press. 

Academic and Consumer Rights Commission of Pakistan (CRCP) director, Salman Humayun elaborated on the perspective of the information consumers, the buyers of the newspaper and their stakes regarding the creation of a press council. He termed the draft proposed by the government as ineffective since it does not take into account the concerns of the consumers and the public in general. The change in prices of the newspapers without prior notice, publishing of misleading advertisements, irresponsible journalism and space manipulations for commercial benefits were some of the considerations of the newspaper consumers which he pointed out. 

He said the role of the proposed press council has been restricted to that of an agency responsible to enforce a code of ethics, but the promotion of research and improving the working conditions of the journalists has been completely ignored by the proposed council. 

"The inadequacy of the proposed press council could be determined from the fact that even the tenure of its members and their jurisdiction has not been mentioned in the proposed draft," he added. 
----------------------------

#3.
(From: The Hindu, 8 September 1999
<http://www.hinduonline.com/today/stories/05092523.htm>)

A Recipe for Disaster

By M. V. Ramana

ON AUGUST 17 last, the Indian Government released a draft version of its nuclear doctrine. Despite a proclaimed commitment to ``minimum credible deterrence'', the doctrine is based on ideas developed by the United States and Russia as they built up their arsenals to absurd levels. If the plans laid out in the doctrine are embarked upon, they would lead India down a path that promises an arms race and commits the nation to huge expenditures on a system that only furthers insecurity instead of promising increased security.

In contrast to the policies of the previous Governments, all of which have rejected the notion of nuclear deterrence, the doctrine whole-heartedly embraces the idea. Even as recently as 1995, at the International Court of Justice (World Court), India described nuclear deterrence as ``abhorrent to human sentiment since it implies that a state if required to defend its own existence will act with pitiless disregard for the consequences to its own and adversary's people.'' All that has been completely swept aside. Instead, the doctrine claims that ``India's strategic interests require effective, credible nuclear deterrence.''

The real problem with deterrence is that it is merely a mind game; there is no good reason to not expect it to fail. To its credit, the nuclear doctrine does recognise this. So do all nuclear weapon states. This is why they make plans to actually use these weapons. This is reflected in the doctrine by stating that India requires ``adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail.'' Further on, it is made clear that this nuclear capability will be used for ``punitive retaliation'' to ``inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor''. In other words, these weapons would be exploded over some cities, each killing lakhs of people. As is typical of the nuclear debate, the question of how bombing lakhs of innocent citizens in retaliation against some political or military leaders and what good such bombing would do is artfully left aside.

Apart from basic problems with deterrence, the notion that there is or can a stable ``minimum credible deterrent'' is extremely dubious. By definition, a deterrent should be credible. If it is not credible, it cannot deter. But what seems credible to one country may not seem credible to the other. What seems credible to one leadership at one time may not be so under different circumstances. Further, the history of the nuclear arms race during the past half a century demonstrates that despite every nuclear weapon state claiming that it only had the minimum required for its security needs, each state kept increasing its arsenal.

If one were to go by the public articles by some of the authors of the doctrine, the size of the planned arsenal would be well over 300 weapons and include a number of weapon varieties. These would be based on a ``triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets.'' Even to those believing in nuclear deterrence, such an arsenal cannot be considered minimal.

The doctrine also fails to recognise the obvious dynamic nature of the issue - that any attempt to build up such a large arsenal would definitely provoke responses from Pakistan and China. Following the (il)logic of nuclear weapons, such responses would, in turn, require India to react by furthering its arsenal. In other words, there would be an arms race.

There are also contradictions implicit in some of the claims made in the doctrine. On the one hand, it is asserted that ``nuclear weapons shall be tightly controlled and released for use at the highest political level'' with the authority to release these weapons residing in the Prime Minister or the designated successor(s). While the doctrine does not go into the details, installing suitable electronic controls that prevent the use of the weapon unless some code is sent from the ``highest political level'' would presumably ensure this. On the other hand, the doctrine also claims that ``India's nuclear forces shall be organised for... rapid punitive response.'' The ability to quickly respond, i.e., after an attack, would require those possessing the weapons, for example, a military officer, to be able to launch these weapons at short-notice. If the attack were to either destroy the political leadership, i.e., the Prime Minister and the designated successor(s), or cripple the c!
ommunication system (through, for example, the electromagnetic pulse set off by a nuclear explosion under some circumstances), such retaliation would either be impossible or would require that the military officer had access to the necessary code to launch the weapons in the first place. In the latter case, the officer could have launched the weapon without authorisation to start with; control for the use of the weapons, therefore, rests with the officer and not with the Prime Minister.

Such problems are particularly acute when dealing with submarines because of difficulties in communicating with them while not exposing their location or when dealing with mobile missiles - both of which seem to be within the scope of the planned arsenal. All this raises valid doubts about the bland assurance offered by the doctrine: that an unauthorised or inadvertent use of weapons would not take place.

The doctrine also claims that ``space-based and other assets shall be created to provide early warning...''. Quite apart from the substantial costs and technical challenges involved in building space-based systems, geography makes it impossible to provide early warning in the case of an attack by either Pakistan or China. Satellites typically detect missile launches by looking for the plume from the exhaust - which is substantially hotter than the surrounding area. Once launched, due to the proximity of Pakistan and China to India, missiles would take somewhere in the range of 4 to 8 minutes in most cases to fly to (say) Delhi. This is the time available for warning and is too short to be considered ``early warning''. There is simply no time to ensure that there are no errors and consider responses carefully.

One can compare this period with the 20-30 minute flight times in the case of ICBMs flying from Russia to the U.S. or vice versa. This window of time allows the two countries a little bit of extra time to recheck their signal. Nevertheless, and despite the enormous financial and technical resources invested in trying to make these early warning systems fool-proof, they often did not perform as expected. Information on these failures is largely kept secret. It is known, however, that between 1977 and 1984 the U.S. early warning system showed over 20,000 false alarms of a missile attack. Over 1,000 of these were considered serious enough for bombers and missiles to be placed on alert. There were similar scares on the Russian side as well. At moments of crisis, such malfunctioning may just lead to a nuclear launch.

Another bland assurance offered is the assertion that an ``appropriate disaster control system'' shall be developed to deal with potential accidents (which are called `incidents' in the language of nuclear strategists) involving nuclear weapons. This would be laughable if it were not tragic. An accidental nuclear explosion of even a small nuclear weapon in a city such as Bombay, home to the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, India's main nuclear weapons laboratory, could kill lakhs of people. Radioactive fallout from the explosion could spread far and last for centuries. No disaster control system can deal with this meaningfully.

Indeed, it is the doctrine that is a recipe for disaster and needs control. If implemented, it is sure to result in an arms race. Instead of furthering the cause of nuclear disarmament, it only promotes weaponisation and leads India closer to the brink of an atomic abyss. Instead of security, it only leads to vulnerability. The time to step back is now. The doctrine must be firmly rejected and the path of weaponisation must be reversed. Nuclear weapons must be abolished both from the region and the world. That is the only way to true security.

(The writer is Research Associate, Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University.)
---------------------------
#4. 
(From: Secular Perspective Aug. 16- 31, 99)

Pakistan, Jihad and Ethnicity
By Asghar Ali Engineer

The militants are roaming the streets of Karachi, Lahore and other major cities of Pakistan raising the slogans of 'jihad' as if 'jihad' is their mental and spiritual diet. It is, to be honest, is a dangerous state of affairs for the Pakistani society and its health. There are number of reasons why Pakistan is passing through the jihad mode today. 

Pakistan was conceived as a homeland for the Muslims. There were so many contradictions in this concept of Muslim homeland which were totally ignored at the time. The heat of partition melted all such contradiction. But these contradictions are surfacing with all intensity. The concept of Muslim homeland implied that all Muslims are united merely on the basis of religion and there are, among them, neither ethnic differences, nor class or sectarian differences. And that all Muslims will equally benefit from this homeland.

Religion is very vital force in human life but it is so on spiritual plane. There are several factors on the secular plane which motivate human behaviour. Human behaviour, it must be remembered, is not determined by religious beliefs alone; rarely it so happens. Human behaviour more often is determined by worldly interests. Muslim homeland itself was product of worldly interests rather than spiritual homogeneity. It was thought by Mohammad Ali Jinnah and his Muslim League colleagues that Muslim political and economic interests would not be taken care of in the 'Hindu India' and that a separate homeland for Muslims is needed. 

The underlying assumption was that if a community of people who follow same religion will automatically have uniform interests. But this has been totally belied today as it ought to have been. Religion can never ensure unity of interests. In a democratic society various divisions surface which also become political fault lines. No truly democratic society can suppress these divisions which also ensure formation of identities. Diversity, in other words, is the lifeline of democracy and genuine national unity can emerge only from respect for this diversity.

But in an authoritarian society these diversities are considered as sign of danger and is sought to be suppressed. The authoritarian society seeks uniformity and confuses uniformity with unity. In all authoritarian societies all other identities - ethnic, linguistic or sectarian, is sought to be suppressed and only one identity - be it national identity or racial or religious identity is enforced from above to ensure unity. But as soon as authoritarian structure is demolished and replaced by democratic or even proto-democratic structure, these identities emerge to the surface and tend to assume more volatile form after a prolonged period of suppression.

Pakistani society has undergone similar process. It was for long under military dictatorship which tried to suppress all other identities except either overarching Pakistani identity or Islamic identity. But ethnic identities exploded the moment first general elections were held in 1969. The Bengali identity was feeling suffocated and the first election itself provided an opportunity for it to break loose from the overarching Pakistani identity. The Pakistan went through great crisis during seventies when a kind of proto democratic structures were surfacing in that country. It was a period of semi-democracy for Pakistan.

Different identities began to emerge and ethnic identities began to submerge the overarching identity after a long period of suppression. While all people of Pakistan are proud of their Islamic identity they are not prepared to barter their regional or ethnic identity for the Islamic identity as the Punjabi ruling classes would like them to do. The ethnic identities become quite explosive even if they are sought to be hegemonised by one particular ethnic identity, the Punjabi identity in case of Pakistan. The Sindhis, the Baluchis, the Pathans and the Urdu speaking Muhajirs who, ironically are also referred to as Sindhis by domicile, are sought to be dominated by the Punjabis. Even within the Punjab the Saraiki speakers are resenting Punjabi domination. The Saraiki speakers claim to be 60% of the Punjab province.

The ultra rightist party of Pakistan - the Jamat-e-Islami is almost exclusively Punjab based party now and it is the Jamat which wants to bulldoze all other identities in the name of Islamic identity. It is the Jamat which is raising the slogan of jihad, jihad to save not the Pakistan but the Punjabi domination. And there is silent collusion of the Punjabi ruling classes with the Jamat and its attempt to bulldoze all other identities in the name of Islam.

It is also to be noted that the word 'jihad' is being utterly misused by the Pakistani religious fanatics. It is interesting to note that one does not find in the Qur'an the word 'jihad' in the sense in which it is being popularly used i.e. 'holy war'. The word in the Qur'an for war is 'qitaal' and not jihad. The word 'jihad' is used in its literal sense i.e. to strive, to assert or to make efforts. Thus jihad in the Qur'anic terminology means to assert oneself or to make efforts to promote what is right and to prohibit what is evil.

And in Qur'an qitaal is also permitted against persecution and to establish justice, not for territorial aggrandisement. Even if the word 'jihad' is used, it is also for defense of faith and not for annexation of territory or to solve territorial dispute. Also to kill innocent civilians as the extremists are doing in Jammu and other parts of J & K cannot be jihad. It is against all principles of Islam. Thus to wage 'jihad' in Kashmir is a total misnomer. Kashmir is a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan which has to be resolved between the two countries. There is no question of religious persecution as far as the Kashmir question is concerned. The Muslims of Kashmir under Shaikh Abdulla had clearly supported the National Conference and its programme of alliance with India. In fact the Kashmiris from the valley fought against the raiders from Pakistan and checked their further advance. It was a purely political move in order to annex territory and could not be constr!
ued as jihad by any stretch of imagination.

Similarly, the intrusion in Kargil is also part of territorial dispute and cannot be called 'jihad' at all. It is real irony that the intruders are described as 'mujahidins' (i.e. those waging jihad). Are these 'mujahidin' defending the faith of Islam in any sense in Kargil? On the other hand, the most affected people by their 'jihad' are the Muslims of Kargil. Their homes and hearths have been destroyed by the relentless shelling in Kargil. The Kargil Muslims have resented the Pakistani intrusion most. Who would, any way, like their homes being destroyed and their normal life completely disrupted? To disrupt the lives of fellow Muslims cannot be a part of jihad anyway.

The Pakistani society is undergoing violent phase. There are several factors responsible for this. The Taliban factor is one among them. Many sagacious thinkers, writers and journalists from Pakistan, the noted anthropologist and scholar Akbar Ahmad being one among them, had pointed out that supporting highly orthodox religious students who have undergone rigorous and rigid religious training in Madrasas in the North West Frontier province, to fight a partisan war in Afghanistan, would not be in the best interest of Pakistan.

The Taliban have not only tested the gun, they have tested the power of religious orthodoxy also. And religious orthodoxy and power of the gun is a heady mix. The Taliban after finishing their job in Afghanistan are returning to Pakistan and wish to recreate Afghan society there. It must be said that compared to many Islamic countries Pakistan is far more 'secular' and 'modern'. The military dictators, after all, were not religious fanatics with the exception of Zia. In fact Ayub resisted the influence of orthodox 'ulama and introduced many modern laws. Yahya Khan too, by and large, refrained from invoking religious orthodoxy for legitimising his rule.

It was General Zia who, for the first time, invoked religious orthodoxy to perpetuate his rule and to legitimise it. He also welcomed the Afghan war as a godsend and got much help from CIA which was interested in defeating Soviet Russia. The Afghan mujahidin too had to invoke Islamic orthodoxy to fight against the atheistic Russians. All the training to them was imparted on the territory of Pakistan adjacent to Afghanistan. Thus it was General Zia who systematically injected religious orthodoxy in Pakistani politics. 

The Taliban phenomenon was its natural outcome. And the madrasas then set up in the North West Province are churning out large number of 'Taliban' every year. These religious students are being injected with the heavy dose of jihad and what is worse, along with the religious training, they are also being imparted military training in these madrasas. Thus the emphasis is more on jihadist mind set rather than on truly religious mind set. These madrasas have acquired vested interest of their own as they receive funds from various sources, including some Islamic countries.

It is, to say the least, not in the interest of Pakistani civil society. It amounts to spreading cult of violence in Pakistan. The ruling classes want to use these 'mujahidin' to suppress ethnic unrest and to maintain the Punjabi hegemony. But so far there is no sign of success. The cult of violence is spreading fast in the civil society without there being any sign of ethnic unrest vanishing. The ethnic groups have their own legitimate aspirations and no amount of jihadist mind set, being promoted by powerful vested interests, can suppress these aspirations. The suppressed ethnic groups, particularly the Sindhis, the Baluchis and the Muhajirs, have acute political consciousness and they will not barter away their legitimate aspirations for an illusionary Islamic identity. However, this does not mean that they are not good Muslims. In fact they are much better Muslims that those selling 'Islamic' identity to them. 

In Pakistan unfortunately the military is not under civilian control and has autonomy of its own. It is also thus interested in keeping the Jihadist mind set alive and spreading the cult of violence. It is only through this strategy that the civil society will remain under its thumb. The civil society will have to wage many a struggle to liberate itself from the hegemony of the armed forces. 

(Centre for Study of Society and Secularism,
Irene Cottage, Second Floor,
4th Road, 
santacruz (E), Mumbai:- 400 055, India.)
----------------------------------
#5.
IPS Gender & Human Rights Bulletin, 30 August 1999

EDUCATION-INDIA: Alternative Schools Net Girl Dropouts 
By Rana Karmakar

HARDOI, India Aug 24 (IPS) - The villagers of Khosi Kheda think that the proper age for a girl to become a bride is 14. So nobody really expected Kishwar Jahan's teachers to oppose her marriage. Kishwar was married and packed off to her husband's home in spite of all the arguments that Mehndi Hassan and other teachers at the local makhtab (primary school imparting Islamic education) made to her parents.
But the incident, a few months ago, did generate a debate on child marriage in Khosi Kheda and the nearby villages of Fakiran Kheda, Narayanpur, Tiloyiya Khurd and Fareda all of which fall in the Hardoi district of northern Uttar Pradesh state. Consequently, the marriages of Nasreen Bano, Shama Parveen and Rukhsana - all Kishwar Jahan's schoolmates at the makhtab - have been postponed. 

A few hundred metres from the makhtab at Khosi Kheda is the balashala (children's school) run by Deshwanti Devi where another 14-year-old, Aarti, is back to her books after being forced to drop out of regular school by her parents.
Makhtabs and Balashalas are examples of alternative schools recognised under the World Bank-funded, District Primary Education Programme (DPEP) which endeavours to get dropouts, particularly girls, back into classrooms.
Studies conducted by the Uttar Pradesh state's 'Education For All' project show that thanks to alternative schooling the dropout rate rate among girls has fallen by 58 percent over the last six years. The dropout rate among boys from government schools has not been investigated but is partly the result of a tendency for parents to shift them to privately run schools which offer better quality education. Girls are discriminated against in India's patriarchal society and parents generally expect daughters to turn into good homemakers even discouraging them from going to regular school which may be some distance away.

Overall, South Asia is a problem area for gender equity with the proportion of girls in primary school increasing by 0.2 percent in the first half of the 1990s - a rate of growth at which gender equity will happen in the next two centuries.
India presents huge disparities among states according to the Education Performance Index (EPI) devised for 'Education Now' a report brought out last year by Oxfam, the U.K-based non-governmental organisation (NGO). While southern Kerala state ranks 12th in Oxfam's EPI table alongside South Korea and above Mexico, Uttar Pradesh ranks 100th or fourth from bottom, below Mozambique.
Recognition by DPEP has improved enrollment in makhtabs, balashalas and other alternative schools. Over the past few years, enrollments have crossed the 10,000 mark in a state where the adult female literacy rate is an abysmal 24 percent.
The middle school enrollment ratio in Uttar Pradesh, which happens to be India's most populous state with 165 million people, is also a low 49 percent.
"There was something wrong with the thinking of our people," says Shamsher Ali, one of DPEP's many motivators. "But things are changing slowly."
The attitudinal change has many small but significant facets such as the use of Hindi and English numerals in the makhtabs which are usually fastidious about Arabic symbols.
But then there has been some give and take. The makhtabs were accommodated in the DPEP just so that Muslim girls could get formal education without ignoring community sensitivities. The balashala model is flexible enough to club disadvantaged pre-schoolers along with older children upto the age of eleven. "While those in the 3-6 age group benefit from a school-readiness package, older children get primary education," explains Rama Devi, a balashala teacher.
"Multi-grade teaching takes care of space and manpower problems," as well she added.
Balashalas take in girls who have dropped out of regular school for one reason or another. Like 9-year-old Goldie who stayed home for a whole year after being slapped by her teacher at a regular school at Sandila, a nearby town.
"We persuade parents to let their out-of-school girls _continue studies in a balashala which is like an extension of their homes," says local primary education official, R. P Sharma. The parents usually agree because the balashalas are flexible enough not to interfere with their domestic chores which may include looking after siblings, Sharma says.
Muslim girls who go to the makhtabs can usually carry on with the traditional kadhai and zardosi (needlework) work they are expected to help with in villages like Fareda.
Akbar Ali, 65, a resident of Fared says he is happy that his grand-daughter has time to get an education and also attend to the family's needlework trade.
According to Project Director Vrinda Sarup, the DPEP models have helped break traditional and social barriers that have long hampered girls' education in the remote villages.
"We plan to cover all the districts of Uttar Pradesh by the year 2005," she said. (END/IPS/rk/rdr/99)