[sacw] Issues of nuclear safety [In India]

[Harsh Kapoor]

Dear Friends,
Here is an important report on the dangerous conditions under which the
Indian Nuclear instalations have been operating.This report was published
in the wellknown Indian fortnightly Frontline. Please share this with other
South Asians and with activists of the peace movement in Pakistan.
Harsh Kapoor
South Asians Against Nukes
================================
From: Frontline, Vol. 16 :: No. 06 :: Mar. 13 - 26, 1999

NUCLEAR POWER: Issues of nuclear safety [In India]

The safety status of nuclear energy installations in
India is far below international standards,
and in the absence of an independent regulatory body
this has serious implications for public
safety.

India's nuclear energy installations and activities
pose key challenges relating to safety. In a context
of official secretiveness and poor public awareness
of the issues at stake, the paramount need is
for transparency. The absence of an independent
regulatory body has proved very costly.

The fact that India's Atomic Energy Regulatory
Board (AERB) remains a dependent creature of
the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) is an
indictment of official attitudes to nuclear safety. It is
also a clear violation of the international
Convention on Nuclear Safety to which India is a party.
Among other things, the Convention requires each
contracting party to take steps to ensure "an
effective separation between the functions of the
regulatory body and those of any other body or
organisation concerned with the promotion or
utilisation of nuclear energy." The Pokhran tests of
May 1974 and May 1998, and hawkishness within the
nuclear energy establishment, have only
reinforced secretiveness and non-accountability on
safety issues.

In this expert appraisal, Dr. A. Gopalakrishnan, a
former Chairman of the AERB, looks closely
and specifically at the safety status of the DAE's
facilities, which he finds "much below international
standards", and proposes a break with the post-1974
track record on nuclear safety by creating a
properly empowered independent AERB in a new
legislative framework.

- Editor, Frontline

A. GOPALAKRISHNAN

ENORMOUS benefits have been derived from the wise
utilisation of the atom ever since radioactivity
and, subsequently, the nuclear fission process were
discovered. As experience amassed, so did wisdom
on how to use atomic energy without attracting the most
hazardous and long-lasting impact it could have
on mankind if it is mismanaged. In spite of this
awareness, the accidents at Chernobyl and Three Mile
Island did occur. Nations across the globe have learned
their lessons from these disasters; India, however,
chooses to ignore the warning.

In India, people are not aware of the potential hazards
they will face if a nuclear installation in their
neighbourhood is mismanaged and it leads to a major
accident. Only such awareness could prompt them
to demand information and data on the true status of
these installations. The people must realise that they
have the right to such information in the democratic
system, even though the draconian Official Secrets
Act is repeatedly employed by the government to deny
them this right.

The experiences of the past
have taught governments across the world the absolute necessity to have
a truly independent nuclear safety regulatory agency, to serve as
a watchdog on behalf of the public. Here again, India refuses to learn;
its nuclear regulatory body is kept as a servile entity.
Other nations have built their regulation norms and approaches to
strengthen nuclear safety through international cooperation. India stands
isolated by the rest of the developed world in this context, ever since the
Pokhran weapons tests of 1974. In spite of this, substantial multinational
assistance in
safety areas is available through the aegis of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). But India takes the stand that it can do without it.
In today's inter-dependent world, there cannot be a more foolish and
arrogant stance.

Whatever little the public knows today about nuclear
safety is from media reports. The media, however,
need to take on a more proactive and sustained role in
bringing about change. However, in spite of these
reports Indian parliamentarians are not alarmed, nor are
they curious to know the truth. Offers from
well-informed persons to testify before the
Parliamentary Committee on Energy on this subject have been
ignored.

It is in this backdrop that this article is written. The
hope is that it would evoke enough interest among
concerned citizens in all walks of life, so that they
will initiate and sustain a fight for their right to know, and
the freedom to live safely in the neighbourhood of
nuclear installations.

DAE installations

All nuclear activities in India, except those for
medical and industrial applications, are carried out under the
responsibility of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE).
This article gives a limited overview of the
safety status of some of these installations and their
significant problems. The lack of a truly independent
nuclear regulatory mechanism and the unprecedented
powers and influence of the DAE, coupled with the
widespread use of the Official Secrets Act to cover up
the realities, are the primary reasons for this grave
situation.

S. THANTHONI The two units of the Madras Atomic
Power Station at Kalpakkam, near Chennai. Nuclear power stations,
research reactors, fuel reprocessing units and waste management facilities
are the installations which pose the highest risk to the health and
life of workers and the general public.
Nuclear power stations, research
reactors, fuel reprocessing units and waste management facilities are the
installations that pose the highest risk to the health and life of
workers and the general
public. This article focusses mainly on the problems of power reactors.
India has 10 operating nuclear power
reactors; four more are under
construction. Table 1 gives the list of the reactor
units and their power ratings. Table 2 indicates their very
poor performance, with a gross life-time capacity
utilisation factor of about 37 per cent. The
corresponding figures in respect of some other nuclear
power nations are well above 60 per cent (Table
3). The DAE has never challenged the capacity
utilisation figures published by foreign journals.

When it comes to safety, the existing compilation of
safety-related unusual occurrences indicates a high
degree of human errors and equipment failures.
Installation-wise, the overall safety status can be gauged
from the following:

Tarapur power station (TAPS-1 and 2)

The two boiling-water reactors at Tarapur are of
1969-vintage U.S. design. All similar reactors around
the world have been shut down for reasons of safety. The
two reactors at the Tarapur Power Station
(TAPS) share the same subsystems, including the
emergency core cooling system, in violation of all safety
standards of today. The inerting of the TAPS containment
with nitrogen was long discontinued by
theDAE, and operation in the present mode could lead to
a containment explosion in case a
loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) happens. Many parts of
TAPS reactors are uninspectable, nor do
Indian scientists have the tools or the technology for
doing this. After 1974, no spare parts or assistance
have been coming from the United States The two steam
generators in each unit are totally disabled owing
to extensive tube failures and because of this TAPS has
been de-rated from 200 MWe to 160 MWe. It is
evident that TAPS-1 and 2 should have been shut down
long ago in the interest of public safety.

Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS-1 & 2)

RAPS-1 and 2 are the two oldest Pressurised Heavy Water
Reactor (PHWR) nuclear power units, built
with Canadian assistance. RAPS-1, which was originally
rated at 200 MWe, had to be de-rated to the
100 MWe level, after an end-shield showed cracks and
consequent leakages. In RAPS-1 and 2 and the
Madras Atomic Power Station-1 (MAPS-1), 3.5 per cent
nickel stainless steel was used to make these
shields, which led to radiation embrittlement and
cracking.

The nuclear fuel in the PHWRs is housed within a
pressure tube (P.T.) which passes through a calandria
tube (C.T.) with a gas-filled gap between them. In the
first seven Indian PHWRs, P.Ts were made of
zircalloy-2, which was later found to be prone to creep
deformation under irradiation. Canadian PHWRs
have all been fully changed over to P.Ts fabricated out
of a zirconium-niobium alloy. The reactors at
RAPS-1, MAPS-1 and 2, the Narora Atomic Power Station-1
and 2 (NAPS-1 and 2) and the
Kakrapar Atomic Power Station-1 (KAPS-1) will have to be
re-tubed en masse between six and eight
full-power years. Otherwise it could lead to a serious
LOCA, as happened in Canada in 1984. RAPS-2
has recently been retubed, but the degree of quality
control and reliability are questionable.

Another very serious safety deficiency in the four
reactors at RAPS and MAPS is the absence of an
adequate high-pressure emergency core cooling system
(ECCS), which is crucial for avoiding
core-meltdown in the case of a LOCA. In a LOCA that
occurs as a result of a medium-sized pipe break,
which is more likely, the coolant in the fuel channels
could vapourise and cause voids, leading to a partial
core meltdown. No PHWR anywhere in the world currently
operates with such an obsolete and unsafe
ECCS as the ones at RAPS and MAPS.
Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS-1
and 2)
In the early 1980s, the discovery of
some pieces of zircalloy in a moderator pump in MAPS Unit-1 was traced to
the problem of substantial cracking of the reactor inlet manifold. An
identical
problem surfaced in MAPS-2 almost during the same period.

Instead of fabricating the manifolds as an integral unit
as per Canadian advice, at MAPS the DAE
fabricated each manifold in three sections and then
joined them within the calandria. The poor quality
control in such work, done within a confined space, has
led to the cracking. The MAPS reactors were
de-rated from 235 MWe to 175 MWe because of this and
their continued operation in this mode is not
considered safe, even at this power level.

The P.T.-C.T. contact problem and the inadequate ECCS
system, as in RAPS, also exist in MAPS-1
and 2. Thus, the synergy of different kinds of serious
safety issues in MAPS-1 and 2 puts this station at a
higher risk than will be acceptable anywhere else in the
world. And Chennai city is within 30 kms of
MAPS.

Narora Atomic Power Station (NAPS-1 and 2)

One major modification at NAPS-1 and 2 was the inclusion
of a fourth level of safety protection through
the gravity addition of boron solution (GRAB) into the
reactor core, as a last-level protection in the event
of a prolonged station power blackout. Just that
eventuality occurred on March 31, 1993 in Narora
Unit-1 when a devastating fire brought the reactor core
very close to partial fuel meltdown. The timely use
of the GRAB system saved the day.

In 1985, an overheated cable joint at RAPS-2 caused a
fire, which spread through the cable trays and
disabled four out of eight PHT pumps. In 1991, a fire in
the KAPS-1 switchgear room led to a complete
loss of emergency diesel power and a partial loss of
D.C. power supply. Then came the NAPS-1 fire in
March 1993.The DAE does not seem to have learnt from its
experiences.

The 1993 fire was initiated by two steam turbine blades
which broke at their roots and caused the
turbine's destruction. Faults in the blade of the design
in similar turbines were detected by the turbine
designer, GEC of the United Kingdom, a few years prior
to the Narora fire. In 1989, GEC promptly
provided a revised blade design to the Indian
manufacturer and it, in turn, prepared detailed drawings for
fabricating and supplying new blades for NAPS, KAPS and
Kaiga. But the DAE did not take any action
on the warning from the GEC, until months after the
Narora fire.

Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS-1 and 2)
In June 1994, flood waters entered the condenser pit and the turbine
building basements in the KAPS reactors because sealing arrangements were
not provided to prevent water ingress through cable trenches and valve
pits.
Similar flooding had occurred twice at RAPS in 1976 and 1982, owing
to the very same construction errors as at KAPS.
The first-generation microprocessor-based indigenous control system
of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) has been introduced at KAPS.
There have been instances of dangerous and erratic
behaviour, such as a shutdown rod coming out when
signalled to go into the reactor. The new systems
introduced from BAPC are not tested thoroughly for their
reliability; no appropriate facility for such testing
exists with the DAE.

Kaiga Nuclear Power Project (Kaiga)

The Kaiga project was substantially delayed because the
pre-stressed concrete containment dome in
Unit-1 collapsed on May 13, 1994 during the final stages
of construction. The AERB Investigation
Committee's findings, which were later accepted in toto
by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),
showed that the failure occurred owing to design
deficiencies and the absence of quality control.

In the Kaiga-1 and 2 and RAPS-3 and 4 projects, the AERB
had directed that integrated ECCS testings
be carried out in each reactor before start-up, proof
and leakage tests be conducted on the reactor
containments, and a full-scope simulator installed for
operator training. None of these stipulations have
been met by the DAE.

Other DAE installations

Safety standards at the research reactors at BARC leave
a lot to be desired. The 100 MWth Dhruva
reactor and the 60 MWth CIRUS reactor are in BARC's
Trombay complex. The safety culture in BARC
is generally poor, even in comparison to the nuclear
power stations. There have been instances of a
reactor being started up with an operator inadvertently
locked inside a room below. There was also an
incident of operating the Dhruva reactor for almost one
month with an emergency coolant system valve
closed tight. The bursting of underground pipelines
carrying radioactive fluids within the BARC campus,
which has contaminated hundreds of tonnes of subsoil,
and leaky tanks holding lakhs of litres of highly
radioactive fluids not being replaced or repaired are
some of the other instances.

The situation in the DAE's fuel reprocessing and fuel
fabrication units is no different. High levels of
air-borne radioactive dust and minor explosions in
active chemical reactors are not rare. Workers at
uranium mines and the extraction plant in Jaduguda and
the Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad are not
adequately protected from radiation intake and external
exposure.

A PROBLEM with assessing safety is that all radiation
measurements and exposure evaluations are done
by health physics personnel employed by the DAE. The
AERB has no facilities or personnel to do this.
Even in the nuclear power stations, the DAE personnel
stationed there carry out the measurements and
the DAE then provides the data to the AERB. These DAE
physicists, however, receive a monthly bonus
from the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC), which is in
proportion to the quantum of energy produced.
If a reactor is shut down on the recommendation of a
station health physicist, he loses his bonus. The
reader can guess how honestly the data will get reported
to the AERB in this situation.

Safety issues in DAE installations

It is evident from the above that the safety status in
the DAE's facilities is far below international standards.
In July 1995 the AEC asked me, in my capacity as
Chairman of the AERB, to make a brief presentation
on the DAE's safety status. The discussion at this
meeting was an eye-opener to the non-DAE members
of the Commission. The Prime Minister's Secretary and
the Cabinet Secretary thereafter informally
directed that the AERB must prepare a more comprehensive
document on safety. After four months of
serious effort by the AERB staff and after referring to
more than 700 of the DAE's own documents, the
AERB prepared a report titled "Safety Issues in DAE
Installations". It covered about 130 safety issues, of
which 95 are of top priority. This document was
discussed and approved by the AERB at its 46th
meeting on November 7, 1995 and then submitted to the
AEC.

The document generated heated discussions at the next
meeting of the AEC held in February 1996, after
which the AEC gave the AERB the clearance to proceed as
it felt proper. This decision was taken at the
insistence of the Prime Minister's Office and the
Cabinet Secretary and the Finance Secretary, and was
not that of the DAE members in the AEC or the DAE
Secretary. To date, however, it is not known
whether any concrete action has been taken on this
report, even though the present Chairman of the
AERB, asserts to the press that "every issue is being
seriously looked into". Top-priority deficiencies still
exist, and the AERB is far from being proactive as it
used to be in the 1993-96 period.

Convention on nuclear safety

In June 1994, the IAEA organised a Diplomatic Conference
to adopt the final text of the Convention on
Nuclear Safety. I was the head of the Indian delegation
to this conference and was unanimously elected
Chairman of the 16-nation Drafting Committee for the
Convention. The Convention, based on the text
submitted by this committee, was adopted on June 17,
1994. India was one of the first countries to join
the Convention in September 1994.

Article 8-2 of this Convention reads: "Each Contracting
Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure an
effective separation between the functions of the
regulatory body and those of any other body or
organisation concerned with the promotion or utilisation
of nuclear energy."

With the present arrangement, under which the AERB
reports to the AEC and, in effect, to the Secretary,
DAE, it is evident that India is in deliberate violation
of this international Convention, to which it is a party.

Independence of the AERB

In India, the administration of the Atomic Energy Act,
1962, is entrusted to the DAE. The Secretary,
DAE, in turn constituted the AERB by an executive order
in 1983, because of which the AERB is a
subordinate entity of the DAE. The AERB is answerable to
the AEC, whose Chairman is also the
Secretary, DAE. Two other members of the AEC are the
Director, BARC, and the Managing Director,
NPC. Indeed, one cannot conceive of a more subservient
existence - the regulatory agency has to report
to those whom it is required to regulate and control in
the public interest.

This organisational anomaly, compounded by the AERB's
lack of technical staff and facilities, has crippled
the regulatory process in many ways. Today, 95 per cent
of the members of the AERB's evaluation
committees are scientists and engineers on the payrolls
of the DAE. This dependency is deliberately
exploited by the DAE management to influence, directly
and indirectly, the AERB's safety evaluations and
decisions. The interference has manifested itself in the
AERB toning down the seriousness of safety
concerns, agreeing to the postponement of essential
repairs to suit the DAE's time schedules, and allowing
continued operation of installations when public safety
considerations would warrant their immediate
shutdown and repair.

In the U.S. the nuclear regulatory system was
substantially strengthened only after experiencing the harsh
realities of the Three Mile Island accident.
Post-Chernobyl investigations found that the lack of
independence of the then existing Soviet regulatory body
was a major contributor to that accident. In
India, are we to wait for a major nuclear disaster to
occur before we wake up to the need for corrective
action?

Precedents for structuring and managing independent
regulatory bodies exist in India. The Chief
Commissioner for Railway Safety does not report to the
Railway Board, but to the Department of Civil
Aviation. The office of the Chief Inspector of Mine
Safety is part of the Department of Labour. During my
tenure as AERB Chairman I appointed an AERB committee to
prepare a document on strengthening and
streamlining the regulatory system. In 1996, this
committee submitted a 'Code for Governmental
Organisation for Regulation of Nuclear and Radiation
Facilities'. This draft code spelt out the desirable
role, responsibilities, structure and organisation for
the AERB. It called for a "functionally autonomous
regulatory body". No further action, however, has been
taken by the present AERB on this matter.

Also, during the first half of 1996 the then Cabinet
Secretary was worried about the AERB's lack of
independence. I understand that he was also very much
aware of a directive given on file by an earlier
Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, that the AERB should be
forthwith made an autonomous body, even if it
has to report directly to him. Rajiv Gandhi's concern
arose just after his review of the DAE's
post-Chernobyl report, which did not reflect an adequate
level of safety in the Indian installations. But,
unfortunately, the DAE successfully saw to it that the
late Prime Minister's directive was scuttled. In 1996,
the then Cabinet Secretary tried to revive the effort
and held a few meetings and framed his own draft
recommendations on providing autonomy to the AERB. The
fate of this draft is not known.

IT is evident that the nation has entrusted the entire
nuclear programme to a department of the
Government, which has over the years become more and
more powerful and has developed an increasing
callousness for public safety and welfare. The 1974
Pokhran tests, in which the DAE played a key role,
was the turning point for the increasing arrogance. With
both the civilian and weapons programmes under
the same individuals and facilities, and with the
Official Secrets Act providing a fig leaf to cover up its
inadequacies, the DAE finds it easy to maintain this
posture. It blocks any attempt to create an
independent nuclear regulatory system, with scant regard
to the people's right to information on matters
that are vital to their health and survival.

In conclusion, today, nuclear safety in India is at a
crossroads. In a democracy such as India's, the final
solution to this dilemma can only come from Parliament.
In countries such as the U.S., and Canada, the
nuclear regulatory body is created under a legislative
act. In India, the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, which
still recognises only peaceful uses of atomic energy, is
defunct after the 1998 nuclear weapon tests, which
have violated the Act's provisions. It would therefore
be timely to amend this Act in order to recognise
both peaceful and military uses of atomic energy, if
need be, and at the time enact a new Atomic Energy
(Safety and Regulation) Act, under which a properly
empowered AERB can be given a fresh lease of life.

In order that Parliament acts on these suggestions, it
is necessary that parliamentarians are sensitised to the
gravity of these issues. Both the public and the media
have a serious and responsible role to play in this.
We cannot let political compulsions and career ambitions
and the craving for personal glory of a few
people stand in the way of openness and corrective
actions. Above all, the nation's ambition to be a
nuclear weapon power, which has necessitated certain
false postures of capability, should not blind the
Government or Parliament from the ground realities of
nuclear safety. Future generations will not pardon
this government or Parliament if a nuclear disaster
occurs in India, despite the warnings.

VIVEK BENDRE
Dr. A. Gopalakrishnan was the Chairman
of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, Government of India, from 1993
to 1996. He holds M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in Nuclear Engineering from the
University of California, Berkeley, U.S.; his area of specialisation was
nuclear safety. He also held senior positions in the University of
California, Berkeley, the Argonne National Laboratory of the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission and the Electric Power Research Institute in Palo Alto.
Immediately after his term as AERB Chairman ended, Dr. Gopalakrishnan
publicly criticised India's nuclear establishment for its excessive secrecy
and lack of accountability (Frontline, August 23, 1996).

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