[sacw] S A A N Post | 9 Sept. 00
Harsh Kapoor
aiindex@mnet.fr
Fri, 01 Jan 1988 01:58:37 -0800
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South Asians Against Nukes Post
9 September 2000
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#1. The Uppsala Declaration on Nuclear Weapon-free Zones
#2. No Reason Still To Love The Bomb
#3. Let Them Eat Nukes. Indo-pak States
-----------------------------------------
#1.
NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES: CRUCIAL STEPS TOWARDS A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD
INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR, 1-4 SEPTEMBER, 2000, UPPSALA, SWEDEN
THE UPPSALA DECLARATION ON NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES=20=20=20=20
A decade after the end of the Cold War, the world faces a stark choice:
achieve the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, or face a second Nuclear
Age with new generations of even more horrifying nuclear and other
high-tech weapons.
We believe there is an urgent moral, political, legal and security
imperative to abolish these weapons, and build a strong momentum towards
complete global nuclear disarmament. This is a precondition for human and
environmental security.
Therefore, more than 50 scholars, peace activists, diplomats and experts
from six continents met on September 1 - 4, 2000, at Uppsala in Sweden. The
conference, convened by the Dag Hammarskj=F6ld Foundation, the Transnationa=
l
Institute, Peace Depot, Gensuikin (Japan Congress Against A- & H-Bombs) and
INESAP (International Network of Engineers & Scientists Against
Proliferation), discussed the feasibility of establishing Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) across the world.
The dramatic threat of a new Nuclear Age highlights the urgent need for
comprehensive nuclear disarmament and rapid destruction of the arsenals of
all nuclear weapons-states. It also calls for incremental measures towards
these goals. These include a nuclear test ban, a missile flight test ban,
separation of warheads from missiles, a ban on the production of fissile
materials used for making nuclear weapons and appropriate disposal or
safeguarding of the accumulated stockpiles of such material.
Crucial among these transitional measures are Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones.
These would ban the manufacture, deployment and transit of nuclear weapons
in specific regions, and demand of nuclear armed states that the zones not
be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. This would help make it
possible to permanently fold the nuclear umbrella, the so-called nuclear
protection that nuclear weapon states offer non-nuclear allies.
Such zones already exist in Latin America, the South Pacific, Africa, and
Southeast Asia. They have prevented nuclear proliferation in those areas. A
new zone is currently being negotiated in Central Asia. Several regions
continue to face severe nuclear dangers, a challenge exacerbated by
menacing attempts to build both National and Theatre Missile Defence
systems. These regions include Northeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East,
and Central Europe. The creation of NWFZs here would not only limit
proliferation, but support active nuclear disarmament with the dismantling
of overt and clandestine nuclear weapons and fissile stocks and rolling
back existing nuclear programmes. Such extension of NWFZs to the Northern
hemisphere will enhance collective security and strengthen efforts to
completely eliminate nuclear weapons.
An NWFZ treaty in Northeast Asia would effectively address security
concerns in Japan and the Korean peninsula. A South Asian NWFZ would
prevent India and Pakistan from making or deploying nuclear weapons in this
volatile region, where the danger of a nuclear exchange is today the
greatest anywhere in the world. In the Middle East, the
establishment of a zone free of Israel's nuclear weapons, and all other
weapons of mass destruction in the region, represents a key component of
regional security. In Central and Eastern Europe an NWFZ would defend the
post-Cold War peace gains now threatened by NATO expansion as well as
facilitate withdrawal of remaining tactical nuclear weapons.
There are no technological obstacles to effective verification of NWFZ
agreements. Establishing such zones requires political will, organisation
and mobilisation. We hereby commit ourselves to:
* Creating a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Network to coordinate efforts in
support of new and existing zones, including actively advocating the
creation of NWFZs in Central Asia, Northeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle
East and Central Europe.
* Public education on the horrors of nuclear weapons, the urgency of
nuclear disarmament and the value of NWFZs.
* Supporting the Latin American proposal to the United Nations General
Assembly for an international conference of all parties to the Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zones.
* Strengthening the existing zones and demanding strict adherence to the
treaty provisions by the nuclear weapon-states.
* Engaging policy-makers and parliamentarians worldwide in support of NWFZ=
s.
* Supporting single-country nuclear weapon-free zones.
* Supporting nuclear-free cities, provinces, and other areas governed by
local authorities.
* Opposing Theatre and National Missile Defence systems as an integral
part of our opposition to nuclear weapons.
* Working to defend nuclear whistle-blowers, such as Mordechai Vanunu, now
entering his 15th year of imprisonment for having revealed Israel's nuclear
arsenal; we demand his immediate release.
Peoples and governments everywhere, as well as the United Nations, have a
contribution to make to the creation and expansion of nuclear weapon-free
zones. We urge others to join us in mobilising energies and resources
towards achieving the noble goal of global nuclear disarmament.
* * *
Participants included:
Karamat Ali (Pakistan Peace Coalition, Pakistan)
Phyllis Bennis (Transnational Institute (TNI) and Institute for Policy
Studies (IPS), USA)
Praful Bidwai (Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament (MIND) and TNI,
India)
John Burroughs (Lawyers Committe on Nuclear Policy, USA)
Jackie Cabasso (Western State Legal Foundation, USA)
Cheong, Wooksik (Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea, South Korea)
Merav Datan (International Physiscians for Prevention of Nuclear War
(IPPNW) and Physiscians for Social Responsibility (PSR), USA)
Fiona Dove (TNI, Netherlands)
Fawzy Hussein Hammad (Atomic Energy Authority, Egypt)
Michael Hamel-Green (Victoria University, Australia)
Niclas H=E4llstr=F6m (Dag Hammarskj=F6ld Foundation, Sweden)
Masako Ikegami-Andersson (Stockholm University, Sweden)
Thomas B. Johansson (Pugwash, Sweden)
Rebecca Johnson (Acronym Institute, UK)
Harsh Kapoor (South Asians Against Nukes, France)
Akira Kawasaki (Peace Depot, Japan)
David Knight (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), UK)
Lee, Sam-sung (The Catholic University of Korea, South Korea)
Issam Makhoul (Member of Knesset, Israel)
Ron McCoy (IPPNW, Malaysia)
Bahig Nassar (Arab NGO Co-ordinating Committee, Egypt)
Otfried Nassauer (Berlin Information-Centre for Transatlantic Security
(BITS), Germany)
Abdul Nayyar (Pakistan Peace Coalition, Pakistan)
Agneta Norberg (Swedish Peace Council, Sweden)
Olle Nordberg (Dag Hammarskj=F6ld Foundation, Sweden)
Sara Olsson (Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society, Sweden)
Sandeep Pandey (National Alliance of People's Movements (NAPM), India)
Charles Parker (Uppsala University, Sweden)
Scott Parrish (USA)
Jan Prawitz (Swedish Institute for International Affairs, Sweden)
Curt Riberdahl (Swedish Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, Sweden)
Enrique Roman-Moray (The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America and the Carribean (OPANAL), Mexico)
Virginia Rosa (USA)
Satya Sivaraman (Journalist and environmental activist, Thailand)
Alice Slater (Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (GRACE), US=
A)
Gideon Spiro (Israel Committee for Mordechai Vanunu and for a Middle East
Free of Atomic, Biological and Chemical Weaponry, Israel
Masa Takubo (Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs (Gensuikin), Japan)
Hiro Umebayashi (Peace Depot and Pacific Campaign for Disarmament and
Security (PCDS), Japan)
Lars van Dassen (Uppsala University, Sweden)
Achin Vanaik (MIND and TNI, India)
Leonore Wide (Swedish Physicians Against Nuclear Arms, Sweden)
Christer =C5kesson (Church of Sweden Aid)
________
#2>
The Telegraph
8 September 2000
Op-Ed.
FIFTH COLUMN/ NO REASON STILL TO LOVE THE BOMB=20=20=20=20
=20=20
BY ARVIND KALA=20
=20=20=20=20
If nuclear weapons are so vital for a nation=92s defence, why did South
Africa dismantle its own nuclear arsenal 10 years ago? India=92s nuclear
hawks don=92t mention South Africa because it weakens their position on
nuclear bombs. But Atal Behari Vajpayee on the eve of his United States
trip must ponder over why India embraces nuclear bombs when 182 of the
world=92s 185-odd nations have rejected them by signing the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty. Since India=92s nuclear position has been
consistently aberrant, we can learn a lot from why South Africa built up a
nuclear arsenal and why it chose to dismantle it.=20
India saw nuclear bombs not in India-Pakistan or even India-China terms but
as a race issue. It resented nuclear bombs being a near-white monopoly of
the US, Britain, France and Russia and wanted its own bomb to challenge thi=
s.=20
Pretoria=92s decision to develop bombs in the late Seventies flowed from
immediate self-interest based on three reasons. One, South Africa was an
international pariah thanks to its apartheid regime. Two, those were Cold
War days and South Africa=92s immediate neighbour, Angola, contained an
estimated 50,000 Soviet-armed Cuban troops out to spread communism and to
destabilize South Africa. And three, neighbouring Zimbabwe had got black
majority rule.=20
Energy redirected
Feeling encircled, South Africa used its uranium reserves to build a small
nuclear arsenal consisting of six nuclear bombs by 1970. India=92s nuclear
policy was confused. It declared its threshold nuclear power status by its
1974 Pokhran explosion, but qualified that by saying that though it
wouldn=92t develop a nuclear arsenal, it reserved the right to do so. South
Africa adopted a policy of strategic ambiguity. It never confirmed or
denied that it was a nuclear power for the 10 years it possessed bombs. But
unlike India, for whom reverting to non-nuclear power status is
unthinkable, South Africa dismantled its bombs in the 1990-91 period, the
first country in history to do so.=20
South Africa=92s decision stemmed from the fact that with the end of the Co=
ld
War, its nuclear deterrent had become superfluous. So it dismantled its six
nuclear bombs and ensured that highly-enriched uranium from each bomb was
returned to the atomic energy commission by early July 1991. South Africa
joined the NPT on July 10, 1991, concluded a safeguards agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Administration, and give it access to all the
facilities previously used in the nuclear programme.=20
India=92s nuclear hawks would attribute Pretoria=92s nuclear policy reversa=
l to
the fact that its white rulers didn=92t want their bombs to pass to a
successor black government. But nothing prevented Nelson Mandela from going
back on South Africa=92s reversed nuclear policy. No government can be boun=
d
by an earlier regime=92s decisions.=20
Pride misdirected
India=92s nuclear hawks enact a lie of omission when they evade talking abo=
ut
Pretoria=92s nuclear rollback. The truth is that not just South Africa,
several other nations have also embarked upon nuclear weapons programmes
that they have given up. During the Eighties, Argentina and Brazil built
uranium enrichment facilities and acquired the potential to manufacture
nuclear arms. But in December 1990, they agreed to place all their nuclear
facilities under bilateral inspection. It was something like India and
Pakistan visiting each other=92s nuclear facilities.=20
India goes against the world tide with its peculiar belligerence on nuclear
weapons. It turned down an Islamabad proposal that the two nations sign a
pact declaring South Asia as a nuclear weapons free zone. Latin American
countries are signatories to a treaty which prohibits the testing, use,
manufacture, acquisition or storage of nuclear weapons in Latin America.
Similarly, the island nations of the south Pacific have signed a treaty
which forbids nuclear weapons in the area.=20
Unlike India, these nations don=92t feel their pride is hurt when they
renounce nuclear weapons. But we are dead against the NPT and the
comprehensive test ban treaty. If India=92s objections to the NPT are so
sound, why has the NPT been the most widely accepted pact worldwide? Are
the 182 signatories to the NPT stupid and are we the sole repositories of
the world=92s wisdom?=20=20=20=20=20=20=20
_____
#3.
From: Isa Daudpota <...>
Date: Thursday, August 31, 2000 3:44 PM
Subject: LET THEM EAT NUKES. INDO-PAK STATS. summary received by email.
> Summary of an article by Muhammad Ahmedullah, "LET"EM EAT NUKES - Two
years
>after their nuclear
>tests, India and Pakistan are less secure, economically weaker, and plague=
d
>with increasing poverty," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, pages 52-57,
>September/October 2000.
>
><At this moment the article is not available on the Bulletin's web site.
>Isa
>
> July 1998 - India & Pakistan explode their nukes
>
> Pakistan: Population 130 million ---- 160 million in 2005 ---- double by
>2025
> Human Development Index: 138
> Seeking IMF release of $250 million from $1.6 billion IMF Credit
>negotiated in 1997.
> IMF regards Pakistan as basket case: As IMF has bailed out Pak. 17 times,
>granting emergency
> loans to cover its external loan repayment commitments.
> Also sought to reschedule $600 million Eurobond loan & an $877 million
>debt to foreign banks.
> 1983-93: $15 billion spent on weapons (Source: U. N. Arms Register)
> 1998-99: $3.5 billion additional on defense - 15% of National Budget.
> Total Foreign Debt: $37 billion ~ more than 50% of GDP
> Monthly trade deficit: $150 million
> Foreign Exchange Reserves: ~ $1.3 billion
> Major Source: Expatriates working in Gulf Region.
> Freeze of Foreign Exchange -- Rs. Lost 25% of its value -- $1 =3D Rs. 54.
>
> Defense: Since 1990, sanctions on Military assistance/sales imposed due
>to Pressler Amendment.
> Thus from 1995-98 Pakistan bought $2 billion worth of used submarines,
>ships, missile armed
> helicopters and surveillance aircraft from France (four Atlantique
>Surveillance planes for
> $60.00 - one shot down by India).
> Big customer of China & North Korea for armaments (missiles, etc.) Paid
>cash for help.
> Most likely, single war-head design acquired from China (25 kiloton) (4th
>test)
> 1990 - it was known that Pakistan had 10 such war-heads.
> Estimated cost of Pakistan's nuclear program: $5 billion.
> 1998 Chhagai explosions deprived Pakistan from conventional weapons from
>U.S. as well.
> Very little local defense industry: Pakistan depends on foreign companies
>for minor spare parts.
> Army: Best paid in South Asia ~ avg. salary of $200/month is those in
>India.
> During peacetime growth rate was ~6.5%
>
>
> INDIA:
> Population: 1 billion plus (~400 million poor) + 30 persons/minute birth
>rise or 15 million/year.
> 400 million people earn less than $1$ a day in India.
> Human Development Index: 139
> Unemployed: 100 million
> Pinches budget for education , birth control and basic health care to fee=
d
> Military Industrial Complex.
> Major problem is to get money for electricity, telecommunications, water,
>and roads
> Despite Clinton's visit in March 2000, foreign investment in 1999-2000 wa=
s
>$8.3 billion versus
> $9.6 billion in 1997-98, except increase in exports of software (that too
>created on
> contract to foreign firms.)
> Defense: Due to friendship with Russia, India has amassed more weapons fo=
r
>less money
> From 1998 to 1999: $10 billion on best weapons in Asia, and lesser amount
>in
> previous years - qualitatively superior to China.
> 1997 - $1.8 billion for 30 Sukhoi fighter planes from Russia ~ at par wit=
h
>F-15.
> During 1999 Kargil war India used laser-guided bombs launched from
> Mirage 2000 ~ nearly at par with NATO.
> Rusian surveillance planes + AWACS type from Israel
> (now Russian AWACS as of 3/2000)
> Russia - sold more than $3 billion military gear during last three years.
> Budget: 8-10 % of National Budget, increased to 25% in 2000.
> Perceived need to match China not Pakistan (as Indians say)
> After the 1998 Nuke test, cost of deterrent is estimated at $10-25 billio=
n
>over
> the next 10 years. For 150 warheads ~ $70 billion. (China has over 300)
> During peace time the growth rate was 7%, whereas avg. growth rate during
> 1998-99 & 1999-2000 was 5.5 % as compared to expected value of 6.5%
>
> World Bank (June, 1999 report) estimates that by 2025, South Asia will
>have the greatest number of people living in poverty anywhere in the world=
.
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