[sacw] Mushirul Hasan on Pakistan vs India

[aiindex@mnet.fr]

June 21, 1999
FYI
(South Asia Citizens Web)
___________________________

Times of India
Sunday 20 June 1999
http://www.timesofindia.com/200699/20sprp3.htm

Why India scored over Pakistan

By Mushirul Hasan

India, with the vibrant legacy of its nationalist movement, put key
institutions of
the modern State into place very soon after Independence. Pakistan's ruling
elites,
unfortunately, messed up rather badly on this vital front, says Mushirul Hasan

THERE are no standard explanations for Pakistan's long-standing animus towards
India. Yet one thing is sure -- Pakistan is not a ``rogue'' state as is
often suggested
in certain quarters. At the same time, its ideological foundations,
anchored in the
two-nation theory, make it prone to belligerence towards India. The powerful
military-bureaucratic oligarchy, nurtured in the tradition of anti-India
hostility, has
exacerbated Indo-Pak tension. Every single act of aggression committed since
1948, including the recent aggression in Kargil, has been the handiwork of this
combine whose hegemony has not been challenged even by the resurgence of
democratic forces.

India has its share of Pakistan-baiters, but their influence is not
profoundly felt.
What has probably kept them at bay are certain important aspects of our
democracy, including a developed political culture, viable institutions,
the tradition
of compromise and accommodation, and the success of political parties in having
institutionalised themselves in the state and society.

In Pakistan, on the other hand, the crisis of governability has been a perennial
factor. Despite the enthusiasm generated by the Muslim League movement, it left
little of any substantial value behind which the post-Jinnah leadership
could rely on
for support. As a result, it took nine years to agree on a Constitution. No
elections
were held under the 1956 Constitution. Two years later, Pakistan fell prey to
military rule.

The `Congress system' steered the Indian ship through the rough currents of
history by keeping regional, linguistic and religious cleavages in check.
In contrast,
the Muslim League failed to provide the leadership essential for underwriting
stability or democracy in Pakistan. In an area where religious passions had run
amok, Jinnah's plea for a secular society offered too little, too late. A
weak-kneed
`secular' leadership could not rein in clerics, who had tasted victory in their
imagined jehad against the Hindus. No wonder the ideal of an Islamic state was
thoughtlessly pursued after 1947 and finally consummated during the inglorious
regime of President Zia-ul-Haq.

Three problems have plagued Pakistan's polity and society. One is the
deep-seated
tension between its dominant and subordinate regions that led, in the first
place, to
the secession of Bangladesh. The crisis has deepened since with different
regional/ethnic groups vying to gain political leverage and a share in the
national
cake. In the process, the purported unity of a common religion lies in a
shambles.
Mere references to religious solidarity are no substitute for building a stable
democracy. In fact, the Iranian, Afghan and Pakistani experience
illustrates that
whenever institutions are imbued with the spirit of religious fundamentalism, an
atmosphere of ideological oppression suffocates the creative impulses of a
society.

There have been many visions of nationhood and alternative frameworks for its
realisation in post-colonial societies. The issue was easily settled in
India owing to
the vibrant legacy of the nationalist movement. Democracy and secularism have
been key motifs in India's historical experience. Key institutions of the modern
State -- liberal democracy, universal adult franchise and democratic
decision-making -- were put in place very rapidly.

Unfortunately, this process did not take place in Pakistan. The ruling
elites had
neither a programme nor adequate institutional arrangements to resolve and
accommodate the conflicting interests and perceptions that existed between
different
socio-economic classes. They relied more on authoritarian State structures
rather
than democratic processes to safeguard their interests. These problems have been
compounded by the pivotal position occupied by the army as the guardian of
Pakistan's nationhood.

Pakistan's elites share the material aspirations of their counterparts in
India. So that
they may like to shed the Islamic cloak and do away with the trapping of an
Islamic
state. But they are constrained, as Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto discovered the hard
way, by
the huge influence of the army and the Jamaat-i-Islami, a party wedded to
Islamic
theocracy and bitterly opposed to a rapprochement with India. The Jamaat's
electoral base is limited, but not its ideological influence in civil
society as indeed
inside the corridors of power. Its readiness to seize control and establish the
Islamic law is likely to impose severe strains on a country that is still
trying to
secure legitimacy in the comity of nations.

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