[sacw] sacw dispatch #1(4 Nov.99)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Web Dispatch #1
Nov.4, 1999
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex
_________________
#1. Democracy, Development & Dictatorship [In Pakistan]
#2. Pakistani autoworkers wage 18-month struggle against Suzuki
#3. Nuclear Power Plants In India Are Money-Guzzling Disasters
#4. In The Comfort of Secrecy [of India's Nuclear Establishment]
#5. New anti war/anti-nuke book for children
_________________
#1.
DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT AND DICTATORSHIP
by S Akbar Zaidi
October 31, 1999.

=46or all those who believe that the ends justify the means, the military
coup led by General Pervez Musharraf has brought welcome relief from the
anarchy and misgovernment that prevailed prior to October 12. The
expectations from this, the third successful military takeover since 1947,
are particularly high, for there is a general belief that things have never
been as bad as they are at present-'rock bottom' is the popular cliche
these days-and hence, the unequivocal support for the military coup from
all quarters. Dissent, leave alone opposition, to the unconstitutional
intervention by the Chief of the Army Staff, is difficult to find at yet
another 'critical juncture'-to repeat the Chief Executive's outworn
cliche-in our brief 52 year existence.

Yet, even a cursory look at Pakistan's history over the previous decades,
and especially so since 1985, shows that we have been here time and time
again. The Chief Executive's first speeches conveyed nothing but a sense of
deja vu, both in terms of the nature of the problems and the issues, as
well as the solutions. Accountability, better governance, decentralization,
reform, revival of the economy, and a host of other promises and solutions
to deal with Pakistan's now familiar problems. Whether it was Junejo in
1985, Benazir in 1988, Moeen Quraishi in 1993, or especially Nawaz Shariff
in 1997 with an unprecedented mandate never to be repeated again, this song
has been sung many times over. So in terms of content and promise, Pervez
Musharraf is just old news.

What seemed to make the difference between General Musharraf and his
predecessors, however, may have been his apparent conviction, and perhaps
perceived sincerity and his ability to deliver on these promises. However,
in the three weeks since the coup, the General has revealed his inability
to be creative or radical, perhaps the two most necessary qualities
required to deal with the numerous problems present. The composition of his
much awaited National Security Council has come as a rude shock to all
those who had expectations from Pakistan's new Chief Executive, and also
suggests, perhaps, that at best the new military government will make a few
cosmetic changes which will not then permit it to deliver on any of its
ambitious promises. The choice of members of the new Cabinet also leaves a
lot to be desired, with a sense of deja vu prevailing yet again.

However, in all this, there is one important distinction between the
incumbent and the other eight governments that we have had since August
1988. Following President Zia's plane crash in 1988, the military decided
to take a backseat to the political process in the country, and the process
which was begun by General Zia in March 1985 when partyless elections were
held, was allowed to continue by the military for over fourteen years. In
the meanwhile, we had four elected governments with three caretaker
governments interspersed between them.

=46rom the time of the elections of the first Benazir government to around
the beginning of this year, for the most part, the military kept its
distance from being overtly active in the political process. There were a
few scandals in the navy and the army, the death of the inservice COAS Asif
Nawaz, and the premature retirement last year of General Jahangir Karamat
the then COAS. Other than that, for the most part, the military kept away
from politics in the eleven years after Zia's death with one important
exception. It was responsible for a number of controversial, if not
downright brutal, armed operations in Karachi against the MQM, and for
taking credit for successfully creating a split in the MQM by forming the
Haqiqi faction. Most importantly perhaps, it was never the military
directly, but always the President of Pakistan, who was responsible for the
dismissal of the three elected governments prior to Nawaz Shariff's recent
dismissal.

The military may have never directly ruled the country since August 1988,
but there is little doubt that in the post-Zia democratic era, which the
military, or at least General Zia ul Haq himself, created, the military
held on to power and was a party to most of the important political
decisions taken in those years. This perhaps is best illustrated by the
military intervention in Kargil and the subsequent fallout since. The
controversy of whether Nawaz Shariff or the army was responsible for
Pakistan's fiasco in Kargil was never really resolved, and the blame and
counter-blame before and after Niaz Naik's revelation, suggested that
perhaps there was a tussle for power over who really called the shots even
in supposedly democratic Pakistan. Nevertheless, the military coup of
October 12, when the military took the decision to be directly involved in
Pakistan's political process and removed the only democratically elected
government since the dismissal of Junejo in 1988, resolved the ambiguity of
who holds (and perhaps has always held) supreme power in this country.

There has always been a great sense of relief, if not outright euphoria, at
the dismissal of governments in Pakistan, particularly since the dismissal
of the first Benazir government in 1990. However, the difference this time
round, is that the military itself has resumed complete power, and despite
an attempt to construct a civilian charade, few would contest the claim
that Pakistan is formally under military rule. This is probably the main
reason why there is far greater expectation for better things to come in
the future, than in the case of the last three dismissals of elected
government. The assumption is that since the military is in control of
Pakistan's sinking ship, unlike the politicians in the past, it may
actually deliver on the promises made by General Musharraf and all other
leaders, elected or caretaker, before him. This assumption and hope rests
on the premise that in the context of Pakistan, it is military rule which
is actually 'good for people' and delivers basic development services and
goods. The years of military dictatorship and martial law under Field
Marshal Ayub Khan and General Zia ul Haq, are supposed to bear testimony to
this claim. In contrast, democracy is seen to be a rule of greed, avarice
and corruption, where the only beneficiaries are politicians in power and
their cronies.

The dichotomy between democracy and dictatorship in terms of what they mean
for development, is perhaps the best and most simplistic of myths accepted
by the general public, scholars and policy makers. Most individuals in
Pakistan recall Ayub Khan's decade as Pakistan's 'best', with General Zia's
a close second. In contrast, the democratic years of Z A Bhutto, his
daughter or of Nawaz Shariff, reveal only the worst manifestations of
democracy. Yet, these 'facts' reveal only half the true picture.

Ayub Khan's decade of development, was indeed that, a period of exemplary
growth for the economy. In the 1960s, Pakistan's economy grew by 6.8
percent a year, no mean achievement for a country that began with very
little. Agricultural growth rates were on average 5.1 percent per annum in
the decade, and the industrial sector showed even more impressive rates, of
9.9 percent growth per annum. General Zia's eleven years were equally
impressive, with the economy growing by about 6.5 percent annually,
agriculture by 5.4 percent, and industry by 8.2 percent during the period
1977-88. Moreover, for the period 1980-88, Pakistan's GDP growth rate was
recognized by the World Bank as the fourth highest in the world. In
contrast, in the five and a half years under Z A Bhutto, the economy grew
on average by 4.4 percent per annum, with agriculture and industry growing
by a mere two percent on average, each; inflation too, in this period
averaged 14 percent. Worse still has been the performance of the economy in
the post-1988 democracy period, easily labeled as the worst decade in
Pakistan's history. Ergo, military dictatorship is far better than
democracy.

It is indeed unfortunate that most people do reach that conclusion from the
facts above, for they ignore far too many features of Pakistan's society,
economics and politics, that have been the cause of these statistics.
Moreover, numerous consequences of these high achievements are also
ignored. It would be instructive to look at some explanatory factors and
their subsequent results.

Ayub Khan's decade was truly impressive, although much of the explanation
for this growth is to be found in the economic and political exploitation
of East Pakistan, where resources were transferred from the eastern wing to
the west. Without the ample use of foreign exchange earned from jute, which
was later invested in West Pakistan, it is improbable that these high rates
of growth (in West Pakistan) would have taken place. The end result of this
Golden Age in Pakistan, was the secession of the majority province after a
brutal and ignoble war which the West lost. The two main factors that
explain General Zia's great achievements are easier to explain: remittances
worth $ 23 billion being sent to Pakistan from the Gulf states which helped
fuel the services and industrial sectors, and military and economic aid in
huge quantities from the west, following the Russian invasion of
Afghanistan. While there was impressive economic growth, the downside was
reflected in unprecedented schisms in society, with ethnic and sectarian
violence raging in numerous parts of the country; a culture now known as
the 'Klashnikov and heroin' culture; a parallel black economy which began
to undermine the 'real' economy; raging budget deficits; and, active
discrimination and sanctified violence against minorities and women, and a
host of other factors which have continued to haunt us to this day. Martial
rule's one-sided picture reflected by impressive statistics has been badly
scarred by reality.

This is not to suggest that democracy has done much better, for it hasn't.
However, research on the ZA Bhutto period has shown that it was a 'bad
luck' factor more than bad management, which resulted in the poor economic
performance, with the loss of East Pakistan, a quadrupling of oil prices,
and years of pest attacks and floods playing havoc with agricultural
production. While corruption, mismanagement and bad governance have had a
formidable role to play in the worst decade since independence between
1988-99, there is much consensus amongst economists, that adherence, if not
capitulation, to IMF's and World Bank's structural adjustment programmes
since 1988 may have been a far greater factor.

This excursion into Pakistan's economic history suggests that there are
very special conditions which have led to high growth under military
dictators and it is not a natural rule or law that suggests that military
governments cause high growth rates. All those who have high hopes of a
revival of the economy beware. Besides, the downside of military rule may
actually undermine the whole growth achievements themselves. Secondly, in
1957 and even in 1977, it was far easier to manage Pakistan, its economy
and society, than it is conceivably today. Not only will one have to
address the demons let loose under earlier military rules, but since the
nature of Pakistan's society is far, far, different from even 22 years ago,
new sets of rules to govern society will be needed. Moreover, many of the
gains made by civil society over the last eleven years, are unlikely to be
pushed aside very easily. Also significantly, the global and regional
situation is quite fundamentally different from either 1957 or 1977, with
major consequences on the polity in Pakistan.

The process of democracy begun in 1985 had little to commend for itself,
yet it was a process that reflected certain economic, social and political
realities. The majority of the English reading public of this country did
not like these processes or these realities. Yet in some ways, they
articulated the concerns, needs and aspirations of certain social and
economic groups and classes. Perhaps the main feature of this period has
been the rise of a large middle class, which has also found democracy quite
lucrative. Nevertheless, while an economic middle class may have formed and
consolidated itself economically, in terms of its politics, it has still
far to develop.

In this new social, economic and political order, the institutions of the
state have become outdated, as has the Constitution, the means and manner
of government, the way the economy is run and managed, the institutions of
justice and law and order, and most other institutions of the state one can
think of. The agenda which General Musharraf (and his half dozen
predecessors when they are newly elected to office) has announced, is
precisely what is required to rebuild the institutions of the state,
afresh. The choice of his team has shown that he is either unable or
unwilling to do what needs to be done. The two previous military rulers
both left office unceremoniously and unwillingly. It is highly improbable
that Pakistan's new Chief Executive will survive for as long as his two
earlier colleagues. Whether he goes in the same manner as his predecessors,
or voluntarily, may be determined by events and forces as a consequence of
Pakistan's new realities. The role Pakistan's new middle class and elements
of civil society play, for better or for worse, will probably determine the
future of Pakistan. Military rulers, whether benevolent or despotic, will
have to realise the implications of this at their earliest.
__________________
#2.
World Socialist Website
2 November 1999

PAKISTANI AUTOWORKERS WAGE 18-MONTH STRUGGLE AGAINST SUZUKI
By Steve Dean

=46or almost 18 months, 150 automotive workers who were sacked from the
Suzuki Motor plant in Karachi, Pakistan, have waged a struggle for
reinstatement and for union recognition. Suzuki dismissed the casual
workers last year after they formed the Pak-Suzuki Motor Company Star
Workers Union and began to campaign for improved working conditions.

Most of the company's workforce=97850 out of 1,200=97were casual workers,
allowing Suzuki to avoid paying even basic entitlements. The existing
union, Pak Suzuki Motor Company Workers Union, which was officially
recognised as the Collective Bargaining Agency (CBA), supported this
situation.

As the new union began to gain support, the company moved rapidly to crush
it. In June 1998, as the workers tried to enter the plant to start work,
local police, acting under management instructions, selected out Star
Workers Union members and barred their way.

The workers were then informed that their services were no longer required.
Ahmed Ali, 29, an active member of the new union, was stopped from entering
along with his brother. "I remember that particular day when we were
gate-stopped. There was a very tense situation at the main gate. Dozens of
armed police and rangers were pointing their guns straight at us. The
company made all these arrangements in an attempt to intimidate us."

Since being locked-out the workers have mounted a legal challenge to the
sackings and to gain union recognition. They have organised public
demonstrations and media statements explaining their case and exposing the
company's repressive campaign.

Some of the sacked workers wrote to the World Socialist Web Site to explain
what had happened and the conditions they faced in the plant.

Iftikhar Ahmed, 27, said: "The average daily production target at the plant
was 135 vehicles. The 850 contract workers carried the workload in the
plant. Unfortunately they were denied all entitlements, annual leave,
bonuses, sick pay, promotion and insurance. These terms were enforced upon
these workers by the management with the help of the CBA union."

Inayat Ismal, a welding supervisor, said the management used the offer of
apprenticeships and training to pay low wages. =93Our intentions were to
become trained, skilled and well-paid workers. However, the harsh reality
was that the company and the CBA union built our hopes up for nothing just
to keep a low paid workforce.

=94Mohammad Yousuf, who joined the company as an apprentice in 1990, spoke
bitterly about the deceptive practice. He said the management had promised
that after three years he would be made permanent. But he and 200 other
apprentices were refused permanency by management and the CBA union refused
to assist them.

=93We all were engaged in regular production and we worked hard to maintain
our skills and efficiency. We were not looking for normal payment because
our main object was a secure and good future with Suzuki. I cannot believe
that I was paid only 300 rupees per month (US$6).

=94Syed Zahid Hussain said the CBA was completely unwilling to lift a finger
to assist casual workers when they tried to oppose the bad working
conditions and the fake apprenticeship scheme. =93We went to the CBA for
help. After hearing what we said, they claimed they could only support the
300 permanent workers at the plant. This is when we started the new union.

=94Mohammed Irfan, a 24-year-old skilled worker, is the sole supporter of hi=
s
family. =93I sensed the frustrations among many workers in the plant. Only a
few were getting good facilities while most of us had nothing. After
meeting leading figures in the union I decided to join to change things.
The management, however, sacked us.

=94The close relationship between the company and the CBA union was revealed
further by a letter sent to the Internet site LabourNet earlier this year.
Written by its general secretary Shah Fakhre Alam, the letter attempts to
discredit the Star Workers Union and its founder Aijaz Ahmed, but reveals
instead that the CBA union is little more than a company union intent on
suppressing workers' grievances.

=93The CBA enjoys excellent relations with management and there is absolute
industrial peace in the company,=94 Shah Fakhre Alam wrote. =93We believe in
peaceful and purposeful bargaining and during our tenure all matters were
settled through bilateral negotiations. Aijaz Ahmed has resorted to all
kinds of unethical and devious means to disturb the industrial peace and
harmony in our company and spoil the cordial relations that exist between
the CBA and management.

=94As the sacked workers made clear, however, the CBA union's =93cordial
relations=94 with the company were responsible for poor working conditions
and safety standards. A lack of safety procedures for the heavy pressing
machines caused a high frequency of accidents. Two workers, Mohammed Yasin
and Mohammed Ramzan, suffered serious injuries last year.

Ramzan lost his finger in an accident in the press shop. After medical
treatment he asked the company for compensation. His request was treated as
an act of rebellion. As a known supporter of the Star Workers Union, his
employment was terminated.

Yasin was directed to use a sheering machine on which he had no experience.
He declined at first but was pressured by his shift supervisor. His right
hand was sliced by a sheering blade and after 13 hours of surgery was
finally amputated.

He was advised by the doctor to take six months' sick leave and to travel
to the United Kingdom to have a false hand fitted. The company ignored the
doctor's recommendation and turned down Yasin's request for leave. It also
denied him any assistance for medical treatment and the 100,000 rupees to
which he was legally entitled under government regulations. Even after
complaints to the Joint Labour Director, nothing has been done to enforce
the regulations.

The sacked workers remain committed to their struggle despite company and
police intimidation and mounting personal hardship.

The Star Workers Union's founder, Aijaz Ahmed, who had worked as an
interpreter, said: =93During the last year I have spent all my savings and
sold my car. The company has spent over 4 million rupees to fight us and
has bribed many officials in the Labour Department. I have been constantly
harassed by state police in an attempt to stop our movement and I am under
surveillance.

=94Mirza Shahid Baig, a 33-year-old welder, said: =93My one and only crime w=
as
that I was an active member of the Star Workers Union. I am now jobless,
without any income and with a family to support. Despite all this hardship
our ideology is clear and immovable, we will follow a legal course to win
justice.

=94Khair Mohammed, a 44-year-old skilled worker who now lives with his
extended family, explained that things were very tough: =93I have made every
effort to find some decent work but it has been fruitless. I have been
jobless for over a year and to survive I have to do odd jobs to earn money.
I am very encouraged to continue our fight now that it is being brought to
international attention.

=94Zeeshan Ahmed, 21, said, =93I was targeted by the company and sacked. I d=
id
not do any wrong and my record is clear. I have tried everything possible
to get a job, but unemployment is very high. I have qualifications but I
cannot afford the money to go back to college to learn more skills. I am
dedicated to this movement of workers and I am proud to be so young and
contributing to such a big struggle.

=94The workers have asked for letters of support and financial assistance.
Protest letters can be sent to the Chairman of Suzuki Motor Company Japan,
Mr. Osamu Suzuki: (fax) 81-053-448-9365, (tel) 81-053-440-2438. Copies can
be sent to:

Aijaz Ahmed
B-54, Block 4-A
Journalist Society
Gulshan-E-Iqbal
Karachi, Pakistan
Email: <mailto:Unionism@y...>Unionism@y...
__________________
#3.

Outlook
Nov.8, 1999
http://www.outlookindia.com/19991108/affairsrl6.htm
=46OCUS

CLOSE TO A CRITICAL MESS
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN INDIA ARE MONEY-GUZZLING DISASTERS-IN-THE-MAKING
By By A.S. Panneerselvan

Major Accidents

Interview [with] : Dr A. Gopalakrishnan

People on both sides of the divide have argued themselves hoarse on whether
the Indian nuclear power programme is a white elephant. But that this
money-guzzling pachyderm of a programme can also go on a destructive
rampage has come to light only recently. Technical experts are gravely
concerned about the safety of India's nuclear plants which had promised
20,000 MWe of power by year 2000, but are down to roducing 1,840 MWe. The
alarm, therefore, is not with the worthless spending of thousands of
crores, it's got to do with human lives.

A close look at various nuclear power stations in the country unsettles the
comforting picture.

The recent nuclear accident at Tokaimura nuclear plant, 110 km off Tokyo,
which shocked the world, could well happen in India, they point out. These
are not anti-nuke voices. They belong to the proponents of the nuclear
energy programme. India, according to them, has been saved from a nuclear
disaster by dint of luck.

A. Gopalakrishnan, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board
(AERB), says, "The threat of a serious accident at nuclear plants is real.
The emergency cooling systems of reactors in atomic power plants of Chennai
and Rajasthan are inadequate. Besides, the two reactors at Tarapur must be
closed immediately."

NPC chairman Prasad has a different logic for de-rating of nuclear power
plants. According to him, it puts safety above everything else.

In 1985, India had six units running with a total capacity of 1,360 MWe. A
15-year plan with the "20,000 MWe by 2000 AD" target was set into gear.
Today, India has 10 operating reactors with a combined capacity, well below
the rojected level.

What lends credence to critics of India's nuclear power rogramme is the
secrecy that shrouds it. The Indian Atomic Energy Act, '62, gives the
department of atomic energy (DAE) enormous power as well as the right to
withhold information; it is not even accountable to Parliament.
Consequently, the department has neither listed out the accidents nor has
it been forthcoming on the real status of reactors.

However, the nuclear establishment has gone on record saying that it is
open to questioning and that it gives safety top priority. Says Y.S.R.
Prasad, chairman and managing director of the Nuclear Power Corporation and
a member of the Atomic Energy Commission: "I'm operating the plants and my
people are working there. The onus is on me to see that they are safe. I
can assure you that our plants are fail-proof. If anything happens, the
reactor shuts down. Besides, if one shut-down operation fails, the other
comes to rescue."

Major Accidents

1976 RAPS-2 Reactors were flooded due to construction errors. Emergency
Core Cooling System got obstructed and this could have led to a meltdown.

1980 MAPS Zircalloy pieces found in the moderator pump following cracking
of the reactor inlet. This led to de-rating of the reactor from 235MWe to
175MWe, resulting in colossal economic loss.

1988 MAPS Heavy water leak exposed workers to high radioactivity and
forced the plant to shut down.

1992 RAPS-2 Fire spread through 4 out of 8 pumps. Had the potential to
affect the cooling system leading to a meltdown-a serious nuclear accident.

1993 NAPS-1 Fire triggered by broken turbine blades led to near-meltdown.
This could have led to a artial explosion.

1994 Kaiga-1 The pre-stressed concrete dome collapsed resulting in
dispersal of radioactivity.

KAPS-1 & 2 Flood water entered condenser pit and turbine building
basement. The soaked cable trenches threatened the secondary safety system
endangering the entire safety back-up.

1999 MAPS Four tonnes of heavy water leaked exposing workers to high
radioactivity.

Recurring TAPS Extensive tube failures have resulted in de-rating of the
reactor and massive losses.

But the AERB compiled a Safety Issues Document in 1995 which lists 134
items relating to accidents, weaknesses in the safety systems, procedural
flaws and equipment failures. It is a classified document and has never
been released. "I do not understand how we can release it. The Bombay High
Court has also upheld the department's view-point," says Prasad.

A close look at various nuclear power stations in the country, however,
unsettles the comforting picture drawn by Prasad. Here are our key power
lants:

Tarapur Power Station (TAPS 1 and 2): These two reactors, with an original
power rating of 210 MWe, constructed with US cooperation and commissioned
in 1969, are still operational. Currently, however, no similar reactors
function anywhere in the world.

The problems with the two Tarapur reactors are manifold. First, they share
the same emergency core cooling system, in violation of all safety
standards. Besides, parts of TAPS are out of bounds for inspectors, and nor
do the Indian scientists have the technology to inspect it. This has been
compounded by zero US assistance after Pokhran-I in 1974. The two steam
generators in each unit are totally disabled owing to extensive tube
failures and because of this TAPS has been de-rated from 210 MWe to 160
MWe. The most disturbing aspect, however, is that the use of nitrogen to
make the containment unreactable (inert) has been discontinued. Therefore,
if the coolant does not perform its function, an explosion is quite likely
to occur, leading to reactor meltdown.

But the npc chairman argues that de-rating is good because it puts safety
above everything else. Says Prasad: "We've developed our own testing
systems and tools. In our opinion, TAPS has a life of another seven to 10
years." He also explains the suspension of nitrogen use in the containment
saying that it is obsolete in the West. But what he fails to mention is
that the US, for instance, has moved to higher capacity reactors and the
ones similar to those at TAPS have long been shut down there.

Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS 1 and 2): These were the first
pressurised heavy water reactors in the country, supplied by Canada. Though
they were rated at 220 MWe, their efficiency was very low to begin with.
Explains Prasad: "In Canada, the temperature of water is about four degrees
centigrade whereas it is as high as 30 degrees centigrade in Rajasthan. The
temperature variance led to its de-rating." The real reason, however, is
not just the difference in temperature.

One of the end-shields at raps-1 developed cracks, leading to leakages. If
the de-rating was only due to the temperature difference it would not have
been more than 20 MWe, but poor quality control forced the plant to be
de-rated from 220 Mwe to just 100 Mwe.

'Threat of a serious nuclear accident is real'

Dr A. Gopalakrishnan was the chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board
between '93 and '96. In July '95, he and his team produced a secret report,
"Safety issues in DAE installations", which covered 134 safety issues. He
spoke to Outlook. Excerpts:

How do you assess India as a nuclear ower-producing country? The problem
with us is we pretend to know everything. Most people at the department of
atomic energy (DAE) have a chip on their shoulders. The threat of a serious
nuclear accident is real.

You've been talking about not learning from past mistakes=8A The '93 Narora
fire was investigated by an independent AERB committee. The fire resulted
from the failure of two steam turbine blades. It could've caused a partial
meltdown of the core. The blade failure was identical to several failures
observed more than three years rior to the accident. GEC, which
manufactured these turbines, had intimated these failures and sent
corrected blade designs to bhel, who were their collaborators in
manufacturing the turbines. bhel urgently conveyed to npc the need for
blade replacement in the turbines at Narora, Kakrapar and Kaiga plants.
Though this advice was given to the DAE/npc a couple of years prior to the
Narora fire, no action was taken.

Why do you doubt the AERB's autonomy? Organisationally and functionally,
the AERB is not independent of the DAE. More than 95 er cent of the total
members of the regular AERB safety evaluation committees are DAE engineers
who are often instructed by the top management of DAE on crucial issues.

How does that affect the functioning of the AERB? When, as chairman, I
appointed an independent expert committee to investigate the containment
collapse at Kaiga, the aec chairman wanted its withdrawal and matters left
to the committee formed by the npc MD. DAE also complained to a minister in
the pmo who tried to force me to back off.

The DAE says that of the 134 items in your report, action has been taken on
a number of issues and only 44 items remain. Of these, 23 are mostly of a
long-term nature. Comment. As long as they don't say what the long-term
items are, I can't comment. But I know that 'long term' is a euphemism for
leaving things undone. What I've said in the '95 report was identified by
the DAE as early as '79. The '79 report, which was prepared after the Three
Mile Island accident and the subsequent one in '87, have the same problems.

Another issue, which is of grave concern, is the status of the pressure
tubes. The nuclear fuel is housed within a pressure tube which asses
through another tube with the gap between the two filled with a gas. In the
first seven instances, the pressure tubes were made of Zircalloy-2 which
was later found to be rone to deformation under irradiation. The Canadian
model, along which the Indian tubes were developed, has fully changed to a
better zirconium-niobium alloy. This, however, has not been carried out at
raps1. Besides, there is no adequate high-pressure emergency core cooling
system (ECCS) there. This system is crucial to prevent core melt-down.

Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS 1 and 2): These two reactors have created
a world record of sorts by being in the gestation phase for more than 15
years. maps1 was commissioned in '84 and MAPS 2 in '86. Within a couple of
years of commissioning, both their reactor inlets cracked. This happened
because the DAE didn't heed Canadian advice on how to set the reactors up.
And they didn't have a clue.

The MAPS reactors were de-rated from 235 MWe to 175 MWe because of this and
their continued operation even in this mode is not considered safe. The
various safety issues in MAPS 1 and 2 puts this Tamil Nadu station in a
risk category unacceptable anywhere else in the world. MAPS has also
witnessed many instances of heavy water leak.

Narora Atomic Power Station (NAPS 1 and 2): These two reactors with a
capacity of 235 MWe each were commissioned in 1991 and 1992 respectively. A
major fire at NAPS 1 helped in foregrounding a problem with the original
turbines in the ressurised heavy water reactors. The General Electric
Company (GEC), which designed the turbines, discovered that there was a
problem with the turbine blades. In 1989, GEC romptly provided a revised
blade design to Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (bhel). bhel, in turn,
prepared detailed drawings for new blades for Narora, Kakrapar and Kaiga.
But the DAE did not take action till a fire on March 31, 1993, brought the
Narora Unit 1 very close to a meltdown. Consequently, the AERB ordered
closure of all heavy water reactors in the country. Says Gopalakrishnan:
"It was a case of callous management. At other lants, the blades were
cracking exactly at the same point as in MAPS-1." Efficient handling of the
crisis by the shift engineers at the plant saved the day.

Kaiga 1 and 2: In 1994, a concrete containment dome collapsed, thanks to
faulty design, during the construction of the Kaiga power station in
Karnataka. This collapse led to a delay of nearly four years. In September
last year, Kaiga 2 was commissioned ahead of Kaiga 1. According to AERB
sources, the DAE is refusing to learn from its mistakes.

AERB had directed the DAE to carry out an integrated ECCS testings in Kaiga
1 and 2 as well as raps 3 and 4 before start up. It also wanted proof and
leakage tests conducted on the reactor containments. And finally, a
full-scope simulator to be installed for operator training. None of these
directives have been complied with so far.

Kakrapar Atomic Power station (KAPS 1 and 2): These plants with a capacity
of 220 MWe each were commissioned in May 1993 and May 1995. They house the
first indigenously-developed microprocessor-based control system. Most
experts feel that Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), which has developed
these systems, did not test them thoroughly for lack of equipment. In this
station too there was flooding in 1994 like at raps.

The only way, therefore, to tackle these safety threats is to make the AERB
a truly autonomous body. Right now it's an organisation held captive by the
DAE. Prasad, however, is unwilling to even concede this and cites a couple
of instances to substantiate his case.

Autonomy for nuclear power regulatory bodies is essential if they are to
have some teeth. And the only way to ensure this is to make nuclear energy
rogramme in India more transparent and subject to public scrutiny.
(=A9 Copyright Outlook 1999 )
___________________
#4.
The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
November/December 1999
Vol. 55, No. 6, pp. 52-57
http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1999/nd99/nd99gopi.html

IN THE COMFORT OF SECRECY [AT INDIA'S NUCLEAR ESTABLISHMENT]
By T. S. Gopi Rethinaraj
__________________
#5.
A new book for children written by DP Sen Gupta and illustrated by Gujjar
from Bangalore has been published recently. It is called 'Brothers from
Chichibaba'. It gives a clear anti-war, anti-nuke message by using simple
language supported by good illustrations. The author has published the book
himself and it costs Rs. 40/-. This 26-page book is a good reading material
for 6-7 year olds....

The author and the illustrator could be contacted by email:
dps@e...
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