[sacw] sacw #2 (Pakistan Special) 29 Oct.99

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Web Dispatch #2
29 October 1999
[PAKISTAN SPECIAL 1]
_______________
#1. No Change in Economic Policy
#2. Pakistan's apathy toward democracy
#3. Hard institutional choices ahead for military
#4. More of the same
_______________
#1.
October 27,1999.

NO CHANGE IN ECONOMIC POLICY
by S Akbar Zaidi

In his first address to the nation immediately following his coup, Chief
Executive General Parvez Musharraf spoke about the sorry and near crisis
state of Pakistan's economy. In his subsequent address to the nation a few
days later, he reemphasized the need to put the economy back on track, and
came up with an agenda for change and reform which has been welcomed by
different sections of Pakistan's population. Unfortunately though, the
immediate measures taken to improve things, and the announcement of his new
team of economic and financial experts, does not suggest much departure
from the way things have been managed for the last decade.

Of the six key players in the economic team, four are old hands who
represent a continuation of the old system, while the two new members have
international credentials which may actually be part of the problem rather
than a means to the solution, as some hope. The former Governor of the
State Bank of Pakistan, who held that position since 1993, on account of
his being a member of the National Security Council, now emerges,
ostensibly, as the most important economic czar in the country. A powerful
former Secretary Finance, returns as Secretary General Finance on a two
year contract, which probably reveals the timetable which the current
government has in mind for staying in office. The Chief Economist of the
Government of Pakistan, and the Economic Advisor to the Ministry of
Finance, remain where they are presently.

The new entrants to the Government of Pakistan's economic and financial
team, are the Minister of Finance and the new Governor of the State Bank of
Pakistan. While the former leaves a coveted position with Citibank, the
latter is a Director at the World Bank. There are two important issues
which are likely to emerge within, and as a consequence, of this team.

Firstly, the Minister of Finance is always considered to be a powerful and
independent individual who designs policy and makes sure that it is being
implemented. However, under the current arrangement, for the first time a
supra-body, the National Security Council, will sit on top of the Cabinet,
which includes the Finance ministry. This scenario and relationship is
likely to generate numerous problems, rifts and controversy once the short
honeymoon period is over, since neither of the two individuals would like
to be undermined in their respective positions. Either that, or then one of
these two will become quite irrelevant to the process of economic policy.
Additionally, although the Governor of the State Bank is (at least in
theory) supposed to be autonomous from the Ministry of Finance, the
relationship between the new and the former Governor, who will now be the
member of the National Security Council, should be interesting to observe.

While this internal balancing act between different actors will be
something new added to the economic and finance offices of this country,
what is unfortunate is that due to the composition of the (new) team,
economic policy is likely to remain the same. To expect solutions for
Pakistan's dire straits from these old, worn-out policies, is to ask for a
miracle.

With the former and new governors of the State Bank from the IMF and the
World Bank, respectively, and the new Secretary General Finance and the
Economic Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, all diehard proponents of the
IMF/World Bank structural adjustment policies, very little good is expected
from their initiatives, no matter how well-meaning. There is ample evidence
in Pakistan which conclusively supports the view that the economic and
financial policies of the IMF and the World Bank bring about only misery,
unemployment, and poverty. The performance of the economy since 1988, when
these policies were actively persued, provide more than ample evidence to
substantiate this view.

What has happened to the economy since 1988 is best summarised by a handful
of key economic indicators generated by the Government of Pakistan over the
last decade and are worth repeating. Firstly, the overall growth rate of
GDP has fallen well below trend levels, and appreciably below the average
of the 1980s. In the eleven years since the implementation of the
programme, in only one of those years was growth in GDP more than the
average six percent observed since 1977; in two of those years, in 1992-93
and in 1996-97, the growth in GDP was 2.27 percent and 1.3 percent,
respectively, the lowest in more than three decades. Since 1988, inflation
was in double digits in seven of those eleven years, while previously in
the 40 years between 1947-87, inflation was in double digits on only seven
occasions. Even the State Bank of Pakistan's Annual Report for 1996-97
admitted that 'almost all macroeconomic indicators showed that 1996-97 was
one of the most difficult and disappointing years in the economic history
of the country'. And, this is prior to the disastrous policy of the freeze
in Foreign Currency Accounts in 1998, after which things only became far
worse.

At one stage manufacturing had been the leading sector in the economy, with
growth rates averaging 9.1 percent between 1980-88; this rate fell to an
average of 4.9 percent for the period 1988-97, falling to a mere 1.19
percent in 1996-97, the lowest in the last thirty years. As an obsession to
cut the fiscal deficit, public expenditure has been cut, and development
expenditure in particular, has borne this brunt. From a high of 9.3 percent
of GDP in 1980-81, development expenditure has been falling since, and in
1997-98, only a little over three percent of GDP had been allocated under
this head.

The rate of unemployment which was 3.1 percent in 1987-88, had increased to
around 5.4 percent in 1997-98, with more than two million currently
unemployed. The Government of Pakistan estimates that the extent of
underemployment is currently around 20 percent of the labour force, and
that as many as 1.3 million persons will enter the job market each year
adding to the pool of the unemployed, as at least half of these 'cannot
expect to find work at the present rate of labour absorption'. It fears
that 'the problem of unemployment may intensify further'.

Since it is more than probable that the same policies devised by the IMF
and the World Bank which were responsible for these downward trends are
likely to continue into the future, we have little reason to celebrate.
Moreover, under the four democratic regimes since 1988, the policies of the
IMF and the World Bank were, at times, halfheartedly followed through
because of their obvious negative consequences, and had to be slowed down
or even abandoned due to public pressure and protest. What is worse and
more worrisome then, is that with little need to be popular as they do not
have to face an election, the military government can go all-out to enforce
these policies. The eventual consequences are likely to be far different
from the expectations of the military or its supporters.

While the adherence to the IMF's and World Bank's policies is likely to be
the most serious concern, there are already voices being raised which
question the nature of the government's immediate measure, that of hauling
in bank loans. Although this measure was initially well-received, it is
perhaps pertinent to ask the question why it is that only politicians and
industrialists (real or fictitious) are being targeted? What about all
those bankers who made the loans available in the first place? If these
bankers are also not questioned, then we have every right to question the
nature of accountability taking place. Moreover, perhaps the single biggest
culprit in the bad-debt scenario may turn out to be the State Bank of
Pakistan itself, for it is, afterall, responsible for the health of the
banking sector. Will its senior most staff be hauled in as well? Highly
unlikely, it seems, given the composition of the new team.

Another matter concerning loan recovery is, that unless a clear distinction
is made between bad loans due to political pressure and those that have
occurred due to bad investments or due to the poor macroeconomic
environment, potential investors will fail to invest in fear of possible
retribution. The high hopes that this government has of investors
jump-starting the economy, may very soon backfire.

If the Chief Executive is sincere in any of the promises that he has made
so far, particularly those concerning a turn-around for the economy, to use
his analogy of amputation and surgery, what is required in terms of
economic policy is not fine tinkering, a few stitches here, a wart removed
from there, but drastic and extensive surgery and transplantation. The old
needs to be thrown out and replaced by the new: new ideas, new people, and
a new set of economic rules. The old IMF/World Bank donor driven, high debt
agenda has failed time and time again, not just in Pakistan, but globally.
Unless there is radical restructuring, the inflated expectations of the
people of this country are likely to get a rude shock and be dashed. Unlike
the October 12 intervention, in a couple of years down the road when things
get even worse, there may no longer any institution willing or able to step
in to stop the rot then.
_______________
#2.
DAWN
29 October 1999
Op-Ed.

PAKISTAN'S APATHY TOWARD DEMOCRACY
By Anis Shivani

WHETHER it is an outright extra- constitutional military coup as now, or
the military-supported "constitutional" coups under the former
dispensation, the rationale offered is always the same: the politicians
have failed as a class, and some group of people other than elected
representatives can best solve the country's dire economic and social
crises.

Always the coup is greeted with temporary euphoria, only to be followed by
bitter disillusionment as yet another tinkering with the democratic set-up
inevitably fails to solve long-standing problems.

What is most surprising about the latest coup is the lack of outrage
expressed by ordinary Pakistanis as well as most of the intelligentsia.
What is most surprising is the ultimate lack of surprise at the coup on the
part of those who closely follow Pakistani politics. For anyone observing
the dynamics of the 1990, 1993, and 1996 interventions, it was only a
matter of time.

What is most disillusioning about the current interruption of democracy is
that the same segments of Pakistani society that have greeted previous
interruptions refuse to learn from past history. What this clearly shows is
that the Pakistani people, both the lay person and the majority of the
intelligentsia, are simply not prepared to deal with democracy on its
terms.

Understandably, the commercial classes are the least committed to the idea
of democracy. They are the first to support any military government; they
care less about civil liberties and the rights of the working class. As
long as they can be assured of a minimal degree of stability in which to do
business, they go along. They don't realize that anything but democracy
only leads in the long term to greater instability. For most of the
intelligentsia to be in accord with the commercial classes' liking for
military rule, however, is less expected and less acceptable.

Unrealistic expectations about democracy lead to repeated support for
rejecting the very processes of democracy. The missing piece of analysis
has to do not with the mechanisms of democracy, which are not at fault, but
with our own expectations and desires. Pakistanis want painless, quick,
instant gratification. Neither democracy nor any other means of governance
can deliver what they want. And yet, in their haste to reach the promised
land, the people of Pakistan keep diminishing the chance that the desired
objective of an egalitarian and prosperous society will ever be met.

It is precisely the sky-high expectations of the people for swift (shading
into undemocratic) action on the part of their elected political leaders
that leads to the politicians justifying autocracy in the name of
expediency. Should the people set their expectations at a more moderate
level, politicians would find it more difficult to justify autocratic
intervention in the normal workings of state institutions.

To the extent that each time the ordinary people and the intelligentsia
have refused to outright condemn the previous interventions - those of
1990, 1993, and 1996 - they have been party to the final overthrow of
democracy. Imagine a scenario in 1990 when, despite disillusionment with
Benazir Bhutto's first term, an absolute line in the sand had been drawn,
and the intelligentsia by and large had refused to accept the presidential
intervention. Certainly, the costs of continuing with Benazir Bhutto at
that time - as with Nawaz Sharif in his first and second terms, and Benazir
in her second term - would have been high. But under no circumstances would
the costs have been as high as those that actually did accrue after the
disguised coups.

By the same logic, it is inconceivable that any possible benefits could
accrue under the present military government that will not be
overwhelmingly offset by the long-term setbacks to democratic governance.

It should be clear by now that the first Benazir government was better by
far than the first Nawaz government, and so on for the three succeeding
governments. The first Benazir government could treat state institutions
with far less impunity than the regimes that followed. Doubtless, this
logic will hold for the present regime as well. Simply to get back to
square one after each intervention takes monumental work. People make the
task well-nigh impossible when they keep supporting illegitimate
interventions for the sake of expediency.

People seem to lack the basic characteristic for the survival of democracy
that the Indian populace seems to have in abundance: patience. None of the
long-term, even endemic and perplexing, problems outlined by the new
military regime, are susceptible to short-term resolution. A few years are
simply not enough to get the economy back on track, or to root out corrupt
politicians, or to deal with deep-rooted ethnic and sectarian violence.
These are tasks that ought to occupy generations. No interim set-up of
bureaucrats or technocrats, whatever the duration of power - a year, two
years, or even five years - can possibly come up with radically different
alternatives to what was already being tried under the four different
democratically elected governments between 1988 and 1999.

Pakistan's basic incomprehension of how democracy functions is highlighted
by the remarkable progress of democracy in India. An elitist party has
gradually seen its power diminish from its heights of autocratic rule, and
dynastic politics has declined over the last three decades. Coalitions of
parties representing the lower classes, the outcasts, and the marginalized
are in the ascendant. No matter how slow India's economic or social
progress, the Indians refuse to discredit democracy for it. Rather the
thought has never even occurred to Pakistan's more enlightened neighbours.
In Pakistan, whenever problems are found to be intractable, instead of
doing everything possible to strengthen the institutional foundations of
democracy, individual culprits are hounded out of office and democracy
itself is questioned.

Certainly, Nawaz Sharif found it easier to weaken democratic institutions
because of all our previous undemocratic interventions. The Supreme Court's
actions in the past justifying the overthrow of democracy under the
doctrine of necessity are one example of institutions undermining their own
long-term viability in the urge to protect themselves in the short run.

Five decades of playing around with democratic institutions almost
guarantees that any representative government will have quite a bit of
success in generating the perception that it intends to stay in power for
good, and that it will undermine democratic institutions with every
increase in power. But precisely the worst way of dealing with a
democratically elected government that acts undemocratically is to abolish
the very process itself. That will only make future governments, even if
democratically elected, more prone to try to ensure their permanent stay in
power.

Once again, the people's lack of patience has made them indirectly party
to a whole new series of likely witchhunts. Accountability as it is
understood in Pakistan is a pipe-dream. Who will watch the watch-dogs? No
answer to this has been found in fiftytwo years in Pakistan, nor in the
various doomed experiments in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe.
The solution is simply to make sure that the rascals are voted out of power
at the end of their term, and that in the meantime they are not allowed to
ensure that their stay will be anything except at the pleasure of their
constituency.

In short, having degraded democracy, the people of Pakistan seem to want
to degrade it even further, and reduce the chances of having a
well-functioning democracy in the future. The benefits of this kind of
intervention cannot possibly exceed the devastating costs. What is most
disturbing is the cheerfulness of the people, or many of them, as they
greet the new regime with high hopes. This reflects nothing but the naivete
of the common people as they curse and condemn the exiting set of
politicians. The intelligentsia is equally naive as it sets out to discover
yet another set of technocrats/bureaucrats who can magically rescue the
country from its own worst instincts.

Pakistan's worst problem is that the entire polity has become distorted
because of the excessive militaristic or despotic attitude. Priorities at
home have been twisted as a result, and civil liberties have had to take a
back seat. Absolutely the worst possible response is to further increase
the power of the military. Nobody wants to talk about a secular, pacifist,
socialist approach to governance, as India shows the capacity to do. But
that takes time, and individual and collective commitment. Democracy at all
costs would be the slogan then. Right now, it seems to be, whatever works,
damned be the ideology. It is a well-set trap, sprung at the least
provocation. Escape is unlikely without massive doses of patience with the
workings of democracy. Until democracy at all costs becomes the desire,
democracy will never work at any cost.

Until the principle sinks through that the worst possible elected
government is always better than the best possible military dictatorship,
democratic institutions cannot begin to gain hold. This is an absolute on
which there can be no compromise. The only solution for the ills of
democracy is more democracy.
_______________
#3.

Friday Times
29 October 1999
Comment

HARD INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES AHEAD FOR MILITARY

Ejaz Haider explains why domestic and international responses to the coup
have been different and says that the military has to rethink itself
institutionally if it is to succeed in delivering the peoples agenda

Since October 12, when the army moved in and ousted Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif, the world has been debating the issue of whether what has happened
in Pakistan is good or bad for that country. The responses have ranged from
the initial knee-jerk reactions of condemnation to a more sophisticated
understanding of Pakistan's problems as a country that has consistently
failed to grapple with the problems of political order and good governance
and where "democracy" has not been synonymous with "constitutional
liberalism". Interestingly, the event has not invited much debate within
the country where people, including most of the intelligentsia, have
largely welcomed the change, its deviation from constitutionality
notwithstanding.

It is pertinent to ask why there has been (and continues to be) such
difference between the internal and external responses to the military
takeover in this country. There are both superficial and profound reasons
for these responses. At the superficial level, the external responses of
condemnation can be attributed both to domestic laws that preclude certain
countries in the West from condoning military takeovers and the evolution
of constitutional liberalism in those countries over centuries that force
their domestic constituencies to take democracy and democratic institutions
for granted. The man on the horseback, therefore, is simply anathema to
them.

Internally, the superficial response can be attributed to the extreme
unpopularity of Mr Sharif's government. Beginning strongly after winning
the 1997 elections, Sharif did everything to raise mis-governance and
imbecility to the level of a fine art. It would be hard today, as it was
when he was in power, to pick up a single, good decision by his government
in the two-and-half years he was in power. Additionally, there is the sense
of apathy bordering on near total fatalism. Democracy and representative
government in Pakistan has constantly floundered and a population that has
lived with three martial laws/quasi-democracies is now being asked to live
with yet another military takeover.

But there are deeper reasons also. At the heart of the dilemma lies the
issue of order and governance. Under the caption, "Political order and good
governance," I wrote in TFT (September 3-9) thus: "The opening line of
Samuel Huntington's 1967 masterpiece, Political Order in Changing
Societies, reads: 'The most important political distinction among countries
concerns not their form of government but their degree of government.' Not
only does this one line epitomise the complexity of that great work, the
evolution of societies in the so-called Third World since Huntington
published his work 32 years ago clearly reflects the profundity of his
observation.

"A superficial interpretation of this thought can lead one to surmise that
Huntington is supporting totalitarian regimes. In fact, in the following
lines he does seem to bracket the Soviet Union in the category - with the
US and Great Britain, for instance - of countries where the 'government
governs', but this is just on the surface. At the heart of the argument
lies the dilemma of governance, not just the issue of the form of
government. What does one do when, among other shortages, there is a
'shortage of political community and of effective, authoritative,
legitimate government[?]' That is why just 'free and fair elections' is not
a formula that impresses Huntington - 'In many modernizing societies this
formula is irrelevant. Elections to be meaningful presuppose a certain
level of political organization. The problem is not to hold elections but
to create organizations.'

"Therefore the primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a
legitimate public order. Men may, of course, have order without liberty,
but they cannot have liberty without order." The point of all this is that
in more ways than one Huntington's work remains relevant to societies that
are still grappling with the problems of good governance. Pakistan is a
prime example of that. It has all the trappings of democracy and yet it was
never as far away from good governance as it is today. It is worse off than
totalitarian regimes because it has neither order nor liberty. During long
periods of martial law, people fought hard for democracy only to find that
democracy (its form, that is) per se is no guarantee either for order or
liberty. It offers no panacea. Good governance remains, as it always has
been, elusive."

Should Pakistanis therefore welcome the October 12 change? It is a choice
between the de jure and the de facto. Constitutionally, the army had no
business doing what it did. But constitutionally Sharif had no business
running the country the way he did. Ironically, he used and manipulated the
constitution through a brute force that was informed not by any enlightened
consensus but by the personal agenda of a man who took pleasure in riding
everyone roughshod. To the extent, therefore, that he was not averse to
destroying the constitution, should he have been allowed to go on?

It is somewhat like the argument about the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in
Algeria. When the government saw the FIS win the first round of the
elections, it just called off the whole exercise. The choice was between
doing the constitutional thing and allowing the FIS to contest the second
round, win the elections and set up a theocratic government that was
avowedly against the very constitution it had piggybacked to get into power
or do the (technically) unconstitutional thing and keep the FIS out of
power so it could not push its theocratic agenda. These are tough
questions.

When Sharif forced former COAS General Jehangir Karamat to resign three
months before his tenure finished, voices in the country blamed the general
for not moving in. General Karamat bowed out because he did not want to do
the "unconstitutional" thing and did not want to split-up the institution
he was heading. General Musharraf has gone in and done the
"unconstitutional" thing because he too did not want the institution to
split-up. Whom of the two did the right thing? The first one thought that
moving in would split-up the institution, the second thought bowing out
would create fissures. If one were to perceive the military as a corporate
entity pushing its corporate interests, perhaps both would rest assured
they did the right thing.

But the question of where the country goes from here remains to be
addressed. Practically speaking the issue does not relate so much to the
technicalities - the mere desirability of seeing elected governments stay
in power and not be removed illegally by generals - but to clear signs that
Pakistan finds itself down in the dumps yet again. With multiple
fault-lines running through the body politic of this country, it is in
danger of becoming a failed state. Can the military put it back on the
rails?

The problems are too many, too varied and too complex to succumb to neat,
administrative solutions. But more than anything else, the issue is that of
the military's own relevance and its place within the country as a
significant player pursuing its interests. Historically, the military has
struck when it perceived, presumably, that a "representative" government
had failed to govern. This has had a strong implication: that the military
perceives itself best suited to not only understand the malaise but to cure
it. Only the cure traditionally has not proved to be more acceptable in the
end than the malaise itself.

Take the economy. It is skidding. But can corruption alone be faulted for
this state of affairs? No one can condone corruption. But if one were to
look at it in mathematical terms within the larger picture of the GDP, it
does not make up for much. Although, it must be conceded that it has a
great psychological effect on the citizenry and to that extent, it must be
curbed with a heavy hand. However, the three major issues that confront the
economy are tax revenues on the one hand and debt servicing and defence
expenditures on the other. It is a moot point whether the army can, or
would, do something to make itself less costly.

This coup, more than the previous ones, has established the fact that the
military takes itself very seriously. Its corporate interests are linked to
certain traditional determinants of Pakistan's foreign policy, which is
heavily security oriented. If that agenda were to change, the obvious
fallout would be the lessening of military's importance as an actor within
the power configuration in the country. Clearly, without changing that
agenda, untying resources from there and diverting them to other neglected
sectors, the economy is not likely to respond to mere austerity measures
and pious hopes to weed out corruption. This has been tried before and has
failed. Reviving the economy would need an integrated view of the situation
to work out solutions that can address the structural problems.

The most recent economic debacle began in May 1998 after the tests.
Presumably, the army was part of that decision. Now, since India's
enunciation of its nuclear doctrine, efforts are on in Pakistan to respond
in a similar fashion. That means only one thing: that Pakistan has not
learnt a lesson from its hasty decision to follow India in the nuclear pit.
How can it hope to revive the economy when it is not prepared to review its
national security policy in view of its economic weaknesses?

Then came Kargil which provided India with a desperately-needed respite
since it conducted its nuclear tests in May 1998. The Kargil operation also
failed to appreciate the likely response of the international community.
Since then, things have been crystallising in a direction that should worry
our national security "experts".

The third aspect that relates not only to Pakistan's international image
but has also led to increased religious and sectarian violence and bigotry
are the various armed religious groups. General Musharraf has reportedly
"asked" the ulema to help quell sectarian tendencies but it is quite clear
that this phenomenon has a nexus with certain aspects of Pakistan's foreign
policy. The world has increasingly blamed Pakistan for fomenting LICs (low
intensity conflicts) in its neighbourhood to push its foreign policy
agenda. It is this presumed use of armed groups that gives them an internal
clout and allows them to institutionalise and entrench themselves in
opposition both to the state and civil society. There can be no solution to
this problem unless these groups are made redundant.

These are some of the basic problems. Improvement in other areas - social
sector, education, healthcare and economy - would necessarily require
addressing these basic questions. The additional problem is that of basic
freedoms for the citizenry, including the freedom of expression. The Sharif
government did not show much promise on that count but despite its
fire-brigade methods, it was susceptible to various pressures, both
internal and external. Would the new dispensation fare any better on that
count? That is a question all of us need to ask. General Musharraf has said
he believes in the free press but he has also added the caveat that the
press must play a "responsible" role. The term can be widely interpreted
and might well carry the fine print.
__________________
#4.
The News International
29 October 1999
Op-Ed.

MORE OF THE SAME
by Imtiaz Alam

The nomination of the 'civilian wing' of the military regime has
disappointed those who had pinned their "last hope" of a "revolution from
above" on the Musharraf government. (Except, probably, for Imran Khan one
of whose partymen is in the new council.) The induction of old and tested
faces in the National Security Council (NSC) and the cabinet, with one or
two exceptions, indicates how this government will move in pursuit of its
national agenda.

The general's agenda and the selection of the team, however, underscore one
thing that the envisaged process of providing a "true democracy" is not
short term. The objectives proclaimed in the October 17 speech will likely
remain unfulfilled for a long time.

This scribe talked to many economists, lawyers and and bankers and they
take a rather indifferent view of the newly formed council. "The man who
has always been on the bandwagon of martial laws", say senior lawyers and
constitutional experts, "is back as the senior adviser because of, if
nothing else, his expertise in mutilating the constitution and providing a
legal cover to every military regime." Sharifuddin Pirzada's elevation
sends a negative signal about Gen Musharraf's resolve not to stay even for
a day more than necessary and revive "genuine democracy".

Even if Gen Musharraf has no such design, the skeptics have started
building scenarios that are quite analogous to Gen Zia's prolonged martial
law and a long drawn out "civilianisation" process that produced the most
poisonous fruit of the Sharifs. But the realists insists that Gen Musharraf
is a post-cold war ruler who cannot ignore the economic and political
constraints, both domestic and international, on the longevity of a
military rule.

Although there is a widespread sense of relief among the people on the
demise of a ruthless, irresponsible and despotic Sharif government and they
want a reversal of Gen Zia's legacy, the new regime, due to its own
authoritarian nature, cannot fulfill all their expectations despite its
sincerity of purpose.

Economists say if economic revival and financial accountability are at the
top of the chief executive's agenda, then appointments on economic slots,
except for one, do not inspire much confidence. Quite disappointing is the
promotion of State Bank Governor Dr Yaqub as member of the NSC, because he
has presided over the collapse of financial institutions and what is
described as plunder of the national exchequer in the last three successive
governments. "Despite getting autonomy," a leading banker says, "the State
Bank under his tutelage let defaulted loans grow by threefold." They hold
him responsible for letting successive governments use foreign currency
accounts (FCAs) to meet fiscal deficit and without keeping even one-third
as reserves, required by rules and standard banking practices.

With this lot of new economic czars, Gen Musharraf cannot pursue his agenda
for economic revival and financial accountability to which he seems so much
committed. Once again the FCAs have been ceased and a campaign against the
small "defaulters" has been unleashed at a mass scale. The way this
campaign has been launched against the farmers and small "defaulters" will
only help the big fish to build a broadest united front against the drive
for accountability of the plunderers of national wealth.

"If with Pirzada no one can hope for an early revival of constitutional
democracy," the political pundits predict, "Pakistan cannot overcome a
state of financial insolvency it faces today if Yaqub is in charge of the
economy." Although no one doubts the intentions of Gen Musharraf, many
doubts the capacity of his regime to handle delicate civilian affairs which
require most sophisticated means other than coercive methods.

Other appointments in the economic sphere, though not objectionable, could
have been even better. Shaukat Aziz who is no doubt an eminent banker who
helped the Nawaz government in floating Euro Bonds which face yet another
possible default. Nonetheless, his financial expertise will be of great use
in the banking sector and investment. But some experts remark, "How far he
will be able to deliver in the presence of Yaqub in the NSC is open to
question." Similarly, Mr Ishrat Hussain is not a banker, nor is he an
economist. He is, however, fit to work in Planning Commission.

On the other hand, quite puzzling an appointment is that of Dr Attiya
Inayatullah as an adviser on foreign policy in the NSC since she has least
touch with the subject. She does represent the NGO sector and has
contributed to the cause of population-control. If women were to be given
representation, and they should have been, there were other eminent females
who could have been considered for the slot. If the others were not
considered for their past political appointments, then Dr Attiya too has
the distinction of serving both the Zia and the Nawaz governments.

The foreign minister, Abdul Sattar, is a hawk and information secretary of
Imran Khan's Tehreek-i-Insaf. He may turn out to be a stumbling block in
winning back the support of the international community when Pakistan faces
a threat of further isolation. Pakistan needed a person of moderate views
to remove the apprehensions of the world community. Again, if he is to run
the Foreign Office, then he should have been on the NSC instead of Dr
Attiya, as Shaukat Aziz or some other reputed economist should have been in
place of Dr Yaqub.

Another representation on the NSC from the civilian side is that of Imtiaz
Sahibzada under the head of national affairs. He is a senior bureaucrat,
but his expertise in national affairs is yet to be tested. Similarly,
although the governors hold good reputation, they lack the spark and energy
this regime needed to undertake even limited surgery. The nominees give an
impression of status quo and quite understandably so.

A cynical lawyer observed that "the men and women of high caliber, who can
perform and deliver, could not be considered for the council since they
don't seem to have the credentials of being from the class of 'shuraafa'
(nobility)." Some might have been "controversial", others may not have the
right connection or the ability to approach those in power. Some choices
with political connections will create serious apprehensions among the
political circles who invariably--and to a varying degree--support the
interregnum. So-called experts with political affiliations must be kept
out, if the regime is to keep an image of an impartial arbiter and an
across-the-board support that it is enjoying at the moment.

Yet Gen Musharraf must be given the benefit of the doubt. Perhaps, he was
left with few choices after the screening of those who don't pass the
"multiple-risk" criteria. Most important thing that is still missing from
the chief executive's plan is the timeframe and a transparent plan for the
restoration of democracy. After cleansing the corrupt in the shortest
possible time, and before Gen Musharraf's tenure expires, a plan to return
to democracy must follow soon.

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SOUTH ASIA CITIZENS WEB DISPATCH is an informal, independent &
non-profit citizens wire service run by South Asia Citizens Web
(http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since1996.