[sacw] Pakistan Article by Ameen Jan

[Harsh Kapoor]

2 Aug. 1999
Posted below is an upcoming article on Pakistan in the Sept./October 1999
issue of Asian Survey
(South Asia Citizens Web)
--------------------------------------

Pakistan on the Precipice

By Ameen Jan

More than ten years after its return to civilian democracy from a
period of protracted military rule, Pakistan is undergoing a political
crisis, institutional collapse and severe economic problems. The country's
political crisis is caused by increased ethnic fragmentation and the growth
of religious extremism, accompanied by the centralization of political
power in the hands of the current Prime Minister. The government's assault
on already ineffective civilian institutions, in favor of greater control
by the executive and the military, has heightened political
dissatisfaction. Dire economic conditions, resulting from both long-term
economic mismanagement and more recent developments, including imposition
of sanctions after Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998, are further
accelerating social and political divisions. Continuing foreign adventurism
in Afghanistan and Kashmir has deeply soured regional relations and
contributed to growing militarism. These concurrent dynamics seriously
endanger Pakistan's stability, and by extension that of its neighbors.
Unless the process of political fragmentation and institutional collapse is
arrested and reversed, serious threats to Pakistan's internal, regional and
international security loom. A politically unstable Pakistan ( in which the
military is increasingly called upon to battle extremist ethnic and
sectarian groups within the country ) could result in widespread civil
violence among a population of 130 million, increasing domestic and
international terrorism, the wholesale replacement of civilian state
institutions by the military, and divisions within the military itself. The
government of Pakistan must take immediate steps to contain and reverse the
unfolding political crisis. Key external countries, including the United
States, Japan, and European countries, should use their political and
economic leverage on Pakistan to prevent such a catastrophe from occurring
in the world's newest nuclear weapons state.

Growing Political Divisions :
The political situation in Pakistan in the first half of 1999 is marked by
increased centralization of power in the hands of Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif. The parliamentary opposition, which increasingly represents
ethnic-based interests, has been effectively frozen out of political power.
Concurrently, albeit for different reasons, a new form of political
opposition, in the guise of extremist religious groups, is growing. In
order to curb the spread of internal political violence - termed
'terrorism=EE by the government - by both ethnic-based political parties and
extremist religious groups, Sharif's government resorted to extra-judicial
measures, including use of paramilitary forces and summary courts.
When he assumed office in February 1997, Sharif rapidly embarked on a
process to consolidate his power. His party's overwhelming parliamentary
majority - 137 out of 205 seats allowed him to take steps that previous
governments were unable to. First, he nullified during his first few months
in office the maligned eighth Constitutional amendment that had been passed
by General Zia ul-Haq in 1985, which gave the President the authority to
dismiss the government and call for new elections. There was widespread
political consensus on overturning this provision, not least because it had
since 1988 been used thrice by two different presidents against both Sharif
and his main rival, Benazir Bhutto. Shortly following that, another law
prohibiting parliamentarians from violating party discipline was passed.
The backdrop to this was the rampant aisle crossing, or "horse trading",
that had characterized the previous parliament, where legislators' votes
could be bought with ease. The new law against this practice ensured that
any divisions within Sharif's own party, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML),
would result in dissenting parliamentarians being suspended. It also
ensured that there would be no means of dissent against Sharif in
parliament.
Initially, Sharif built alliances with some of the other parties that had
won parliamentary seats in the smaller provinces. These included,
importantly, the Muttahida Qawmi Movement (MQM), which has the strongest
political support in Karachi, and the Awami National Party (ANP) in the
North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Both of these alliances were short
lived. Since 1997, the ANP, in order to gain political mileage, had
advocated changing the name of the province to 'Pakhtunkhwa', which would
reflect the dominant ethnic group in the province. The Sharif government
refused to consider this demand for fear of inflaming ethnic tensions in
the province, and the ANP terminated its alliance with the PML on February
27 1998.
On October 17, 1998 a widely respected figure and former governor of Sindh,
Hakim Saeed, was assassinated in Karachi, which the government accused the
MQM of engineering. Sharif immediately suspended the Sindh Provincial
Assembly and imposed Governor's rule in the province, effectively
terminating his party's alliance with the MQM. Even though Sharif's PML
held the parliamentary majority in Sindh and therefore headed its
provincial government, the MQM and Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party
(PPP) together controlled 65 out of 109 provincial parliamentary seats,
which necessitated that the PML collaborate with them to conduct provincial
affairs. The PML's action to suspend the assembly in favor of central rule
sent a strong message to opposition parliamentarians that the PML simply
had no intention to include them in governing the province.
More recently, in April 1999 a politicized judiciary convicted Sharif's
main political opponent, Benazir Bhutto, and her husband of corruption
during her stint in office and barred them from holding public office, in
addition to imposing five-year jail terms and a heavy fine. Few doubted
that Bhutto had engaged in massive corruption during her previous term in
office, but the targeted nature of the inquiry that exonerated Sharif and
his own cohorts from the same process made her conviction appear nothing
more than a witch hunt. With Bhutto effectively barred from political
activity, Sharif has ensured that the PPP, which like the PML remains a
highly personalized party, will be unlikely to effectively challenge his
power.
In parallel with these efforts to squeeze out the opposition from any share
of political power, the PML government also took major steps to curb press
freedoms during early 1999. Since the end of the Zia dictatorship in 1988,
Pakistan has developed a robust press that presents views spanning the
political spectrum and does not shy from being highly critical of any
incumbent government. In February 1999, the government targeted one of the
largest newspaper groups in the country, the Jang Group, accusing it of tax
evasion. Rather than taking the newspaper to court, the government simply
refused to release imported newsprint which the Jang Group had already paid
for. The true reason, most independent observers noted, for the
government's actions was that the Jang Group had been critical of the
government and had not buckled under pressure to support the government and
sack certain journalists. The Chairperson of the private Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan, Asma Jehangir, claimed that the government was
"bent upon destroying the press because it was bringing to light its
misdeeds."
In May, the government's crackdown on the press took a nastier turn when a
prominent journalist, Najam Sethi, the editor of The Friday Times, a weekly
newspaper highly critical of the Sharif government, was beaten and arrested
in a midnight raid for alleged anti-state activities. Again, many
independent commentators believed the true reason for the arrest was
Sethi's recent interview with the BBC for a documentary being produced on
corruption by Sharif and his associates. Other critical journalists, some
with ties to the opposition PPP, were also arrested and beaten. At the same
time, the Punjab provincial government, whose Chief Minister is Sharif's
own brother, banned some 2000 non-governmental organizations, freezing
their bank accounts and seizing their assets, and threatened similar action
against the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.
Sharif's efforts at centralizing political power and squeezing out
parliamentary and other opposition from all forms of political activity are
being undertaken against a backdrop of increasing ethnic fragmentation in
the country. Political violence along ethnic lines has centered in Sindh
province over the past decade. The emergence of the MQM during the Zia
years, with its political agenda based on protecting the ethnic interests
of the muhajir community in Pakistan, signaled a new phase in ethnic
politics. The fact that the MQM virtually controlled Karachi, the largest
port city and commercial capital of the country, made it a force to be
reckoned with. Successive governments have repeatedly suppressed the MQM's
demands in order not to allow Karachi, which is a critical economic center
for the country, to become independent of central authority. The MQM's own
brutal tactics have legitimized in the view of many non-MQM supporters the
use of violence by the state to curb their demands. The result of this
politics of violence on both sides has led to increasing radicalization of
the MQM and the creation of new and more firebrand splinter groups.
Karachi, which has significant pockets of all the other ethnic groups of
Pakistan, has from time to time therefore suffered serious ethnic violence.
Whilst Karachi has suffered the most from such violence, ethnicity also
increasingly defines the political platforms of other parties in the
country. The ANP in NWFP, which called in 1997 for renaming of the province
as Pakhtunkhwa, and the Baluch National Party (BNP) in Baluchistan both
represent ethnic interests. Even the PPP, which was relegated to capturing
the bulk of its parliamentary seats from rural Sindh in the 1996 elections,
no longer appears able to represent interests beyond those of the Bhutto
family's ethnic constituency. The ruling PML, which gained the bulk of its
political support from the majority Punjab province in the last election,
and which is heavily dominated by Punjabi landowners and industrialists, is
viewed by many as primarily representing Punjabi interests. Sharif's recent
measures to centralize political power and marginalize the other political
parties has added to the sense of ethnic hegemony by Punjab and
strengthened the ethnic basis of the opposition. =02
Ethnicity has been an underlying factor in Pakistani politics since the
country's creation. Punjabi officers heavily dominate the most powerful
institution in the country, the army, and the bureaucracy who administers
the state is similarly composed. The retention of institutional power by
Punjabi, and to some measure Pashtun, elites has historically fuelled
ethnic dissatisfactions in the polity. The lead-up to the 1971 civil war,
in which the ethnically mobilized Bengali population of East Pakistan, was
Pakistan's first catastrophic conflict with sharp ethnic overtones. Shortly
thereafter, a Baluch nationalist uprising was brutally suppressed by
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and in the years since ethnic-based political agendas
have increasingly been voiced among populations from rural Sindh, Karachi,
and the NWFP. Adding to these divisions, much more recently sectarian
violence has gripped the country, especially Punjab. The rise of militant
sectarianism, between Shi'a and Sunni Muslim groups, is a new phenomenon.
While sectarian divisions have existed and been politicized in Pakistan for
many years, they are now militarized in a way not witnessed previously.
External support, primarily from Saudi and Iranian sources, to extremist
groups on both sides has fuelled these divisions.
Notably, a spate of new Sunni extremist parties has emerged from the
madrassas, or religious schools, along Pakistan's western border with
Afghanistan. Some of these madrassas are funded from Saudi sources and are
the germinating ground for the Taliban, who have effectively conquered the
bulk of Afghanistan since their emergence in 1994. Like the Taliban - which
is a genuine cross-border movement involving ethnic, political, military
and economic networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan - several of the
sectarian groups that operate in Pakistan, such as Sipah-i-Sahaba and
Harakat-ul Mujahideen, have emerged from the same madrassas and ascribe to
the same philosophy, rooted in the Deobandi school of Islam, that is
strongly anti-Shi'a. The Deobandi madrassas are based predominantly in the
tribal areas of NWFP and Baluchistan, and their students come largely from
poor, rural backgrounds. Sectarian groups, such as Ahle Hadith, have also
emerged from urban areas. Shi'a sectarian groups, such as Sipah-i-Muhammad,
have also formed, many with external financial support, at least in part to
counter the emergence of Sunni groups.
The magnitude of the sectarian problem in Pakistan is clear. 1997 witnessed
a dramatic increase in sectarian violence within Punjab, resulting in
hundreds of deaths. This trend has continued since then, notwithstanding
efforts by the government to impose law and order. However, because the
activities of these groups are geographically diffuse and their acts are of
a terrorist nature =F1 such as attacks on worshippers in mosques =F1 it is f=
ar
more difficult to control than violence that is limited to a city like
Karachi. Some of these extremist groups have also gained following after
the August 1998 U.S. bombing of suspected terrorist training camps in
Afghanistan, an act that many in Pakistan viewed as an unprovoked attack on
fellow Muslims by an arrogant Western superpower.
In November 1998, at a political rally in the NWFP, Sharif praised the
Taliban's enforcement of Islamic law and suggested that he favored such a
legal system in Pakistan. In the same month, the parliament's lower house,
which is dominated by the PML, passed the fifteenth Constitutional
amendment establishing Islamic law (shari'a).=02 Yet, Sharif's action did no=
t
correspond with the agendas of the religious extremist groups, which reject
the current democratic political system altogether. All of these groups, as
well as the more mainstream Islamic parties that participated in the
democratic system, such as the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), rejected Sharif's
efforts to establish shari'a, which they viewed as a political ploy to
enhance his own power. Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the leader of the JI, criticized
Sharif at a major political rally in Islamabad in October 1998 by claiming
that those in power lacked courage and competence to implement Islamic law.
'They have grabbed more and more powers through constitutional amendments,
turned the office of president redundant and destroyed the sanctity of the
judiciary', he claimed. In contrast, he said, the JI campaign was aimed at
giving the country an honest leadership and a corruption-free society
through the establishment of a system based on the Islamic code.
Two levels of political opposition to the government exist =F1 one seeking
increased autonomy on the basis of ethnicity within the existing federal
system, and the other seeking to overthrow the present system in favor of
an Islamic regime. Each of these trends includes variations on the
moderate-extremist scale. However, the trend in both cases is towards
greater extremism, as the government favors suppressing rather than
including parliamentary opposition in governing the country and curbs press
freedoms, and as the ground for religious extremism becomes more fertile.
The government has had far greater success in restricting the opposition
political parties than the religious extremist groups. In fact, under
growing pressure from the Islamic political groups, shari'a was for the
first time formally enacted as the law of the land in January 1999 in
several border districts in NWFP.

Weakening Civilian Institutions:
Sharif's effort at consolidation has also involved changing the balance of
power in the country's institutional apparatus, away from an independent
judiciary and in favor of a strengthened role for the executive, in close
co-operation with the military. The first important example of the tussle
between the executive and the judiciary was the confrontation between the
Chief Justice and the Prime Minister in late 1997, when the Chief Justice
held Sharif in contempt of court for using derogatory language against him
and other members of the bench. This episode was resolved in Sharif's favor
when he created a revolt in the Supreme Court against the sitting Chief
Justice, leading to his resignation. Shortly thereafter, because of his
opposition to Sharif's strong-arm approach to subjugate the judiciary, the
President, Farooq Leghari, resigned and was replaced by a Sharif family
friend, Rafiq Tarar.
In 1997, the PML-dominated parliament passed a law giving the Prime
Minister direct control over the accountability process (Ehtesab) that had
been initiated to bring to book those high officials accused of corruption
in the previous Bhutto regime. A close Sharif confidant, Senator Saifur
Rahman, chaired the Ehtesab process. This process bypassed the judiciary
entirely, which has the constitutional authority to try all civil and
criminal cases, in favor of Sharif himself being the arbiter of the
previous government's misdeeds. In the same vein, in 1997 the parliament
adopted the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) which gave police sweeping powers to
use lethal force against anyone 'committing, or believed to be about to
commit, a terrorist offence.=EE Special courts were established to conduct
summary trials of persons charged with such offences. Major international
human rights advocacy groups, including Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch, condemned the passage of the ATA. In a scathing criticism,
Amnesty International wrote, 'the existing legal and judicial system is
already equipped to deal with all the offences referred to in the Act. The
problem then seems to be a lack of implementation, not a lack of laws.
Amnesty International believes that recourse to a law which explicitly
dispenses with constitutionally secured fundamental rights will not in the
long term secure the rule of law. . . . Reforming the police, strengthening
the judiciary and insisting at every level on the strict implementation of
the existing law are alone able to restore respect for the rule of law and
secure fundamental rights for all citizens of Pakistan.=EE=02
The government's assault on the judiciary continued. In November 1998, the
government superceded the ATA and established summary military courts in
Sindh to curb terrorism and restore law and order. Subsequently, Sharif
declared his intention of extending the military courts to the other
provinces of the country. Political violence was indeed rife in Sindh
during 1998, which neither the civilian police and courts nor the Special
courts established by the ATA were able to stem, partly because of rampant
corruption in the civilian law enforcement and judicial apparatus and
partly because of the scale of violence. The establishment of military
courts had a temporary calming influence, because the well-paid military is
less amenable to small-time corruption, but the lull came at a terrible
price to civilian institutions and to respect for human rights.
Paramilitary forces (Rangers) patrolled the streets of Karachi, arresting
criminals and 'terrorists=EE, trying them and sentencing the guilty, all in
very short order. In early 1999, several suspects, with ties to the MQM,
were arrested, tried, found guilty and executed in the span of a few weeks.
While many of those apprehended by the military courts may in fact be
guilty of the crimes they are charged with, the fact that due process under
law has been so severely curtailed means that there is very little recourse
to an appeals process and innocent people may be punished as a result.
Needless to say, the system of military courts also lends itself to
political manipulation by those in power.=02
In response to the government's establishment of military courts, the
Supreme Court of Pakistan declared on 17 February 1999 that the military
courts were unconstitutional. Whilst recognizing the problem of terrorism
in Karachi and other parts of the country, the Supreme Court ordered that
all cases pertaining to such incidents be dealt with by the Special Courts
established by the ATA. The government accepted this verdict. In effect,
having taken an extreme position by establishing military courts, the
government was able to shift the center of the debate on how to combat
internal violence, so that the Special Courts, with all their
extra-judicial powers, became an acceptable solution.
In contrast to his dealings with the judiciary, Sharif has forged a close
partnership with the military, the institution that remains the ultimate
arbiter of Pakistan's political destiny. In late 1998, the Prime Minister
purged the top brass of the military and handpicked the new Chief of Army
Staff. Sharif also replaced the Director-General of the Inter Services
Intelligence (ISI), a quasi-military organization which has been on the
front-line of implementing Pakistan's policy in Afghanistan. His purge of
the military top leadership and His imposition of military courts in Sindh
was an important step in placing trusted Generals in charge and providing
them with an important institutional role in the country. In addition to
maintaining internal security, the military is also increasingly involved
in running other civilian institutions, including the large Water and Power
Development Authority (WAPDA). In November 1998, the entire management of
WAPDA was suspended and the military was inducted to run the utility. Other
civilian public sector institutions, many observers believe, may be next in
line for a take-over by the military. These steps give the military a stake
in allowing Sharif to rule while they reap the economic benefits of
controlling major revenue-generating public institutions.
However, events in May and June 1999 in Kashmir strongly suggest that
Sharif still does not wield the desired control over the military. Credible
claims that the Pakistan army was behind the occupation by several hundred
militants of some heights in Indian-held Kashmir without Sharif's prior
consent highlights the lack of accountability of the army to anyone. The
episode in Kashmir also indicates the growing Islamist trend within the
military's officer ranks.=02
Handing civil authority to the military also has important political
consequences. Punjabis and Pashtuns have historically dominated Pakistan's
military forces. When the army is called upon to intervene in civil
affairs, to maintain law and order or run public institutions like WAPDA,
ethnic dissatisfactions are further fuelled because minorities see these
ethnic groups as being firmly in power. Second, while the military
currently has little interest in formally assuming power, not least because
it does not relish dealing with the deep economic and social problems
afflicting the country, a key role in civilian affairs creates a situation
in which the army can gain all the benefits of ruling without any of its
responsibilities. This provides the military with a strong vested interest
in institutionalizing its role in civil affairs, especially in public
sector functions that are potentially lucrative. A third political change
underway, namely growing religiosity among military officers, raise
troubling questions about the military's future agenda. More specifically,
in situations where the military is called upon to quell internal sectarian
violence it may not be willing to take actions to defend the secular
constitutional status of Pakistan.=02
In effect, a condominium between the democratically elected government and
the military has emerged in Pakistan since 1997, in which the military
wields considerable power but is accountable to nobody. Concurrently, the
police and judiciary, who were already ineffective and corrupt due to an
absence of institutional reform, lack of internal accountability and meager
salaries for civil servants, have been further weakened.

A Collapsing Economy
The poor economic situation in the country is a result of long-term and
more recent factors. Because a majority of the parliamentarians in Pakistan
are feudal landlords, they have resisted imposing any taxes on agriculture,
which remains the country's economic base. Revenues are largely generated
through imposition of customs duties, sales taxes and income tax on the
salaried people. The middle class therefore bears the burden of taxation.
Because tax revenues are far below government expenditures, Pakistan
borrows heavily from international financial institutions. With a total
foreign debt burden of more than $30 billion, the bulk of public
expenditure goes towards debt servicing (40 percent). The military consumes
another 26 percent of the pie. Little therefore remains for development,
especially given the high degree of corruption at all levels of the public
sector.
Another important structural factor is the linkage of the Afghan economy to
that of Pakistan. Because there is very little productive activity in
Afghanistan (except for the cultivation of poppy), basic commodities such
as wheat and cooking oil are smuggled from Pakistan into Afghanistan.
Similarly, consumer goods are smuggled from the Gulf through Afghanistan
and sold in Pakistan. The government loses valuable customs revenues
because of this smuggling, and the price of basic commodities is pushed
upwards due to higher demand. Drug trafficking networks in Afghanistan and
Pakistan generate considerable foreign exchange through the sale of heroin
and other drugs that are cultivated mainly in Afghanistan to Europe and
beyond.
In 1998, several developments contributed to making much worse what was
structurally already a precarious position. First, the Sharif government
brought before the Ehtesab bureau many of the foreign investors who had set
up independent power plants (IPPs) to generate and supply much needed
electric power to the country. The reason for this was that the IPPs had
allegedly - and not surprisingly - bribed officials in the previous Bhutto
government for their contracts. Indeed, the pattern of bribing high level
associates of Bhutto during her term in office was not limited to the IPPs,
but was a practice that prevailed for virtually any investor that needed
government clearance. The net effect of the government's action against the
IPP's, which resulted in their operations being shut down, was to scare off
potential foreign investors who viewed the risk of their contracts being
terminated on the whims of one or other government as being too high.
=46ollowing India's nuclear tests in May 1998, Pakistan tested its own
nuclear capability, which swiftly resulted in economic sanctions being
imposed, notably by the US and Japan. Fearing massive capital flight, the
government froze all foreign exchange accounts, which further undermined
domestic and foreign investor confidence. At the same time, the global
financial crisis had resulted in most developing countries being affected
by higher interest rates; Pakistan's response to these global and domestic
economic troubles was to threaten to default on its foreign debt
obligations. The international reaction was predictable: except for
Afghanistan, Pakistan is now considered the riskiest country in the region
for foreign investors.=02
=46earing domestic instability in Pakistan, the US eased economic sanctions
from non-military items on Pakistan in late 1998 and, in early 1999,
decided to bailout Pakistan. The IMF released in January 1999 the first
tranche of $575 million of a $1.56 billion loan over a three-year period.
The loan is a very short-term solution, with stringent economic and
political conditions attached. The main political condition imposed by the
U.S. is tangible efforts by Pakistan towards non-proliferation, including
its signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Responding to these
pressures, Pakistan (as well as India) agreed to sign the CTBT during
summer 1999, in an atmosphere that was not 'coercive.=EE=02 At the time of t=
his
writing, however, it is unlikely that the CTBT would be signed before the
end of the year, in part because of planned Indian elections in September
1999.
More significant than the recent IMF measures is the general decline in
confidence in the country's economic and political future among the
professional and capitalist middle class. A large volume of capital has
left the country, including through liquidation of foreign currency
accounts at much lower than market exchange rates fixed by the government,
because people fear that conditions are destined to worsen further. Figures
for capital outflows are difficult to obtain; however, anecdotal evidence
from bankers in the United Arab Emirates indicates that immediately
following Pakistan's nuclear tests there was a sharp upturn in new bank
accounts being opened by Pakistani investors. The domestic stock market has
virtually collapsed during the past several years. Industrial production is
also likely to sag because of energy shortages stemming from insufficient
energy production, distribution losses and pilferage in the country. New
power generation from the IPP's was curtailed because of the ongoing
corruption cases against them, and the much sought after oil and gas
pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan into Pakistan is no longer
likely in the near-term, following UNOCAL's decision to cut its losses and
leave Pakistan after the US missile strikes on suspected terrorist camps in
Afghanistan. Many young, educated professionals are seeking employment
opportunities abroad because the immediate and future prospects at home are
so limited. For lower and middle class Pakistanis, leaving the country is
not an option; the immediate and growing concern for them is coping with
the pressure of rising prices and declining incomes.
At the same time as this sense of general despair at the country's short-
and medium-term prospects, surprisingly there is bustling commercial
activity in urban centers. The money for this activity comes from a variety
of sources. Part of it is legitimate, generated from continuing
agricultural and industrial production. However, a large part is also
generated from drug smuggling from Afghanistan and through northern
Pakistan.
Pakistan's declining economic conditions are likely to have detrimental
political effects. First, with reduced public expenditure on development
and shrinking foreign investment, capital and professional flight from the
country, continuing inflation, and energy shortages leading to lower
productivity, urban unemployment is likely to grow. Poor economic
conditions in cities, compounded by continuing rural-urban migration, will
undoubtedly heighten the ethnic and sectarian sources of dissatisfaction
and fuel support for extremist political elements. Second, as the
legitimate economy shrinks =F1 because of lack of capital due to low foreign
investment, low credit-worthiness, and the loss of external markets - the
illegal economy is likely to expand. This will have severe social
consequences in Pakistan and the region, in the form of proliferation of
drugs (there are currently almost 2 million drug addicts in Pakistan) and
weapons. Third, with increasing numbers of young, educated professionals
seeking work opportunities abroad, the country will in the near future
suffer an even greater brain drain than before.

And Foreign Adventurism
Pakistan's history of antagonism with its larger neighbor India has
made it all the more important to build strong alliances with other
countries in the region. These alliances provide Pakistan with political
guarantees and an economic space. In the 1970's, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto forged
closer ties with the Muslim world and, more important, with China, in order
to counter perceived Indian designs against it. In the 1990's, these
alliances have suffered badly in large measure because of Pakistan's
single-minded pursuit of installing a regime in Afghanistan that is closely
aligned with its interests.
With the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 and
the subsequent decline in American support for Pakistan and the Afghan
opposition forces, a new proxy war between Pakistan and Iran emerged inside
Afghanistan. Regional rivalry, with Iran seeking a government that would
include Shi'a and Tajik elements and at minimum would not be against its
interests and Pakistan and Saudi Arabia seeking to install a Pashtun and
Sunni dominated regime, quickly took the place of superpower competition in
Afghanistan. The emergence and rapid military successes of the Taliban, a
radical Sunni, Pashtun-based movement, that were backed by the Pakistani
ISI and Saudi financial support, sharpened the Iran-Pakistan confrontation.
It also deteriorated Pakistani relations with several Central Asian states,
whose markets and energy reserves Pakistan desires to access, Russia, and
China, each of who fear for their respective reasons a Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan. Pakistan's erstwhile patron, the US, which had been cooling
off its support because Pakistan was no longer an important geo-political
player, pulled away further mainly because of the Taliban's support for its
most wanted terrorist, Osama bin Laden.
While Pakistan's strong support for a Taliban victory started under
Benazir Bhutto's government, it has continued unabated. Nor does the
government have any real control over Afghan policy, which is conceived and
implemented by the ISI. Worsening regional relations have heightened
Pakistan's security dilemma vis-=FD-vis India. Notwithstanding Sharif's
overtures to Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee, which resulted in the latter's
famous bus trip from Delhi to Lahore in March 1999, the army-led
adventurism in Indian-held Kashmir a scant two months later has severely
deteriorated Indo-Pak relations. The growing sense of regional isolation,
in large measure created by the military and the ISI's own actions, further
strengthens the military establishment's implicit desire for it to be
strengthened in order to protect Pakistan's national interests.
Unlike the areas of domestic politics, neither Sharif nor any other
civilian government has much control over this type of foreign adventurism.
The army and the ISI essentially act independently in formulating and
implementing policies relating to Afghanistan and Kashmir. These actions
are generated from their respective military mindsets as well as their
corporate interests in remaining well funded and relevant.
=D6 Require Immediate and Long-term Measures by the Pakistan Government =D6
While many of the deep-seated problems of the country are not solely of its
making, the Sharif government's actions have exacerbated political
divisions, weakened civilian institutions and deepened the economic malaise
in Pakistan since 1997. The principal responsibility of turning away from
the present political and economic precipice rests with the government. A
serious commitment to reversing this disastrous course will require a
series of changes in Pakistan's domestic and foreign policy.
In the short-term, the government must reopen a process of meaningful
dialogue with the other political parties that are represented in
parliament at both federal and provincial levels. It must also restore and
strengthen civilian institutions, refrain from using the military to
maintain internal security and run civil affairs, and stop the harassment
of the press.
The principle of the will of the majority is sacrosanct when two conditions
are met. First, there must be a broad consensus regarding the acceptability
of the democratic system itself. Second, key institutions such as the
judiciary must be strong and independent, so that they can check and
balance the power of the executive. Because of Sharif's actions since 1997,
both these conditions are threatened. The parliamentary opposition has
become increasingly alienated. It has little stake in the parliamentary
system, in part because the chances of a democratic change in its favor are
distant, but also because the government has used its majority to totally
sideline the other parties rather than building coalitions. The judiciary,
which was always politicized and corrupt because of the habits of all
previous regimes, has been further weakened by the introduction of military
courts and Special Courts established by the Anti-Terrorism Act, and the
Ehtesab bureau established by the executive. These institutions, while
effective in the short-term in punishing the misdeeds of Sharif's political
opponents, are anything but impartial.
The desire for ethnic-based autonomy among many groups in Pakistan itself
indicates the failure of nation building. Non-Punjabi populations have
consistently been excluded from institutions of power and patronage, such
as the military and bureaucracy. Now, the wholesale suppression of all
opposition demands is leading to worsening fears among minority groups of
ethnic hegemony by a government that is heavily dominated by Punjabi
elites. Moderate elements of the opposition parties, many of whom are
currently in the national and provincial parliaments, should be included in
a genuine parliamentary process, where their representation on various
committees can influence the course of legislation and policy. In the
long-term, the only solution to curbing ethnic dissatisfaction is to
accommodate the interests of the minority ethnic groups in the institutions
of political and economic power. This will require representation in
national institutions, such as the military, as well as a greater
devolution of power to the provincial and municipal levels. The longer
these demands are ignored, the more difficult it will be to accommodate
more radical demands at a later stage.
The Sharif government must deal firmly with political violence and the use
of terrorism by the extremist ethnic and sectarian groups. However,
perpetrators of such violence should be punished through an effective and
transparent law enforcement and judicial process, not through
extra-judicial means. The extremist sectarian groups, with their
revolutionary rhetoric and agendas, threaten the democratic and secular
underpinnings of the state of Pakistan. The government must take firm
measures to restrict their growth. For this purpose, the political
conditions that have allowed them to germinate and the flow of money that
feeds them must be severely contained.
Pakistan's support to the Taliban is directly related to the growth of
these groups. In order to curtail them, the government must closely monitor
the madrassas from which the Taliban and the Pakistani sectarian groups
have arisen, and restrict their access to arms, money and military
training. This will also require finding ways to curtail private channels
of support, from both local and foreign, primarily Saudi, sources, to the
Taliban and other groups that have arisen from the madrassas. The
unrestricted movement of people and goods across the Pak-Afghan border must
be checked for this purpose. The porous border permits the free movement of
money generated from the drug trade, weapons, and militias that are
required to fight the war in Afghanistan. Each of these also creates
political and social instability inside Pakistan. The Pakistani military
could be deployed along the major border transit points to check the flow
of goods and persons. While this will not entirely stop these cross-border
flows, it will make it more difficult for militant groups to operate. In
order to do this, elements within the ISI that continue to operate
autonomously in formulating and implementing Afghan policy must either be
purged or brought into line under a moderate, unified command. These
measures will also have the additional effect of improving Pakistan's
relations with its neighbors, especially Iran. Good relations with these
neighboring countries are extremely important for Pakistan's strategic and
economic interests, especially in Iranian and Central Asian energy
resources and markets.
There is little that can be done in the short-term to restore confidence in
Pakistan's economy. Because of the government's arbitrary measures during
1998 to freeze foreign currency accounts and its threat to default on its
foreign obligations, investor confidence will not be easy to restore.
However, the political steps it can take towards engaging with opposition
parliamentary groups, supporting freedom of the press, committing itself to
strengthening civilian institutions, and restricting the basis of support
for the extremist groups through legal means will send the right message to
Pakistan's potential investors. The temptation to resist undertaking these
fundamental political measures is large, especially because the government
feels that it can continue to have an economic lifeline from the West,
which does not want to contend with the consequences of an economic
collapse in Pakistan. In effect, Pakistan, much like Russia, can implicitly
threaten the U.S. - by dint of its new nuclear status - that the
consequences of its economic collapse could severely hurt American
interests.
While this situation may be true for the short-term economic lifeline
required by the government, the need for fundamental political reform and
stability is necessary to lure private foreign investment back into the
country, which is ultimately a more effective driver of growth than are
international aid and loans. The message of political moderation should be
buttressed by implementing many of the structural economic reforms, which
Sharif's government has in fact agreed to with the IMF.
=46inally, the government must tighten controls along the land border with
Afghanistan in order to restrict smuggling of consumer goods into Pakistan
and of commodities to Afghanistan. This illicit trade robs the government
of much needed customs revenue and floods Pakistani markets not just with
televisions and refrigerators but also drugs and weapons. Concomitant with
the imposition of strict border controls over the flow of commodities is
the need for assessing the impact that these restrictions will have on
Afghanistan. Reeling from twenty years of civil conflict, the Afghan
economy is inextricably linked to Pakistan. Restricting the flow of goods
to and from that country will undoubtedly have severe economic
repercussions, which must be minimized, particularly for the worst affected
Afghan civilians who depend on basic commodities and food items from
Pakistan. The international aid community should be more active in ensuring
that the poorest Afghans can have continued access to basic food items,
while a more long-term strategy is developed to change the Afghan economy's
dependence on Pakistan and convert its cultivation of poppy to agricultural
produce.
Yet, it is unlikely that the Sharif government will enact any of these
measures by itself. Elected governments in Pakistan, as elsewhere, tend to
act in the interest of short-term gains and typically ignore longer-term
measures that may be politically costly. Ironically, the army must agree to
these measures and pressure the civilian government to embark on a course
of domestic moderation because the impact of the current policies of
authoritarianism will hurt the military's corporate interests. The army
needs a relatively stable and economically solvent country in order to
continue to receive the budgetary allocations it needs. The present
situation of impending domestic disintegration threatens these corporate
interests. To avoid this, the army leadership must first rein in elements
of its officer corps and the ISI who are bent on pursuing divisive agendas,
and recommit itself to defending a stable polity.

And the International Community
While the burden of responsibility for turning Pakistan away from
the precipice rests on the government and the army, the international
community too has an important stake in leveraging its influence on
Pakistan. Unlike some other countries, such as Somalia, Sierra Leone or
Afghanistan, the wider international consequences of increased civil
violence, possibly leading to state collapse, in Pakistan are enormous. The
most obvious international interest is in preventing the political
breakdown of a nuclearized state. Heightened political divisions within
Pakistan may invite foreign influence from a variety of neighboring and
more distant countries, thereby altering the strategic balance in and
seriously destabilizing the entire region from South Asia to the Middle
East. Other international consequences of growing political chaos and
extremism in Pakistan include the proliferation of terrorist groups,
increased drug trafficking to the West, and the flow of refugees to
neighboring and other states. In a country with a rapidly growing
population that already exceeds 130 million, the humanitarian consequences
of political chaos and state failure could be immense. Many industrialized
countries also have a strong interest in trading with and investing in the
surrounding regions of Pakistan, which would be jeopardized by political
instability.
The international community should use a mix of pressures and incentives on
both the government and the army to induce compliance with demands for
better governance. This involves opening political space, curbing the
growth of extremist sectarian groups, strengthening civilian institutions,
stabilizing the economy, and limiting foreign adventurism and seeking
political solutions to external problems. One of the most important
international instruments available is the ability to lend money. The
government's financial situation is continuously precarious, as a result of
which important lenders such as the U.S., Japan, and the international
financial institutions have tremendous influence on Pakistan. Lending can
be used as either a carrot or stick =F1 increased lending can be promised fo=
r
positive steps that the government may take, or loans can be suspended if
the government acts in ways that run counter to the interests of its
lenders. But such financial instruments need to be used cautiously in order
to be effective. Following Pakistan's nuclear tests in May 1998,
significant amounts of bilateral and multilateral lending came to a
temporary halt, as punishment for breaking the global non-proliferation
regime. In the months following, these sanctions have been reduced,
primarily because the U.S. fears that the dire economic situation caused by
sanctions may unleash widespread unrest inside Pakistan. Other than serving
a symbolic purpose, these sanctions were irrelevant in altering state
behavior and, in fact, demonstrated that the international community is
afraid to cut aid to the government because of its potential consequences.
The U.S. has also made the longer-term renewal of lending to
Pakistan contingent on its adherence to the non-proliferation regime,
including its accession to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The
IMF conditionality includes structural adjustment of the economy. These
conditions should be broadened to include concrete measures that the
government must take in the areas of internal political and institutional
reform. International lenders can also press the government to take steps
to closely monitor the madrassas in the border areas from which the Taliban
and other extremist groups have emerged, heighten border vigilance to
interdict the flow of drugs, arms and men, and reduce the role of the
military in civilian institutions. The promise of renewal of bilateral
loans and aid from major lenders like the U.S. and Japan, as well as
multilateral lending, will be a strong inducement for the Sharif
government, particularly given its persistently precarious financial
situation. International assistance could also be offered for targeted
purposes, such as heightened vigilance to interdict the drugs and weapons
trade across Pakistan's western border and to restrict cross-border
movements, or to strengthen the judiciary. The U.S., in particular, has a
strong national interest in trying to stem the cross-border flow of persons
and weapons, since these directly influence the growth of terrorist groups.
Political measures can also be adopted by key governments, notably
the United States, to pressure Pakistan into compliance with a series of
internal and external measures. These include diplomatic demarches, direct
pressure on the political and military leaderships from their counterparts,
high-level political statements in various bilateral and multilateral fora
calling publicly for a change in certain practices, and threats such as
placing Pakistan on the U.S. State Department's list of state sponsors of
terrorism. Such pressures will punish Pakistan for its extremist actions,
which may strengthen the hand of those within policymaking circles that
champion a more moderate course. However, pressures by themselves are
unlikely to alter Pakistan's behavior for the better. In fact, they may
result in knee-jerk reactions in a direction opposite to the one desired. A
strong incentive package is therefore necessary that is linked with
positive steps that are taken.
While economic incentives are important, political and security
incentives may go a long way in inducing compliance. The Pakistani state
has long sought in vain to internationalize its dispute with India over
Kashmir, because India remains vehemently opposed to anything other than
bilateral discussions on that issue. Because of the trenchant Indian and
Pakistani positions, not to speak of the complex political reality of the
disputed territories of Jammu and Kashmir itself, prospects for a bilateral
solution remain dim. At the same time, as recent military events in Kashmir
demonstrate, the need for a sustainable resolution is high since it can
easily trigger war between two newly nuclearized states. In this context,
some form of external facilitation =F1 possibly using back channel diplomacy
similar to the Oslo process that started the Middle East peace efforts =F1
may be necessary.
Initiating such a diplomatic process would require broad international
consensus among the major global political and economic powers, including
the USA, Russia, China, the European Union and Japan, and concerted
pressures by them on both India and Pakistan to address in a sustained
dialogue the totality of their relationship, including Kashmir. The
prospects of such external facilitation could be effectively used as a
carrot for Pakistani compliance on a wide range of actions. More
specifically, external support for internationalizing the Kashmir issue,
which Pakistan desperately desires, could be conditioned on the army
reining in adventurism in the region and the government taking key steps to
improve domestic governance. At the same time, nimble diplomacy is required
to have India accept an external facilitation role in a way that is not
perceived by it as compromising its sovereignty.
The international aid community, including the United Nations and
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), has a tangential but
important role to play as a partner in the process of supporting political
moderation in Pakistan. As described above, strong border controls imposed
by Pakistan to check the flow of illicit commodities, consumer goods and
food between Pakistan and Afghanistan are necessary to alter political and
economic dynamics in the direction of moderation. However, the Afghan
economy is likely to suffer because of these measures, which will have a
severe impact on the poorest people in that country. A robust package of
multilateral assistance that is delivered by the UN and NGOs in the absence
of an Afghan government should therefore be developed to reduce the
humanitarian effects on those most affected =F1 by providing basic food item=
s
and medical care - and to support local production of food items. An
effective Afghan aid program should also involve enhanced drug control and
poppy crop substitution programs, and demining activities to clear land for
productive use. Many of these activities are currently taking place, but
will need to be expanded to meet the needs of Afghanistan's population.
A concerted international response to the growing political crisis
in Pakistan is needed. Sufficient early warning of impending violence and
gradual state failure =F1in which the state lacks both the will and the
capacity to protect its citizens - is already evident. Early warning of a
growing fragmentation of Pakistan's body politic along ethnic and sectarian
lines, with the military increasingly being employed to hold together a
nation that is rapidly losing its natural adhesive, also exists. What is
required to translate that warning into action is necessary political will
to prod the Pakistani state towards a moderate course in its domestic and
related foreign policies.
Pakistan is a powder keg that sits in an already inflamed region. It now
has a nuclear weapons arsenal, over which unified command and control is a
question mark, given the autonomous status that the military has
historically enjoyed in Pakistan. Its population is over 130 million and
fast growing. It is awash with guns and drugs, which is a direct fallout of
the Afghan war over the past two decades. If widespread civil violence
erupts in Pakistan, coupled with gradual state collapse, its consequences
will be grave. In the face of these potential dangers, the risks of
inaction both by the Pakistani government and the international community
- are too high.

NOTES

=02 In response to the increasingly restrictive political environment, in
1997 a loose alliance of ethnic nationalist political parties was created,
calling itself the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONAM). PONAM's key
agenda is to press the central government to grant greater autonomy and
ensure rights of the non-Punjabi ethnic groups in the country.

=02 In order to become law, the bill must be approved by two-thirds of the
Senate. This is unlikely, because the PML is unlikely to muster the needed
58 votes in the 87 member Senate for the bill to become law. The
composition of the Senate differs from that of the National Assembly
because of different methods of election to those bodies. The National
Assembly is comprised of legislators elected directly from districts
throughout the country, while the Senate is elected indirectly by
provincial legislators from the four provinces.
=02 Amnesty International, 'Pakistan: Legalizing the Impermissible: the New
Anti-Terrorism Law.=EE (October 1997, ASA 33/34/97)
=02 During the previous government of Benazir Bhutto, a similar crackdown in
Karachi against the MQM was undertaken. The process of eliminating criminal
elements and others was euphemistically called 'extrajudicial killings.'
The Sharif government, as the one before it, hopes that its MQM problem can
be crushed.
=02 Ahmed Rashid, 'Military Intrusion: Is the Pakistani Army Making Kashmir
Policy?' Far Eastern Economic Review (June 17, 1999).
=02 See Ahmed Rashid, 'Raise the Crescent.=EE Far Eastern Economic Review
(December 3, 1998).
=02 All major credit-rating agencies lowered Pakistan's sovereign debt ratin=
g
to their lowest level.
=02See 'US Informed About CTBT Signing.' DAWN (Pakistan), March 21 1999.