[sacw] A date with history; a path to walk (The Hindu)

[Harsh Kapoor]

From: THE HINDU, Friday, February 19, 1999 SECTION: Opinion

A date with history; a path to walk

By C. Raja Mohan

NEW DELHI, Feb. 18.
The Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, and his Pakistani
counterpart, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, have given themselves a date with history.
But are they ready to make something of it?
Mr. Vajpayee and Mr. Sharif could grab the moment and go down as the men
who began to change the tragic course of Indo- Pak relations. Or they could
turn out to be weaklings with a burning desire but no stomach for real
action.
Like two rash adolescents, Mr. Vajpayee and Mr. Sharif pulled their
nations across the red line on the nuclear front. But are they man enough
to face up to the consequences? Can they turn the post-nuclear adversity
into a political opportunity to bury the bitter legacy of the last five
decades?
There is no question that Messrs Vajpayee and Sharif have taken
considerable political risk in pushing forward the bus diplomacy. But are
they bold enough to carry the process towards the logical conclusion?
The two leaders are under tremendous pressure from their security
establishments to slow down, if not stop. Bureaucracies are paid to be
cautious, to maintain continuity and tread down the path well-worn.
History, however, judges political leaders for their ability to think big
and their readiness to walk down the road that is not often taken.
Mr. Vajpayee and Mr. Sharif are being pulled back from taking a new path
to peace in the subcontinent by political forces on the fringes of their
own extended political families.
The peace initiative of Mr. Sharif, who heads the Pakistan Muslim League,
is being strongly opposed by the Jamat-e- Islami. Mr. Vajpayee cannot for a
moment take his eyes off the crazies in the Sangh Parivar. We have one
luminary of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad advising the Prime Minister to travel
to Lahore in a tank, and throw nuclear bombs on the way for good measure.
If they are constrained by bureaucratic resistance and are afraid of
attacks from political extremists, Mr. Vajpayee and Mr. Sharif will achieve
very little at Lahore. But if they are willing to rise above these
pressures, they could unveil a new beginning in relations.
The problems that have bedevilled relations are indeed daunting. No one
really expects that the two will resolve these in a one- night stand at
Lahore. What then, would make the rendezvous a success?
There are two important elements that Mr. Vajpayee and Mr. Sharif could
nail down. One is to give a new political thrust to rethinking relations.
This involves unveiling a new vision for cooperation and initiating a
credible process of negotiation that chips away at the differences that
divide the two nations.
The other is to recognise the new nuclear imperative before the
subcontinent. Nuclear weapons have fundamentally altered the parameters of
national security thinking in the subcontinent. The fundamental strategic
objective of the two nations must now be the avoidance of any war between
themselves-either nuclear or conventional.
But it will be a while before this simple rule of the thumb sinks into the
consciousness of the national security decision-makers in New Delhi and
Islamabad. It took nearly 40 years for Washington and Moscow to discover
that a ``nuclear war cannot be won and ought not to be fought''. Must India
and Pakistan be as slow in figuring this out?
It should be easy for Mr. Vajpayee and Mr. Sharif to simply put out an
agreement that abjures the use of force in bilateral relations and commits
the two nations to avoid a nuclear war.
But some times the national security establishments find it hard to agree
on the obvious. There will be any number of sophisticates on both sides of
the border who will object to the iteration of the simple truth that war is
no longer a credible strategic option between India and Pakistan.
In Pakistan, there is the view that an agreement not to use nuclear
weapons will provide an advantage to India which has a larger conventional
military force. But the fact is that the nuclear arsenal of Pakistan, small
as it may be, has given Pakistan an unbeatable equaliser.
There may be some in India who may believe India should retain the option
to wage a conventional war against Pakistan. But the fact is that even if
India were foolish enough to invest in building a massive conventional
military advantage against Pakistan, such an edge is utterly unexploitable.
Can any Indian leader believe he can embark on a 1971-like expedition to
vivisect Pakistan and expect that Islamabad will not use its nuclear
weapons?
Even the International Court of Justice, in its ruling on the legality of
nuclear weapons, suggested that the use of nuclear weapons by a nation when
its very existence is threatened could well be legitimate. The rejection of
the use of nuclear weapons helps India and Pakistan to better manage the
future crises from escalating into nuclear wars.
It is entirely up to Mr. Vajpayee and Mr. Sharif to state the
obvious-India and Pakistan recognise that any war, either nuclear or
conventional, would be disastrous for the subcontinent.
If they can match this political declaration with a package of practical
measures to reduce the risk of a war, the two leaders will have
successfully begun to align their national security policies with the new
nuclear realities.

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