[sacw] sacw dispatch #2 (28 Nov.99)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Web Dispatch #2.
28 November 1999
--------------------------------
#1. Pakistan: The democracy debate
#2. On Sangh Parivars claims of high growth of India's Christian Population
#3. Blasphemy Law in Pakistan
#4. India Pak Arms Race & Militarisation Watch No.2
#5. Discriminatory laws hinder women in Pakistan
--------------------------------
#1.
IPS
Nov 28 1999=20

PAKISTAN: THE DEMOCRACY DEBATE
by Beena Sarwar

LAHORE: Fiery critics of deposed Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif from
among the media and non-government organisations have joined the new regime
headed by army chief Gen. Parvez Musharraf. The inductment of at least two
such activists into the federal and provincial cabinets has sparked off
opinions ranging from downright disapproval to cautious acceptance among
media and NGO circles.

Omar Asghar Khan, federal minister for environment, tourism and culture,
and Shahid Hafeez Kardar, finance minister for the Punjab, have been
outspoken critics of Pakistans nuclear and foreign policies, and now seem
committed to helping the new chief executive implement a more progressive
agenda for the country.

Both have resigned from the non-government organisations in which they held
posts, and are now being keenly watched by their former colleagues to see
whether they succeed, or whether they leave the new set-up if they find
themselves blocked as many expect. Much is also expected from many other
cabinet members at provincial and federal levels, given their track
records in their respective fields.

At least three of the women in the cabinets stand out for their work in
education, like the outspoken Anita Ghulam Ali in Karachi, the grassroots
rural school organiser Zubeida Jalal from rural Balochistan, or the
education NGO director Shaheen Atiqur Rehman in Punjab. A fourth, the
respected law professor Shaheen Sardar Ali from Peshawar is known for her
work in the womens rights and religion area.

But it is Omar Asghar Khan and Shahid Kardar who are likely find themselves
the focus of much attention, given their open political stands. And it is
their old colleagues who are most sceptical of their chances of success,
despite the fact that these ministers will be supported in much of their
work by other like-minded cabinet members.

Despite their lack of political constituencies, the new cabinet members
tend to be uncontroversial because of their clean records and commitment
to various social causes. In fact, it is being said that the country has
never before had cabinets in the provincial and federal set-up with so
many clean and committed members.

However, Pakistan NGO Forum, the apex body of five coalitions of NGOs in
the provinces and capital, in a recent press release following a national
meeting, was quick to state that the activists who have gone into the
cabinet are not there as NGO representatives, but in their personal
capacity.

But the NGO Forum also expects that the ministers inducted from its ranks
will not lose sight of the agenda they have always believed in, of
strengthening civil society, said Khawar Mumtaz of Shirkat Gah, a
Lahore-based womens resource centre that is currently the secretariat for
the Forum.

Were caught between principles and practicality, she added. We have to
deal with a military government, and we have to engage with it, but we
cannot condone a military set-up. There is also a clear consensus that the
Nawaz Sharif government should not be restored. We want rule of law, but
we also want accountability.

This was the consensus at the end of the day-long debate at the national
meeting, attended by many representatives of the Forums over 2,500 member
organisation, said Mumtaz.

In its statement, the Forum also called for a restoration of democracy, and
demanded that the military regime should state what measures it was taking
and to set a time-frame towards this end.

She believes that the ministers who have gone in from NGO circles faced a
conscience problem. They want to make a positive contribution towards the
new agenda Pakistan appears set to be following, but are known for their
anti-military stances. At the same time, they dont want to continue
criticising from the outside if they are given a chance to go change the
system from within.

But many believe that the fact that activists have accepted ministries is a
non-issue. Among them is economist, educationist and peace worker Haris
Gazdar, 35, who spends half his time at the London School of Economics
where he is a research fellow, and half in Pakistan doing field work.

Gazdar believes that the real issue in Pakistan today is conflict between
vested economic interests. Military dictatorships and civilian rulers have
provided various mechanisms for mediating these conflicts. Both have
failed, he says, predicting that they will fail again.

Responding to the question of whether the military set-up in Pakistan
should be supported because it is being presented as an alternative to
talibanisation, he says that this debate, of liberalism versus
fundamentalism is about ideologies than can be used for mobilisation.

Both liberalism and fundamentalism have been used in the past (and at the
present) by the ruling classes. If today fundamentalism of a particular
variety is falling out of favour of the ruling classes it is partly
because of the fear that it is driving out of control. Also makes bad copy
in the WSJ, FT and the Economist, he adds cheekily.

The real fear, he suspects, is that fundamentalism might provide a coherent
ideological and organisational vehicle to the other side in the class
conflict -- that the powerless may gain power through fundamentalism,
although he doubts that fundamentalism has this revolutionary potential in
Pakistan, given its divided and divisive character.

He advocates not getting confused by the fundamentalism versus liberalism
debate, or the democracy versus dictatorship debate. We should have
democracy, whether it works or not, because it is the very basis of all
modern political institutions. But the task of real democrats and
progressives is not to defend Nawaz or Benazir because they won elections,
and then Musharaf because appears to fighting the Mullahs.

Surely the task is to expose the anti-people and anti-democratic character
of both military and civilian rule as it has been experienced in Pakistan,
and also expose the anti-democratic and anti-people nature of both
fundamentalism and liberalism as experienced in Pakistan.

Gazdar suggests that those working for democracy should have their own
agenda to fight for real democracy, and points out that the situation
didn't change on 12 October. We should be opposed to military coups, and
shouldn't conciliate with them, but as a political strategy why should we
waste our energies on supporting the coup or opposing the coup. It is
somebody else's game, we are bystanders, and the real issue is conflict
between classes and other social conflicts. The main question is where you
stand on that and what can you do about it.
(ends)

--------------------------------
#2.
=46rontline
Volume 16 - Issue 25, Nov. 27 - Dec. 10, 1999
COMMUNALISM
http://www.the-hindu.com/fline/fl1625/16250930.htm

A NUMBERS GAME
The campaign by the Sangh Parivar that there has been a
disproportionately high growth in the Christian population in India relies
on skilful and selective suppression of facts.

V. SRIDHAR

THE repeated articulation by sections of the intelligentsia of mendacious
theories floated by Sangh Parivar elements goes some way towards investing
these with an aura of legitimacy. The canards the Sangh Parivar spread
about Muslims in India since the 1 980s (Frontline, October 25, 1991)
gained currency because its propositions were repeated even by informed
sections of society. This strategy is now being employed against
Christians in India. While attacks against Christians have gone on across
t he country, the Sangh Parivar has managed to focus on the "evil designs"
of Christian missionaries indulging in "mass conversions". This shrill
campaign, which grew ever louder on the eve of Pope John Paul II's visit,
has however been picked up by others.

On the day the Pope arrived in India, several newspapers published (as an
advertisement) an open letter to him addressed by several prominent
personalities. Among those who appended their signatures to the letter,
under the banner of the Citizens Committ ee of Dharma Raksha Sammelan in
Chennai, were the ophthalmologist Dr. S.S. Badrinath, dancers Sonal
Mansingh and Padma Subramaniam and several writers and film personalities.

They alleged that evangelisation was but a "less dignified cousin" of
"conversion" and that "the Christian missionary activity in our nation is
tearing apart families and communities in every strata of our society."
They said that "religious conversion, which seems to be synonymous with
papal work, is violence pure and simple." They blamed the "intolerance of
missionaries" for the "clashes" that occurred regularly since the
Bharatiya Janata Party came to power in 1998. "We Indians are deeply hurt
by the spurt in the aggressive campaigning of the Church to convert the
people of India by all available means," they claimed.

On the eve of the Pope's visit, Organiser, the mouthpiece of the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), published several articles attacking the
Christian community in India. The Pope was obviously the main target, but
there were also articles which u sed official and other statistics to back
claims of a massive increase in the Christian population in India. An
article titled "Christian population: Misleading figures," by Rajendra
Kumar Chaddha in the October 31 issue, used "statistics" to drive home the
point that the Christian population is increasing at an alarming rate.

The author provides a list of districts in India where the Christian
population has grown by more than 100 per cent between the 1981 and 1991
Censuses. However, an analysis of the Census data reveals that the
Organiser has abused the statistics in several cases, suppressed relevant
facts in some others, and used bogus figures in still others. For
instance, Organiser claims that the Christian population as a percentage
of the total population increased from 2.53 per cent in 1981 to 2.61 per
cent in 1991; however, Census data show that the percentage declined from
2.45 per cent to 2.32 per cent during this period. The r atio of Christians
in the population increased by a little over half a percentage point
between 1921 and 1991, indicating t hat conversions are an insignificant
factor in the long-term demographic transition of Christians in India.

The list of districts in which the RSS claims that the Christian
population increased sharply between 1981 and 1991 is interesting. The
article provides just the percentage of increase of the Christian
population. It ignores any mention of ratios of Chri stians in the total
population, details which will indicate whether their weightage in the
population is increasing. What is striking is the small numbers of
Christians in many of the districts listed in the Organiser article. For
instance, in Gun a district in Madhya Pradesh, the number of Christians
increased from 258 to 642 over a 10-year period ending in 1991. Although
this is an increase of nearly 150 per cent, the fact remains that the
Christian population in Guna accounted for 0.05 per cent of the total
population in 1991, up from 0.03 per cent in 1981. Obvious factors such as
migration into the district over a 10-year period have not been taken into
account by the author, who seems determined to attribute the incr ease
entirely to conversi ons.

In three cases of the districts examined-Udaipur and Sirohi in Rajasthan,
and Periyar (now Erode) in Tamil Nadu-Organiser's figures are false. For
instance, Organiser claims that the Christian population increased by 928
per cent betwe en 1981 and 1991 in Erode district; the fact is that the
Christian population here increased by only 2.28 per cent during this
period. In fact, in 1991 Christians accounted for 1.86 per cent of the
population of 2.32 million, having declined from 2.02 pe r cent in 1981.
[=8A] In the case of Arunachal Pradesh, Organiser again makes a skilful
suppression of facts about percentages and ratios. Its claim that the
Christian population in Arunachal Pradesh grew by 226 per cent between
1981 and 1991 is true; however, it fails to mention that the Christian
population as a percentage of the total population increased from about 4
per cent in 1981 to about 10 per cent in 1991. The Census figures show
that the population of the States in the northeastern region increased at
a ra te far above the national average. For instance, while the population
of India increased by about 24 per cent, the population of Arunachal
Pradesh increased by 37 per cent between 1981 and 1991. This was probably
because of the porous nature of the borde r in these States and also
because of large-scale migration within the region. Interestingly, while
Organiser mentions the districts where the Christian population grew more
rapidly than the Hindu population between 1981 and 1991, it fails to ment
ion two other districts in the State- Upper Subansiri and Lohit-where the
Hindu population grew much faster than the Christian population.

An interesting aspect of the data for the northeastern States is that
there was a sharp decline in the number of people who told the enumerators
that they were from "other religions and persuasions". This category would
include those who maintain their t ribal identity, worshipping local
deities, and whose beliefs and practices would be far-removed from
mainstream Hindu practices and rituals. In Arunachal Pradesh this category
accounted for more than 50 per cent of the population in 1981; in 1991,
people with "other religions and persuasions" accounted for only 36 per
cent. While the Hindu population increased sharply in some districts, the
Christian population increased in some others. This trend in the decline
of the percentage of people with such bel iefs is in line with the
historical tendency of mainstream religions to make inroads into such
communities.

Historian Sumit Sarkar points out that "Sanskritisation" or "cultural
integration" of marginal groups and tribals were often termed "shuddhi",
"reclamation" or "paravartan" (the Vishwa Hindu Parishad's preferred term
for getting these group s back into Hindu society) and is not
substantially different from the term "conversion" (Sumit Sarkar, Economic
and Political Weekly, June 26, 1999). Sumit Sarkar also elaborates on the
point made by Richard Eaton in his study of the rise of Isla m in Bengal
"that in large parts of the subcontinent, certainly in medieval times and
to a considerable extent even today, the great religious traditions have
been expanding at the cost, not so much of each other as in relation to a
multitude of local cu lts or practices." He emphasises the point that the
potential for conflict in premodern times was far less because of the slow
nature of the process. Moreover, the process in those times was not based
on conversion of individuals but of whole groups, fam ilies, clans or
local communities. This, he notes, reduced the scope for conflict. Such an
explanation also contradicts the right-wing claims that the state, whether
during Mughal rule or during British rule, played the major role as a
facilitator in the spread of Islam or Christianity.

Data available from the National Family Health Survey conducted in 1992-93
reveal some patterns across the various religious communities. For
instance, the rate of illiteracy was about 33 per cent among Christians,
compared to 64 per cent among Hindus. N early 8 per cent of the Christian
population had studied above the high school level, compared to 3.4 per
cent among Hindus. The empowering aspect of the figures is brought out by
these figures: nearly half the Christian women surveyed knew the legal min
imum age for marriage, compared to 32.5 per cent among Hindu women.

ANU PUSHKARNA At the papal Mass in New Delhi on November 7. Census data
indicate that conversions are an insignificant factor in the demographic
transition of Christians in India.

The results of the survey show that the Christian population in India also
has better access to health care. Neonatal mortality among Hindus was
estimated at 55 per thousand live births, compared to 32.6 per thousand
live births among Christians. Post-ne onatal mortality rates were
estimated at 35.4 per thousand live births for Hindus, compared to 17.3
per thousand for Christians, while the infant mortality rate for Hindus
was 90.4 per thousand live births compared to 49.9 per thousand live
births among Christians. The child mortality rate was estimated at 19.4
per thousand live births among Christians while for Hindus it was 36.9 per
thousand live births. More than 60 per cent of those surveyed among
Christians reported that they received antenatal car e from a doctor,
compared to only 38.6 per cent among Hindus. A comparison of the Total
=46ertility Rate (TFR), the measure of the average number of children
delivered by a woman during her reproductive life, among Hindus and
Christians also indicates a ga p among the two communities. While the TFR
for the Christian population was 2.87 in 1992-93, it was 3.3 for Hindus.
The obvious conclusion is that the Christian population had better access
to medical facilities compared to the rest of the population. Ob viously,
the death rate among Christians was far lower than in the rest of the
population-8.2 per cent, compared to 12.9 per cent among Hindus (figures
for 1984).

The rate of growth of the Christian population in India was high between
1921 and 1971; in fact, between 1921 and 1971, the rate of growth of the
Christian population was consistently higher than that of the total
population, although the gap narrowed in successive rounds of the Census.
However, since 1981, this trend has been reversed. While the population of
India increased by almost 24 per cent between 1981 and 1991, the Christian
population grew by 17 per cent.

It is clear that the Christian population in India is well on its way
towards a demographic transition. Principles of demography show that the
first impact of development is on the death rate, reducing it by the
delivery of modern medicine to combat the basic diseases. However, the
birth rate takes longer to slow down because it is in part a function of
literacy, particularly among women, and other long-term factors. It is
quite plausible that the natural rate of growth of the Christian
population up to 1971 was higher because of the sharper decline in the
death rate among Christians when compared to the rest of the population.
However, since then, exposure to literacy and other factors, particularly
among women, appear to have set the birth rate on a declining trend. This
would have caused the natural rate of growth of the Christian population
to slow down. The unwinding of this process means that the natural rate of
growth of the Christian population is likely to slow down even more in
relation to t he rest of the population.

What this means in terms of the logic of the Sangh Parivar is that if the
Christian population has to catch up, it has to rely increasingly on
conversions. The fact that the proportion of Christians in the population
has increased by just half a percenta ge point in the last 70 years shows
the absurdity of such fears. The Christian population accounts for only
2.5 per cent of the total population almost 2000 years after the religion
reached India.

It is obvious that much of the advancement in the living conditions of the
Christian population has been because of missionary activity-not confined
to conversion in the narrow sense, but also in reaching literacy, health
care and other basic empowerin g resources to the poor. That the state has
failed to reach these basic fruits of development to large sections of the
people is the obvious corollary.
-----------------------
#3.
The Nation
28 November 1999
Opinion

BLASPHEMY LAW IN PAKISTAN
by Altaf Gauhar

Blasphemy is a subject with which I have a close personal connection. I
was born in Gujranwala, the Pakistani city which hit the headlines of
Western newspapers when two Christians were awarded the death penalty
under the Anti-Blasphemy Law. I loved the place as a child in the early
1920s for its milk and yoghurt and for its wrestlers, in particular Rahim
pehlwan, who knocked out a British challenger, Hudson, in less than a
minute. It was also the birthplace of the famous Sikh ruler, Raja Ranjit
Singh. Several mosques and temples in the town served as centres of
training for Hindu pundits and Muslim preachers. The town had a large
community of sweepers, all low-caste Hindus converted to Christianity by
British missionaries during the Raj. Their principal occupation was to
keep the town's open drains in as clean a state as possible-a pungent task
which they could perform only when fortified by a heady local brew called
thurra. They were treated as 'untouchable' and members of other
communities had no dealings with them. These Christians, once they were
given enough money to acquire a large enough quantity of thurrah to
inflame them, could also be used as agents by pundits and preachers to
provoke communal disturbances. But more about that later. Never a month
passed, even in those days of highly disciplined British administration,
when the town was not rocked by some communal incident resulting in
rioting and arson. Now the Muslims would take to the streets shouting
'death to the Hindus' for planting a lump of pig flesh in the mosque, thus
defiling its sanctity. In retaliation the Hindus would burn down some
Muslim shops for throwing a large chunk of beef in a temple to compromise
the chastity of gaomata (mother cow). The Christians, who consumed beef
and bacon with equal relish, were the ones who were used for planting the
offensive chunks of flesh in places of worship by rival Hindu and Muslim
zealots. It was all a game of communal passion, played in the name of
religion, in which innocent Christians were used as pawns, often with
disastrous consequences. The British Penal Code provided stringent
punishment for defiling a place of worship or imperiling the law and order
situation by causing outrage to the religious beliefs of any community,
but the punishment did not include the death penalty. The same provisions
of law continued until Pakistan's third military ruler, General Ziaul Haq,
embarked on what he called the process of lslamisation of laws. Blasphemy,
by then, had become a matter of great concern for the religious parties in
Pakistan. The Ahmadiya community had been expelled from the fold of Islam
for their beliefs though the Muslim divines could not agree on the
definition of a true Muslim. The court of inquiry where this matter was
considered in the 1950s observed: "What is Islam and who is a momin or a
Muslim? We put this question to the ulema (religious scholars) and we
shall presently refer to their answers to this question. But we cannot
refrain from saying here that it was a matter of infinite regret to us
that the ulema whose first duty should be to have settled views on the
subject, were hopelessly disagreed among themselves. Keeping in view the
several definitions (of a Muslim) given by the ulema, need we make any
comment except that no two learned divines are agreed on this fundamental.
If we attempt our own definition as each learned divine has done, and that
definition differs from that given by all others, we unanimously come out
of the fold of Islam" (Justice Munir Inquiry Report, 1953). The majority
of the people of Pakistan are Sunni Muslims and the ulema who claim to
represent them have always been agitating that the Shias, because of their
beliefs, pose a great threat to the integrity of Islam. To appease these
ulema, General Ziaul Haq amended the Penal Code to provide for the
punishment of the offence of blasphemy in 1980. The ulema were happy to
have made their first major inroad into the judicial process though the
lawyers were distressed by the extremely broad and vague formulation of
the offence. No particular procedure for the lodging of complaints and
their investigation was ever prescribed. The assumption was that no Muslim
would ever lodge a false complaint because such a complaint would
constitute a blasphemous act. Two years later, the scope of the offence of
blasphemy was widened and made punishable with life imprisonment. The
first person to be punished for this offence was a Muslim preacher who had
allegedly thrown a copy of the Quran in a pot of boiling milk in a fit of
temper. The man was taken to the local police station but a crowd of angry
believers dragged him out of the lock-up and lynched him. His body was
later tied to the back of a motorcycle and dragged through the streets.
Guess where the incident occurred? In the city of Gujranwala. Where else?
The religious groups had now acquired enough influence to compel General
Zia to help them crush their sectarian rivals and other liberal groups who
were agitating against the growth of a parallel legal system under the
name of lslamisation. By now General Ziaul Haq had set up the Federal
Shariat Court which had been empowered not only to interpret but also
expound the Islamic law. Their hope was that flogging, amputation of limbs
and public hanging would soon become the accepted forms of punishment for
a whole range of crimes. An Article (295A) was added to the Pakistan Penal
Code in 1986 which provided for the death penalty in blasphemy cases.
Gujranwala again! Three Christians belonging to different villages of
Gujranwala, Salamat Masih, Rahmat Masih and Manzoor Masih were tried and
sentenced to death by the trial court on February 9, 1995. The complaint
was lodged by a certain Hafiz Fazle Haq, Imam of a mosque, in 1993 when
Salamat Masih, one of the three accused, was only 12 years old. The Hafiz
withdrew his complaint before the death sentence was pronounced but by
then the court had come under the control of the crowd which would
surround the court room during the hearing and demand the execution of the
accused persons on the spot. The crowd was so enraged when the three
Masihs were granted bail by the High Court of Lahore that one of them,
Manzoor Masih, was shot dead outside the court building. The proceedings
went on for two years because the prosecution could not produce any
evidence to support the charge that the accused had been scribbling some
scurrilous words derogatory to the Holy Prophet (PBUH) on the wall of the
mosque nor would they produce the chits of paper bearing the alleged
blasphemous words which the accused had thrown into the compound of the
mosque. The witnesses declined to repeat the objectionable words as the
repetition would have amounted to a blasphemous act. It was pleaded on
behalf of the defence that one of the accused was a minor and the other
two were illiterated who could not have written the objectionable words.
Despite the lack of any reliable evidence the trial court sentenced the
accused persons to death. The announcement of the sentence caused an
outrage. The world Press criticised Pakistan for sentencing two citizens
to death under, what was considered a 'barbaric' law. The them Prime
Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, expressed "shock" and most of the
educated people in the country criticised the judgment which they knew had
been passed under the pressure of certain religious groups whose
supporters kept the court under siege throughout the trial. An eminent
jurist and a former Chief Justice of the High Court of Lahore, Dr Javed
lqbal, said that the blasphemy law under which the trial had been held was
wholly inconsistent with the spirit of the Quranic injunctions on the
subject. He argued persuasively that only a Muslim could be tried under
the blasphemy law if he said or did anything derogatory to the Prophet
(PBUH) and the Quran. While the appeal was being heard in the High Court
of Lahore, one of the religious leaders declared that if the appeal was
allowed and the accused were set free, he would himself strangle them to
death. The court finally accepted the appeal and the accused persons were
set free. The government knew that it could not guarantee their safety in
freedom and they were soon dispatched to Germany where they were granted
political asylum. These blasphemy cases demonstrate the state of law in
Pakistan. The educated classes are deeply disturbed by the introduction of
certain laws which they find alien to their culture. They are opposed to
flogging and public hanging and that is the reason why General Zia's plan
to introduce these punishments never succeeded and there was so much
opposition to Mian Nawaz Sharif's attempt to promulgate the Shariah Law.
They find the law of blasphemy unacceptable because they do not recognise
that the honour of the Prophet (PBUH) and his family or the sanctity of
the Quran is under threat in a country almost entirely populated by
Muslims who deeply revere the Prophet (PBUH). The religious groups, none
of whom has ever secured more than marginal support in the elections, have
turned mosques into a platforms of political agitation and indulge in
irresponsible rabble rousing in the name of Islam. They have acquired
undue importance because successive military dictators have used them to
consolidate their personal rule under the garb of Islam. As a result our
culture is dominated by the spirit of intolerance wholly alien to Islam or
any democratic system of government. Fundamental human rights remain a
vague and elusive concept: a believer invokes these rights in his own
interest but rarely concedes them in the interest of any non-believer. As
a nation-state, Pakistan is going through a turbulent phase of transition.
Undefined Islamic laws, wholly divorced from their social context, are
being imposed on a society committed to adapting itself to the
requirements of the modern age. This is being done by a small obscurantist
group, divided into various sects, that is bent upon distorting the
original vision of Pakistan as a democratic state in which every citizen
will have equal rights, opportunities and status. They consider, as they
had declared before Justice Munir's court of inquiry in 1953, that, A
state based on this idea is the creature of the devil.
--------------------
#4.
INDIA PAK ARMS RACE & MILITARISATION WATCH NO.2

[information & news for peace activists on Arms sales to the region,
defence budget figures, acquisitions & updgrades of weapons systems,
development and deployment of new weapons, implications of militarisation;
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is our goal here. No to secretive & exclusive control of this information
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scrutiny.
Please help us in the information gathering work for wide public
dissemination in South Asia.
Send Information via e-mail for IPARMW series to: aiindex@m... for
inclusion in the Emailings]

The Frontier Post
28 November 1999

PAKISTAN TO BUILD AGOSTA 90-B SUBS
ISLAMABAD (NNI)-Pakistan Navy will be able to indigenously build Agosta
90-B submarine by the year 2003, at Karachi dockyard, a Navy official told
this agency Saturday. "We have already started campaign to book orders for
the state-of-the-art submarine and expect to earn much wanted foreign
exchange for the national exchequer," the official said. The first such
submarine that was completely built in France is already on its way to
Pakistan. "The first Agosta 90-B is hopefully arriving in Karachi by the
middle of the next month (December)," the official said. France under an
agreement, signed about eight years back, was supposed to transfer the
technology of the Agosta class submarine by the year 1999. According to
the accord, the construction of the third submarine was planned at Karachi
dockyard this year, where the facilities had been already developed.
However, the sanctions imposed by France and some other developed
countries in 1998 resulted in delay in transferring the technology. The
sanctions were imposed on Pakistan on responding to India's nuclear
explosions in May last year. "The work for the construction of the 2nd
Agosta 90-B submarine has already been started at Karachi dockyard as well
in France," the official said. It is believed that the second submarine
would be completed by the end of next year, jointly by France and
Pakistan, the official added. Pakistan navy is the third navy in this
region after Iran and India to have this submarine. However, Pakistan
would be the first country in this region to be manufacturing the
submarine indigenously by the year 2003. Online adds: First out of three
Agosta 90-B submarines, Pakistan Navy is to receive from France, will
arrive in Karachi by middle of January 2000. "Pakistan navy crew is
operating the submarine with national flag on it, which has already sailed
from France", informed sources told this news here Saturday, adding there
is no delay in arrival of the first submarine and everything is going on
according to the schedule. France had signed a 900 million dollars
agreement with Pakistan in 1995 for supply of three Agosta 90-B
submarines. Under the agreement each submarine will cost a little over 250
million dollars to Pakistan. =20
----------------------
#5.
News Network International
Sunday 28th November, 1999

DISCRIMINATORY LAWS HINDER UTILIZATION OF WOMENS CAPABILITIES: CJ

LAHORE (NNI): Chief Justice of Pakistan Justice Saeeduz Zaman Siddiqui has
said that discriminatory laws have so far hindered the complete
utilization of womens capabilities for national development. He was
addressing a daylong all Pakistan Convention of Women Lawyers on Saturday.
The Chief Justice who is also the chairman of Pakistan Law Commission
asked the bar members and people to submit their suggestions for
elimination of unjust and discriminatory laws. He said that PLC was
reviewing the laws like citizenship act. The convention was attended by
Chief Justice Lahore High Court Justice Rashid Aziz Khan, President Lahore
High Court Bar Association Ahmed Javed Jillani, members of the judiciary
and a large number of women lawyers.
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